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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 Women are at greater risk than men for experiencing eating disorders, depression, and 
sexual dysfunction (American Psychological Association, 2007; Fredrickson & Roberts, 
1997). Objectification theory (Fredrickson & Roberts, 1997) was proposed to explain one 
process through which sexist social experiences affect women’s mental health outcomes. 
Objectification theory posits that women are frequently treated as objects in Western society, 
and that they internalize this treatment such that they view themselves as objects. This self-
objectification affects their experience of themselves in the world, heightening body-related 
shame and appearance- and safety-related anxiety. It also makes it more difficult for women 
to feel connected with their bodies and to experience flow, a pleasant sensation of feeling 
absorbed in the present moment. Flow has a rich body of research dating back to at least 
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1975, when Csikszentmihalyi wrote about flow as experienced by chess players, dancers, 
rock climbers, and surgeons. Historically, however, objectification theory researchers have 
used measures of flow not grounded in Csikszentmihalyi’s multi-dimensional 
conceptualization. One purpose of the present study was to investigate the aspects of flow 
most relevant to objectification theory (i.e., concentration, control, and loss of self-
consciousness) using an appropriate, validated measure. 
 A second purpose of the present study was to explore mindfulness and self-
compassion as potential moderators within the objectification theory framework. These 
strength-based practices have received recent attention for treatment of anxiety, depression, 
and other mental health concerns. We studied mindfulness and self-compassion at the trait 
level as a first step in exploring how these cultivatable strengths may buffer against the 
deleterious effects of objectification. 
 The present study used a correlational design to explore relationships among 
objectification theory variables and hypothesized strength-based moderators. We sampled 
data obtained from 500 women recruited through three different methods who completed an 
online survey consisting of 11 different measures. Data were analyzed using structural 
equation modeling. Hypothesized moderated relationships were generally not supported, 
although most correlations were in the expected directions. Overall, results underscored the 
need to a) study flow within the objectification theory framework using a multi-dimensional 
conceptualization and b) develop strength-based interventions for treating women’s mental 
health concerns.   
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 In Guidelines for Psychological Practice with Girls and Women, the American 
Psychological Association (APA; 2007) highlighted the importance of establishing treatment 
interventions specifically tailored to the unique mental health challenges faced by girls and 
women in the 21st century. The United States Department of Health and Human Services 
(USDHHS), Office on Women’s Health (2009) echoed this concern in Action Steps for 
Improving Women’s Mental Health. Both publications emphasized the striking gender 
disparities in a variety of mental health concerns: 
• Women are approximately two times more likely than men to be depressed, and girls 
are seven times more likely than boys to experience depression (APA, 2007). 
• Girls and women are about nine times more likely than boys and men to experience 
eating disorders (APA, 2007). 
• Women are three times more likely than men to engage in nonlethal self-harming 
behavior (USDHHS, 2009). 
• Women are two to three times more likely than men to experience anxiety disorders, 
including post-traumatic stress disorder, panic disorders, phobias, and obsessive 
compulsive disorders (USDHHS, 2009). 
The causes of these disparities are complex and wide-ranging, encompassing diverse 
economic, biological, developmental, psychological, and sociocultural influences, including 
a pervasive culture of rape, abuse, and sexism within the United States (APA, 2007; 
USDHHS, 2009). In addition, many women experience the interaction of gendered 
discrimination with other types of discrimination based on their race, ethnicity, culture, 
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sexual orientation, gender identity, ability status, or other marginalized identities (APA, 
2007). 
 Feminist scholars have proposed a variety of models to explain how women’s 
experiences of gendered discrimination affect their mental health. Some models focus on 
specific diagnoses, including models of somatoform and pain disorders, premenstrual 
syndrome, postpartum depression, addiction, personality disorders, schizophrenia, and 
depression (Ballou & Brown, 2002). Other models attempt to contextualize the effects of 
specific types of gendered discrimination on a variety of outcomes. One such model of 
women’s experiences that has received considerable attention within the past decade and a 
half is objectification theory.  
Objectification Theory 
 Objectification theory was proposed by Fredrickson and Roberts in 1997 to explain 
how pervasive sexual objectification in mainstream United States culture affects women’s 
psychological functioning. Sexual objectification occurs when a woman’s body is viewed as 
separate from her person—as an object to be used or consumed by others (Kaschak, 1992). 
Sexual objectification takes a myriad of forms, including being “checked out” (or “ogled,” or 
“leered at”) by men and other women; seeing other women “checked out” by men in-person 
or in media; and visual media that highlights female bodies and body parts (Fredrickson & 
Roberts, 1997). Other socialization experiences interact with sexual objectification to 
compound its effects, including gender or cultural identity conflict and experiences of 
heterosexism, racism, and other types of discrimination (Moradi, 2010). According to 
objectification theory, women internalize these objectifying experiences through the process 
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of self-objectification: in other words, they adopt the idea that their bodies are objects for use 
by others rather than a part of themselves (Fredrickson & Roberts, 1997).  
Moradi (2010) offered a three step explanation of the self-objectification process. 
First, as a result of externally objectifying experiences, women start to believe that the 
young, slim, White female ideal propagated by Western media is the standard against which 
they should measure themselves. This internalization of dominant cultural standards of 
attractiveness causes women to devote considerable portions of their conscious attention to 
concerns about their appearance (body surveillance), interrupting their thoughts and actions 
and resulting in a variety of negative psychological consequences. Body surveillance 
increases body shame and appearance anxiety, because women’s self-assessments of their 
bodies inevitably come up short compared to the idealized female bodies promoted in 
Western media. Body surveillance also decreases women’s ability to experience flow, the 
feeling of being “in the zone” (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990), by forcing women to divide their 
attention between attending to the task at hand and monitoring their appearance. Similarly, 
when women view their bodies from an observer’s perspective, their internal bodily 
awareness, or their ability to accurately detect internal physiological sensations, such as 
stomach contractions and physiological sexual arousal (Moradi & Huang, 2008), is 
diminished. Finally, at a broader level, the idea that women’s bodies are objects for others’ 
consumption contributes to a culture of sexual harassment and violence, increasing women’s 
anxiety about their physical safety. These five consequences for women’s subjective 
experiences—greater body shame, greater appearance anxiety, reduced flow experiences, 
diminished internal awareness, and greater physical safety anxiety—result in greater rates of 
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eating disorders, depression, and sexual dysfunction (Fredrickson & Roberts, 1997; Moradi 
& Huang, 2008; Szymanski, Moffitt, & Carr, 2011; see Figure 1). 
 The canon of research into Fredrickson and Roberts’s (1997) model of objectification 
shows strong support for the links from sexual objectification experiences to internalization 
of dominant cultural standards of attractiveness and body surveillance, and from these 
constructs to disordered eating through body shame and appearance anxiety (Szymanski, 
Moffitt, & Carr, 2011). However, there has been relatively less attention paid to the other 
pathways, including the mediating roles of physical safety anxiety, reduced flow experiences, 
and lower internal bodily awareness (Moradi & Huang, 2008; Szymanski, Moffitt, & 
Carr2011). The extant studies examining these pathways have produced mixed support for 
mediation and are limited by methodological concerns, including primarily White samples, 
no tests for significance of mediation, and inconsistency or inaccuracy of measurement 
(Moradi & Huang, 2008). In their review of a decade of objectification theory studies, 
Moradi and Huang (2008) called for more studies focusing on the intermediary roles of 
physical safety anxiety, flow, and internal body awareness in order to begin developing 
prevention and intervention strategies for the full spectrum of objectification theory concerns. 
Flow 
 The role of flow in objectification theory is especially intriguing, because on the 
surface, it seems to be less related to body concerns than the other mediators proposed by 
Fredrickson and Roberts (1997). Csikszentmihalyi (1990) coined the term flow to refer to a 
highly enjoyable state of peak performance that occurs when one is completely immersed in 
an activity to the point that the activity itself becomes its own reward; it is similar to feeling 
“in the zone” or “on fire.” Increased experiences of flow have been shown to produce a 
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Figure 1. Objectification theory framework (Moradi & Huang, 2008; Moradi, 2010).
 
 variety of positive outcomes, including greater positive emotions, intrinsic motivation, and 
satisfaction (Csikszentmihalyi & Csikszentmihalyi, 1992).  
Csikszentmihalyi (1990) proposed that flow consists of nine distinct but related 
dimensions: merging of action and awareness, clear goals, unambiguous feedback, high 
concentration, sense of control, loss of self-consciousness, transformation of time, an 
autotelic experience (i.e., a feeling of intrinsic reward), and a balance of challenge and skill. 
Within the objectification theory literature, however, flow has most commonly been treated 
as a unidimensional construct, rather than as nine distinct but related factors (e.g., Szymanski 
& Henning, 2007; Tiggemann & Kuring, 2004; Tiggemann & Slater, 2001; Tiggemann & 
Williams, 2012), or sometimes measured by proxy using task performance (e.g., Hebl, King, 
& Lin, 2004; Fredrickson, Roberts, Noll, Quinn, & Twenge, 1998; Fredrickson & Harrison, 
2005; Quinn, Kallen, Twenge, & Fredrickson, 2006). In reviews of objectification theory 
research, Moradi and Huang (2008) and Szymanski, Moffitt, and Carr (2011) suggested that 
future research on the mediating role of flow use a multidimensional approach and focus on 
the distinct roles of the various dimensions of flow. 
Conceptualizing flow as nine distinct dimensions (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990), rather 
than as a one-dimensional construct, could help elucidate the role of flow in the 
objectification theory model. In particular, it seems that three dimensions of flow—
concentration, loss of self-consciousness, and sense of control—may be most relevant to the 
study of self-objectification. A woman’s immersion in an activity may be interrupted when 
someone calls attention to her body or appearance, or when she feels threatened that someone 
might; it takes her out of the moment, out of “the zone.” This interruption may impede her 
ability to experience the concentration dimension of flow. In addition, once a woman has 
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 ingrained the habit of viewing her body as an object to be used or evaluated by others (i.e., 
self-objectification), she must divide her attention between the task at hand and monitoring 
her appearance (i.e., body surveillance), thereby becoming more self-conscious. She may 
become overly concerned with how she appears to others while performing a task, and 
experiencing the loss of self-consciousness dimension of flow will be difficult. Finally, 
external experiences of objectification usurp a woman’s feeling of control over her own 
body; internalization of this lack of control may affect her ability to experience the sense of 
control dimension of flow. 
Strengths-Based Moderators 
In addition to clarifying the mediating role of flow, Szymanski, Moffitt, and 
Carr(2011) also called for research to identify constructs that might moderate the 
relationships among self-objectification, consequences for subjective experience, and 
psychological outcomes. Understanding the traits, attitudes, and behaviors that can buffer 
against the deleterious effects of objectification will be vital for developing preventative and 
remedial interventions. Some research has emerged on potential moderators of the 
objectification-mental health link. Watson, Ancis, White, and Nazari (2013) found that an 
internalized multiculturally inclusive identity moderated the relationship between sexually 
objectifying experiences and internalization of dominant cultural standards of beauty for 
African American women, such that the link between sexual objectification experiences and 
internalization of dominant cultural standards of beauty was not significant for women with 
high levels of internalized multiculturally inclusive identity. Szymanski and Feltman (2014) 
found that resilience moderated the relationships between sexually objectifying experiences 
and both internalization of sexual oppression and psychological distress, such that both of 
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 these links were not significant for women with high levels of resilience. These two studies 
offer hope that women can develop traits or behaviors to buffer against the effects of 
objectification; however, there is room for additional research on additional buffers that may 
be more applicable for all women or more easily developed. 
 Mindfulness. The structure of objectification theory, and specifically the relationship 
between self-objectification and negative psychological consequences as proposed by 
Fredrickson and Roberts (1997), offers a fertile starting point for thinking about potential 
buffers. Self-objectification often manifests as body surveillance. Body surveillance steals 
cognitive resources away from focusing on the task at hand (resulting in a diminished ability 
to experience flow) and internal bodily states (resulting in decreased internal awareness; 
Fredrickson & Roberts, 1997). It is possible that the deleterious effect of self-objectification 
on flow and internal bodily awareness could be ameliorated by an increased focus on the 
present moment.  
 Dispositional mindfulness refers to an individual’s tendency to be mindful, or to focus 
on the present moment in a non-judgmental way (Dijkstra & Barelds, 2011). Two recent 
studies offer a promising first look at the relationship between mindfulness and body 
concerns. Dijkstra and Barelds (2011) explored a model of dispositional mindfulness, body 
comparison, and body satisfaction. Using data from a sample of women in the Netherlands, 
they found that dispositional mindfulness partially mediated the inverse relationship between 
body comparison and body satisfaction, such that greater mindfulness was associated with 
less body comparison and greater body satisfaction. Similarly, Dekeyser, Raes, Leijseen, 
Leysen, and Dewulf (2008) found that body satisfaction was positively correlated with four 
mindfulness skills (i.e., mindful observation, action, acceptance, and description) among a 
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 sample of male and female adults in Belgium and the Netherlands. Mindfulness has also been 
shown to correlate positively with flow (e.g., Aherne, Moran, & Lonsdale, 2011; Kee & 
Wang, 2008) and internal bodily awareness (e.g., Brotto, Seal, & Rellini, 2012), and 
negatively with anxiety (e.g., Bergen-Cico & Cheon, 2013; Desrosiers, Klemanski, & Nolen-
Hoeksema, 2013) and depression (e.g., Desrosiers et al., 2013). 
 These studies offer a promising glimpse into possible intervention strategies for self-
objectification. Increasing mindfulness may help women decrease the proportion of cognitive 
resources devoted to body surveillance. Yoga, a meditative practice that involves body 
movement, breath control, and intentional thought, has been shown to increase mindfulness 
(e.g., Brisbon & Lowery, 2009) and has been tested as an intervention for body image 
concerns in several studies. Daubenmier (2005) found that women who practiced yoga 
reported greater awareness and responsiveness to bodily sensations, lower self-
objectification, greater body satisfaction, and fewer disordered eating attitudes than women 
involved in aerobic exercise or no exercise. Similarly, Impett, Daubenmier, and Hirschman 
(2006) showed that participating in a two-month yoga immersion program decreased self-
objectification for women and increased body awareness, positive affect, and life satisfaction 
for women and men. Despite these initial promising findings, little is known about how 
mindfulness works within the objectification theory framework proposed by Fredrickson and 
Roberts (1997), or how mindfulness-enhancing interventions other than yoga may help 
alleviate the consequences of sexual objectification.  
 Self-compassion. The potential ameliorating power of additional cultivatable 
strengths is also worth investigating. Self-compassion is one such strength that has received 
considerable attention in the positive psychology literature (e.g., Neff, 2009). Self-
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 compassion has been defined as “being touched by and open to one’s own suffering, not 
avoiding or disconnecting from it, generating the desire to alleviate one’s suffering and to 
heal oneself with kindness” (Neff, 2003b, p. 87). Self-compassion has been touted as an 
alternative to self-esteem for conceptualizing individuals’ healthy attitudes towards 
themselves. Unlike self-esteem, self-compassion does not involve evaluation of self or others 
(Neff, 2003b). Instead, like mindfulness, self-compassion involves intentional non-judgment.  
 Whereas increasing mindfulness may moderate the relationships between body 
surveillance and flow and internal bodily awareness, self-compassion might moderate the 
relationships between body surveillance and body shame and appearance anxiety. When 
women critique their bodies, they almost inevitably fail to measure up to the young, slim, 
White female ideal propagated in Western culture. Self-compassion could help ameliorate 
this self-criticism. Similarly, self-compassion could curb the influence of body surveillance 
on appearance anxiety by decreasing self-judgment. 
 Early investigations into the relationships between self-compassion and several 
objectification-related constructs have yielded promising results. Wasylkiw, MacKinnon, and 
MacLellan (2012) found that high self-compassion predicted fewer body concerns and less 
eating guilt in a sample of undergraduate women in the Netherlands. Furthermore, self-
compassion was found to partially mediate the positive relationship between body 
preoccupation and depression in their sample, such that lower body preoccupation was 
associated with greater self-compassion, which in turn was associated with fewer depressive 
symptoms. Albertson, Neff, and Dill-Shackleford (2014) found that women who participated 
in a three-week self-compassion meditation program experienced greater reductions in body 
dissatisfaction, body shame, and contingent self-worth based on appearance, as well as 
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 greater increases in self-compassion and body appreciation, compared to control group 
participants. As with mindfulness, however, researchers have yet to incorporate self-
compassion into the full framework of objectification theory. Also, following the trend in the 
larger body of objectification theory research, there has been much less attention paid to the 
role of self-compassion in anxiety, flow experiences, internal bodily awareness, and sexual 
dysfunction. 
Study Importance 
 Historically, in the United States, women are much more likely than men to 
experience depression, anxiety, and eating disorders (APA, 2007; United States Department 
of Health and Human Services, 2009). Objectification theory (Fredrickson & Roberts, 1997) 
posits that many women experience these psychological disturbances as a result of a 
pervasive culture of sexual objectification. Some pathways in the objectification theory 
model have received strong support, but other pathways have received relatively little 
attention from researchers, and what findings do exist have been mixed (Moradi & Huang, 
2008). In particular, the mediating role of flow deserves further investigation with more 
rigorous methodology. Furthermore, a better understanding of women’s cultivatable 
strengths that moderate the relationship between self-objectification and mental health risks 
is overdue, in order to create strengths-based interventions that focus on women’s whole 
selves. The present study is an early step in this process. 
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 CHAPTER 2 
BACKGROUND AND REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 The purpose of this study was to explore the mediating role of flow and the potential 
moderating roles of mindfulness and self-compassion in the objectification theory 
framework. The scientific context of this study encompasses three broad areas of theory and 
research. The first area is an overview of the model of objectification theory, including the 
original theory proposed by Fredrickson and Roberts (1997), seminal research using 
Fredrickson and Roberts’s (1997) model, and contemporary trends in objectification theory 
research and conceptualization. The second area is an in-depth exploration of the concept of 
flow through the lenses of flow theory and objectification theory, as well as an examination 
of incongruences between these conceptualizations. The final area is comprised of theoretical 
and empirical underpinnings of mindfulness and self-compassion. 
Objectification Theory 
 Fredrickson and Roberts (1997) proposed objectification theory to explain the 
sociocultural context in which girls and women experience their own bodies, as well as the 
mental health risks and psychological outcomes of constructing their bodies in a sexually 
objectifying context. Objectification theory operates from a feminist constructivist 
epistemology, highlighting the place of the female body within a social and cultural context. 
Fredrickson and Roberts posited that the sociocultural context throughout much of the world, 
and specifically the United States and Europe, is rife with sexual objectification, and that this 
pervasive objectification puts women at increased risks for certain psychological problems 
that disproportionately affect women compared to men.  
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  Fredrickson and Roberts (1997) proposed four elements of objectification theory: 
external sexual objectification experiences, self-objectification, consequences for subjective 
experience, and mental health risks. Although these elements are usually discussed and 
depicted sequentially (see Figure 1), it is important to note that they occur simultaneously; 
women experience sexual and self-objectification constantly, because it is ingrained in the 
cultural context. 
 External sexual objectification. Fredrickson and Roberts (1997) defined sexual 
objectification as “the experience of being treated as a body (or collection of body parts) 
valued for its use to (or consumption by) others” (p. 174, italics in original). Although sexual 
objectification can occur between any two or more people, regardless of gender, the sexual 
objectification of women by men is especially problematic due to (a) its cultural 
pervasiveness, especially in the media, and (b) the power differential between men and 
women in Western society, which includes a history of legislating the oppression of women 
(Benokraitis & Feagin, 1995). 
 Sexual objectification takes many forms, ranging from subtle sexual evaluation to 
sexual violence (Fredrickson & Roberts, 1997). Kaschak (1992) proposed that the most 
ubiquitous form of sexual objectification is the male gaze, or visual inspection of the female 
body by men. Women encounter the objectifying male gaze in three ways (Fredrickson & 
Roberts, 1997). First, women experience it personally in social encounters when they’re 
“ogled” or “leered at” by men. Second, women see it in media, such as television, movies, 
magazines, and music, in which men objectify women. Third, women experience the 
objectifying gaze through media that spotlights bodies and body parts, forcing the viewer into 
the position of the gazer. Kaschak (1992) acknowledged that not all men objectify women, 
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 but explained that the potential for sexual objectification is inherent in all instances of male 
sexualized gazing because it is not under women’s control. In other words, when the male 
gaze occurs in a sexually objectifying context, it is experienced as sexually objectifying 
regardless of the man’s conscious intentions.   
Recent research into objectification theory (e.g., Moradi, 2010; Moradi & Huang, 
2008; Szymanski, Moffitt, & Carr, 2011) has expanded the conceptualization of external 
sexual objectification beyond the male gaze to include related behaviors by men, appearance 
pressures propagated by the media, sexual violence and harassment, and gender or cultural 
identity conflict and marginalization. The implicated behaviors by men look most similar to 
Fredrickson and Roberts’s (1997) original conceptualization of external sexual 
objectification; they include sexist comments, sexual remarks, and sexist actions that 
prioritize women’s bodies or bodily functions over other aspects of their whole selves 
(Szymanski, Moffitt, & Carr, 2011). These behaviors may take the form of appearance 
evaluations, cat calls, or inappropriate sexual comments (Moradi & Huang, 2008). 
Another type of external objectification proposed by Szymanski, Moffitt, and 
Carr(2011) includes the narrow and unattainable standards of beauty propagated by Western 
media that covertly or overtly tell women that they need to fit certain physical molds (i.e., 
White, thin, and young) in order to be happy and successful. Moradi and Huang (2008) 
specifically identified thinness-related pressures and harassment as a component of external 
sexual objectification that has a powerful influence on women’s relationships with their 
bodies. These messages are more pronounced in certain situations, environments, and 
subcultures in which the objectification of women is encouraged, such as beauty pageants, 
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 modeling, cheerleading, pornography, and certain work and sporting environments (Moradi 
& Huang, 2008; Szymanski, Moffitt, & Carr, 2011).  
Sexual victimization is an extreme type of sexual objectification that nevertheless 
directly or indirectly affects many women. Nearly 1 in 5 (18.3%) women in the United States 
have been victims of rape, and more than half of all college women have experienced some 
sort of sexual victimization (e.g., rape, sexual assault, sexual harassment; Fisher, Cullen, & 
Turner, 2000; National Center for Injury Prevention and Control & Division of Violence 
Prevention, 2012). These incredibly violating experiences are compounded by a culture 
steeped in rape myth endorsement. Rape myths place responsibility for sexual violence 
partially or entirely upon victims, such as suggesting that women “ask for it” by wearing 
“provocative” clothing (Lonsway & Fitzgerald, 1994). Sexual objectification and rape myths 
reciprocally reinforce each other, resulting in a culture that both mandates and punishes 
women for conforming to conventional standards of beauty. 
Szymanski, Moffitt, and Carr (2011) also drew attention to the special types of sexual 
objectification experienced by certain groups of women. In the media, sexually objectifying 
depictions of women of color, lesbian and bisexual women, and low income women are often 
infused with stereotypes (e.g., African American women as objects or sexual aggressors; 
lesbian and bisexual women as components of male sexual fantasies; low income women as 
sexually promiscuous and deserving of sexual violence; Szymanski, Moffitt, & Carr, 2011). 
The intersection of gender and other stigmatized identities compounds the experiences of 
objectification for ethnic and sexual minority women, and related experiences of oppression 
(e.g., racism, heterosexism) also contribute to sexual objectification in unique ways (Moradi 
& Huang, 2008; Szymanski, Moffitt, & Carr, 2011). 
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 Moradi (2008) proposed an amended objectification theory model to encompass 
additions to Fredrickson and Roberts’s (1997) original objectification theory, including 
modifications to the contextual piece. She proposed including sexually objectifying 
experiences under the heading “socialization experiences,” alongside gender or cultural 
identity conflict or marginalization; experiences of heterosexism, racism, etc.; and masculine 
appearance norm pressure (in reference to recent work on the adaptation of objectification 
theory for men; see Moradi, 2008). There is a growing body of research on the unique sexual 
objectification experiences of marginalized groups, including African American women 
(Buchanan, Fischer, Tokar, & Yoder, 2008; Watson et al., 2013; Watson, Robinson, 
Dispenza, & Nazari, 2012) lesbian women (Haines et al., 2008), bisexual women (Brewster 
et al., 2014), and sexual minority men (Wiseman & Moradi, 2010), These amended models 
serve as reminders that sexual objectification does not occur in a vacuum and is not easily 
isolated from other socialization experiences. Together, these experiences interact to 
influence the complex process of self-objectification. 
 Self-objectification. Self-objectification occurs when a person adopts an observer’s 
perspective of her or his physical self (Fredrickson & Roberts, 1997). Objectification theory 
posits that women self-objectify because they internalize the notion that physical 
attractiveness translates to power (Fredrickson & Roberts, 1997). Indeed, numerous studies 
have found that women judged to be physically unattractive or overweight face more barriers 
to success at work and in social relationships than women deemed attractive or thin (see 
Fredrickson & Roberts, 1997, for an overview of these studies). Because women are 
rewarded socially and even economically for adhering to conventional standards of 
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 attractiveness, they learn to “be their own first surveyors” (Fredrickson & Roberts, 1997, p. 
178), monitoring their own physical appearance in anticipation of others’ judgments. 
Moradi (2010) proposed that self-objectification should not be viewed as a single 
construct, but rather as a process promoted by sexual objectification experiences and 
manifested as internalization of cultural standards of attractiveness and body surveillance. In 
this conceptualization of self-objectification, which has been used by other researchers (e.g., 
Tolaymat & Moradi, 2011; Watson et al., 2013), the mental health risks proposed by 
Fredrickson and Roberts (1997; i.e., greater body shame, greater anxiety, reduced flow, and 
reduced internal bodily awareness) are thought to result from the self-objectification process. 
Internalization of cultural standards of attractiveness. Internalization of dominant 
cultural standards of attractiveness includes personal preference for a thin physique (i.e., 
internalization of the thin ideal) and comparison of one’s own physical self to women who 
embody conventional standards of beauty (e.g., models, actresses, celebrities; Heinberg, 
Thompson, & Stormer, 1995). Theoretically, this construct is consistent with Fredrickson and 
Roberts’s (1997) proposition that women adopt conventional standards of beauty as their 
own personal standards, due to the privileges associated with women who meet these 
standards (Moradi & Huang, 2008). Empirically, internalization of sociocultural standards of 
beauty has been shown to mediate the relationship between externally objectifying 
experiences (e.g., interpersonal sexual objectification experiences and exposure to beauty 
magazines) and self-objectification, body surveillance, body shame, and eating disorder 
symptomatology (Moradi, Dirks, & Matteson, 2005; Morry & Staska, 2001). 
Body surveillance. Body surveillance has been conceptualized as one manifestation 
of self-objectification (Moradi & Huang, 2008); it includes a preoccupation with how one 
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 looks to others and an emphasis on physical appearance over physical comfort or function 
(McKinley & Hyde, 1996). Although fastidious attention to appearance may be construed as 
narcissism or vanity, it is better understood as a woman’s attempt to have some power over 
how other people see her and the associated consequences of her appearance (Fredrickson & 
Roberts, 1997).  
Fredrickson and Roberts (1997) proposed that body surveillance disrupts a woman’s 
flow of consciousness. Women must devote significant portions of conscious attention to 
monitoring their appearance in anticipation of others’ judgments (Fredrickson & Roberts, 
1997). This divided consciousness leads to the experience of “doubling” proposed by de 
Beauvoir (1952), in which a woman exists not only as herself, but also as an observer of 
herself. This doubling has deleterious consequences for a woman’s subjective experience of 
herself and her world (Fredrickson & Roberts, 1997). 
Contemporary conceptualizations of the objectification theory framework posit that 
body surveillance partially mediates the positive links between internalization of cultural 
standards of beauty and body shame, and fully mediates the positive links from 
internalization of cultural standards of beauty to anxiety, flow, and internal bodily awareness 
(Moradi, 2010; Moradi & Huang, 2008). In correlational and experimental studies, higher 
levels of body surveillance have been associated with greater body shame (Calogero, 2004; 
Fredrickson et al., 1998; McKinley, 2006; Quinn et al.,  2006; Roberts & Gettman, 2004), 
greater appearance anxiety (Calogero, 2004; Choma et al., 2010; Fitzsimmons-Craft & 
Bardone-Cone, 2012; Roberts & Gettman, 2004; Szymanski & Henning, 2007), lower levels 
of dispositional flow (Fredrickson et al., 2008; Hebl et al., 2004; Quinn et al., 2006; 
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 Szymanski & Henning, 2007; Tiggemann & Kuring, 2001), and lower awareness of internal 
bodily states (Tylka & Hill, 2004).  
 Consequences for women’s subjective experience. Fredrickson and Roberts (1997) 
proposed that objectification theory serves as a viable explanation for known gender 
differences in subjective experiences, including experiences of shame, anxiety, flow, and 
internal bodily awareness. Objectification theory posits that these factors mediate the 
relationship between body surveillance and the psychological outcomes proposed by 
objectification theory (i.e., eating disorders, depression, and sexual dysfunction; Fredrickson 
& Roberts, 1997; Moradi & Huang, 2008). Conceptualization of these mediators has largely 
remained unchanged since Fredrickson and Roberts’s (1997) initial articulation of 
objectification theory, although anxiety is often split into two distinct types, appearance 
anxiety and physical safety anxiety (Moradi & Huang, 2008). 
 Body shame. People experience shame when they evaluate themselves relative to an 
internalized or cultural ideal and perceive that they do not live up to this expectation 
(Fredrickson & Roberts, 1997). Body shame is a particular type of shame that occurs when 
people feel that their physical appearance does not measure up to internalized cultural 
standards of beauty (Moradi & Huang, 2008). Cultural standards of beauty for women in the 
United States include youth, slimness, and Whiteness; these standards are extremely difficult 
for most women and impossible for many women to achieve (Fredrickson & Roberts, 1997). 
For example, Wolfe (1991) suggested that as few as 1 in 40,000 women meet the 
requirements of a model’s size and shape. In addition to concerns about size, Women of 
Color, older women, women with disabilities, lesbian and bisexual women, and gender non-
conforming women may face additional discrepancies between their own bodies and 
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 dominant cultural standards of beauty (McKinley & Hyde, 1996). Body shame is not 
confined to negative feelings about the body; it also includes more global negative feelings 
toward the self. For example, the Body Shame Scale of the Objectified Body Consciousness 
Scale contains items such as “I feel like I must be a bad person when I don’t look as good as 
I could” and “When I’m not exercising enough, I question whether I am a good person” 
(McKinley & Hyde, 1996, pp. 191-192). 
 The mediating role of body shame in the relationship between self-objectification and 
eating disorder symptoms has been well-supported by research with diverse samples of 
women. In samples of predominantly White and racially diverse college women, Noll and 
Fredrickson (1998) found that body shame partially mediated the positive relationship 
between self-objectification and eating disorder symptoms, such that greater self-
objectification was associated with greater body shame, and greater body shame was 
associated with greater eating disorder symptoms. Partial mediation of the positive links from 
self-objectification and body surveillance to eating disorder symptoms through body shame 
has also been found in an ethnically diverse sample of physically active and inactive young 
adult and middle age women (Greenleaf, 2005); adolescent girls in Australia (Slater & 
Tiggemann, 2002); college women in Australia (Tiggemann & Kuring, 2004); ballet dancers 
and nondancers in Australia (Tiggemann  & Slater, 2001); deaf women who were 
predominantly White (Moradi & Rottenstein, 2007); and predominantly White women 
diagnosed with eating disorders (Calogero, Davis, & Thompson, 2005). Generally, using 
Cohen’s (1988) criteria for effect size estimation, these indirect effects have been small to 
medium in size. 
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  The mediating role of body shame in the link between self-objectification and 
depression has also received generally consistent empirical support, although most of the 
samples have been predominantly White or lack demographic data. Specifically, body shame 
has been found to partially mediate the positive relationship between body surveillance and 
depression for adolescent girls and women, such that greater self-objectification is associated 
with greater body shame, and greater body shame is associated with higher levels of 
depression (Grabe, Hyde, & Lindberg, 2007; Muehlenkamp, Swanson, & Brausch, 2005; 
Szymanski & Henning, 2007; Tiggemann & Kuring, 2004). These results suggest that the 
affective component of body evaluation (i.e., body shame) exacerbates the positive effect of 
the behavioral/vigilance component (i.e., body surveillance) on depression symptoms. 
Intervening in the link between body surveillance and body shame is likely to decrease the 
effect of body surveillance on depression symptoms. 
 Body shame has also been shown to mediate the positive relationship between body 
surveillance and sexual dysfunction. In a sample of undergraduate women in Australia, Steer 
and Tiggemann (2008) found that body shame partially mediated the positive link between 
body surveillance and self-consciousness during sex, which was related to reduced sexual 
functioning. Similarly, in a sample of undergraduate women from the United Kingdom, 
Calogero and Thompson (2009) found that body surveillance was related to body shame, 
which was related to reduced sexual satisfaction. In a study of predominantly White college 
students, Aubrey (2007) found a medium-sized positive correlation between body shame and 
body image self-consciousness during physical intimacy, and a small negative correlation 
between body shame and sexual esteem; however, an analysis of the mediating role of body 
shame was not conducted. Although the research on the link between body shame and sexual 
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 dysfunction is fairly limited, it strongly suggests that body shame is a robust predictor of 
reduced sexual satisfaction. 
 Appearance anxiety. Appearance anxiety results from not knowing when or how 
one’s body will be evaluated by others (Fredrickson & Roberts, 1997). Frequent and 
unpredictable experiences of external sexual objectification remind women that they may be 
evaluated by men without warning at any time, so they must remain hypervigilant about their 
appearance (Fredrickson & Roberts, 1997). Women’s fashions may compound this problem; 
many garments require regular body monitoring to ensure that neither undergarments nor 
“too much skin” are exposed (Fredrickson & Roberts, 1997). Like other forms of anxiety, 
appearance anxiety may be experienced as motor tension, vigilance, and scanning 
(Fredrickson & Roberts, 1997). The Social Appearance Anxiety Scale (Hart et al., 2008) 
includes appearance-related concerns ranging from “I am concerned that I have missed out 
on opportunities because of my appearance” to “I am uncomfortable when I think others are 
noticing flaws in my appearance” (Hart et al., 2008, p. 53). 
 The mediating role of appearance anxiety in the link between self-objectification and 
mental health risks has received limited, mixed support. Studies using samples of racially 
diverse college women (Greenleaf & McGreer, 2006) and Australian samples of young, 
middle age, and older age women whose race/ethnicity was not reported (Tiggemann & 
Kuring, 2004; Tiggemann & Lynch, 2001) have shown appearance anxiety to be uniquely 
and positively related to eating disorder symptoms. However, the unique contribution of 
appearance anxiety to eating disorder symptoms was not upheld in other studies using 
samples of college women who were White, predominantly White, African American, or of 
unreported racial/ethnic background (Slater & Tiggemann, 2002; Tiggemann & Slater, 2001; 
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 Watson et al., 2013). The mediating role of appearance anxiety in the relationship between 
self-objectification and depression was supported in two studies, one using a sample of 
predominantly White women across the lifespan (Szymanski & Henning, 2007) and one 
using a sample of Australian undergraduates whose race/ethnicity was not reported 
(Tiggemann & Kuring, 2004). Finally, among a predominantly White sample of 
undergraduate students, Aubrey (2007) found a strong positive correlation between 
appearance anxiety and body image self-consciousness during physical intimacy, and a 
moderate negative correlation between appearance anxiety and sexual esteem. Taken 
together, these studies suggest that the mediating role of appearance anxiety in the link 
between self-objectification and mental health risks (i.e., disordered eating, depression, 
decreased psychosexual functioning) is viable but not well understood at this point. There is 
a need for further research exploring the links from appearance anxiety to depression 
symptoms and sexual functioning, particularly among racially and ethnically diverse women. 
 Reduced flow experiences. Flow is a highly enjoyable state of peak performance that 
people experience when they are completely immersed in an activity to the point that the 
activity itself becomes its own reward (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990). In everyday vernacular, 
flow is often referred to as being “in the zone” or “on fire” (Csikszentmihalyi & 
Csikszentmihalyi, 1992). Hallmark features of flow include total concentration on the tasks at 
hand, feelings of complete control, and loss of self-consciousness (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990). 
Flow has state and trait forms; state flow refers to an individual’s feelings of being “in the 
zone” at a given moment or in a given activity, whereas dispositional (or trait) flow refers to 
an individual’s general proclivity to experiencing flow (Csikszentmihalyi & 
Csikszentmihalyi, 1992). 
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  Fredrickson and Roberts (1997) proposed that women may be less likely to 
experience flow than men due to sexual objectification. High levels of body surveillance 
interrupt concentration, decrease women’s feelings of control over their own bodies, and 
prevent women from achieving the loss of self-consciousness necessary for achieving a flow 
state. Whether a woman is playing a sport or a musical instrument, the need to be aware of 
her body’s appearance at all times saps cognitive resources that would otherwise be devoted 
to mastering and enjoying the task at hand. 
 The proposed mediating role of flow in the relationship between body surveillance 
and mental health risks has received little empirical support. The mediating role of flow in 
the link between self-objectification or body surveillance and eating disorder symptoms was 
not supported in samples of racially diverse young and middle age women (Greenleaf, 2005; 
Greeleaf & McGreer, 2006), college women in Australia whose race/ethnicity was not 
reported (Tiggemann & Kuring, 2004), and former ballet dancers and nondancers in 
Australia (Tiggemann & Slater, 2001). In one study of predominantly White women across 
the lifespan, the mediating role of flow in the link between self-objectification and depression 
was upheld, such that greater self-objectification was linked to decreased flow, which was 
then related to higher levels of depression (Szymanski & Henning, 2007); however, in 
another study of college women in Australia whose race/ethnicity was not reported, the same 
mediating role of flow was not supported (Tiggemann & Kuring, 2004).  
 Notably, in all of these studies, flow was operationalized as a one-dimensional 
construct, rather than as nine related but distinct factors. This is problematic because flow 
was originally proposed as a multidimensional trait (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990), and the most 
commonly used measures of state and trait flow use a multidimensional model (Jackson & 
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 Eklund, 2002). However, most existing studies that integrate flow and objectification theory 
use only a global flow score (e.g., Szymanski & Henning, 2007; Tiggemann & Slater, 2001; 
Tiggemann & Williams, 2012). Furthermore, upon a closer examination of the nine 
dimensions of flow, it appears that three dimensions (i.e., concentration, sense of control, and 
loss of self-consciousness) might be more strongly influenced by self-objectification than the 
other six dimensions (Szymanski & Henning, 2007). Indeed, in an exploratory study using a 
sample of predominantly White undergraduate students, Grotewiel and Marszalek (2013) 
found that higher levels of body surveillance were related to lower levels of loss of self-
consciousness, and that higher levels of appearance anxiety were related to lower levels of 
loss of self-consciousness, concentration, and sense of control. Grotewiel and Marszalek 
(2013) found no relationship between self-objectification and overall level of dispositional 
flow, and only a small negative correlation between body surveillance and overall level of 
dispositional flow. There is a clear need for a more nuanced exploration of the role of flow as 
originally conceptualized by Csikszentmihalyi (1990) in the objectification theory 
framework.  
In addition to concern with the operationalization of flow, measurement of flow is an 
issue in most extant studies on objectification theory. Despite the availability of well-
validated instruments such as the Dispositional Flow Scale-2 (DFS-2) and the Flow State 
Scale-2 (FSS-2; Jackson & Eklend, 2002), some authors (e.g., Szymanski & Henning, 2007; 
Tiggemann & Slater, 2001) have developed new or study-specific measures that do not 
reflect Csikszentmihalyi’s (1990) original conceptualization of state or trait flow. A more 
thorough analysis of the construct of flow and associated measurement issues is offered in 
the next section. 
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  Internal bodily awareness. Internal bodily awareness, sometimes called interoceptive 
awareness, refers to the ability to accurately detect internal physiological sensations, such as 
stomach contractions and physiological sexual arousal (Moradi & Huang, 2008). In general, 
women seem to be less skilled than men at detecting internal physiological symptoms in the 
absence of relevant contextual clues (Fredrickson & Roberts, 1997). For example, Katkin, 
Blascovich, and Goldband (1981) found that in a small sample of undergraduates, men were 
able to learn to discriminate their own heartbeats, but women were not. Fredrickson and 
Roberts (1997) offered two reasons why women may have poorer internal bodily awareness 
than men. First, it may be that women learn to suppress their hunger cues from a young age 
in order to diet to attain a socially desirable thin physique. This habit may generalize to 
tuning out other internal bodily cues. The second theory is that body surveillance requires so 
much energy that women have fewer perceptual resources left to monitor their inner body 
experience. So, according to Fredrickson and Roberts, “by internalizing an observer’s 
perspective as a primary view of the physical self, women may lose access to their own inner 
physical experiences” (1997, p. 185). 
 Studies that have examined the full range of proposed objectification theory 
mediators have produced mixed support for the role of internal bodily awareness. In a sample 
of African American undergraduate women, Watson et al. (2013) found that sexually 
objectifying experiences were associated with poorer interoceptive awareness, which was in 
turn related to greater disordered eating symptoms. However, in samples of undergraduate 
women and former ballet dancers and nondancers in Australia, links from self-objectification 
and body surveillance to awareness of internal states were not supported (Tiggemann and 
Kuring, 2004; Tiggemann & Slater, 2001). Using a sample of predominantly White 
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 undergraduate students, Tylka and Hill (2004) found that body shame (but not body 
surveillance) predicted unique variance in poor awareness of hunger, satiety, and emotions, 
which predicted unique variance in disordered eating. Similarly, in a sample of 
predominantly White heterosexual undergraduate women, Kozee and Tylka (2006) found 
that interoceptive awareness partially mediated the positive relationship between body shame 
and eating disorder symptomology; however, this finding was not replicated with a sample of 
predominantly White lesbian women (Kozee & Tylka). The proposed inverse relationship 
between internal bodily awareness and depression has not been supported in samples of 
undergraduate women in Australia whose race/ethnicity was not reported (Tiggemann & 
Kuring, 2004) and predominantly White women of all ages (Szymanski & Henning, 2007). 
There is a need for more research on the role of internal bodily awareness in objectification 
theory to determine if it should be maintained, dropped from the framework, or 
reconceptualized. 
 Daubenmier (2005) suggested that the conceptualization of internal bodily awareness 
should be expanded to include responsiveness to bodily sensations. The concept of body 
responsiveness emphasizes how bodily sensations are valued and treated and not just whether 
or not they are perceived. Using a sample of racially diverse undergraduate women, 
Daubenmier found that body responsiveness, but not internal bodily awareness, mediated the 
positive relationship between self-objectification and eating disorder symptoms. 
Furthermore, in a sample of women exercisers, Martin, Prichard, Hutchinson, and Wilson 
(2013) found that internal bodily awareness, as measured by Daubenmier’s (2005) scale of 
body responsiveness, mediated the relationship between yoga participation and both mindful 
eating and disordered eating in the expected directions. Together, these studies suggest that 
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 body responsiveness, a broader construct than internal bodily awareness, may be a more 
useful variable to assess within the context of objectification theory.  
 Physical safety anxiety. Fredrickson and Roberts (1997) posited that women 
experience more concern about their physical safety than men due to ever-present threats of 
sexual violence. Rape myths, ideas that women whose appearance or behavior is considered 
“striking” or “provocative” provoke their own rape (Fredrickson & Roberts, 1997; Lonsway 
& Fitzgerald, 1994), underscore the role of sexual objectification in sexual violence. Because 
all women face the possibility of sexual victimization, they learn to closely monitor their 
appearance and behavior (ranging from interpersonal behavior, such as flirting and selecting 
clothing, to safety-promoting behavior, such as double-checking locks, staying inside after 
dark, jogging with a dog, etc.) in an attempt to avoid physical and sexual violence. This 
constant vigilance is a chronic source of anxiety for many women, and Fredrickson and 
Roberts (1997) proposed that it contributes to eating disorder symptomology, depression, and 
sexual dysfunction.  
 Although research on the role of physical safety anxiety in the objectification theory 
framework is sparse, two extant studies suggest that sexual objectification experiences do 
predict women’s physical safety anxiety. Using a sample of Black/African American and 
White undergraduate women, Watson, Marszalek, Dispenza, and Davids (2015) found that 
sexual objectification experiences predicted increased perceived risk of crime, which was 
related to greater fear of rape and other crimes. In one recent qualitative study of African 
American women’s sexual objectification experiences, Watson et al. (2012) found that 9 out 
of 20 participants reported experiencing physical safety anxiety when they were faced with 
external sexual objectification, such as fear of physical retaliation when rejecting a man’s 
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 sexual advances. Taken together, the results of these two studies suggest that objectification 
experiences are associated with increased levels of physical safety anxiety, but further 
research is needed to understand the effect of physical safety anxiety on eating disorders, 
depression, and sexual dysfunction. 
 Summary of proposed mediators. The mediators proposed by Fredrickson and 
Roberts (1997) in the link between self-objectification and negative psychological outcomes 
include body shame, appearance anxiety, flow, internal bodily awareness, and physical safety 
anxiety. In general, studies support the role of body shame in mediating the relationships 
between self-objectification and eating disorder symptoms, depression, and sexual 
dysfunction. The roles of appearance anxiety, flow, and internal bodily awareness have 
received mixed support; research into the role of flow in particular is limited due to concerns 
with operationalization and measurement of the construct in many extant studies. In one 
study in which dispositional flow was conceptualized using Csikszentmihalyi’s nine 
dimensional definition, loss of self-consciousness, concentration, and sense of control 
emerged as the only three dimensions predicted by body surveillance and/or appearance 
anxiety (Grotewiel & Marszalek, 2013). The mediating role of physical safety anxiety has 
largely been ignored in empirical studies, and the mental health risk of sexual dysfunction 
has frequently been overlooked as well. 
 Mental health risks. The entire objectification theory framework is anchored in 
Fredrickson and Roberts’s (1997) hypothesis that the implicated experiences may contribute 
to women’s increased susceptibility to certain mental health risks, including eating disorders, 
depression, and sexual dysfunction. More extreme and direct sexual objectification 
experiences, such as physical and sexual abuse and harassment, often contribute to these 
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 psychological conditions as well; however, Fredrickson and Roberts were specifically 
interested in creating objectification theory to elucidate the ways in which simply being a 
woman in a culture that objectifies the female body may affect women’s mental health. 
 Eating disorders and eating disorder symptoms. Eating disorders and eating disorder 
symptoms are perhaps the most obvious consequences of living in a society that objectifies 
the female body. Indeed, girls and women experience anorexia and bulimia nervosa at 10 
times the rate of men (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). At any given time, 0.4% of 
young women in the United States meet the diagnostic criteria for anorexia nervosa, and 1-
1.5% of young women in the United States meet the diagnostic criteria for bulimia nervosa 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013). The relative frequency of these disorders among 
women suggest that society’s differential treatment of women may be at least partially to 
blame. 
 Within the framework of objectification theory, Fredrickson and Roberts (1997) 
explained that eating disorders are strategies that girls and women use to attempt to gain 
power over the objectification of their bodies. Eating disorders can function as a way of 
attempting to meet cultural standards of beauty, such as through dieting, purging, and 
excessive exercising; when taken to an extreme, these behaviors can result in bulimia 
nervosa. Less frequently, eating disorders can also function as an attempt to subvert cultural 
standards of beauty, such as through the extreme restricted eating characteristic of anorexia 
nervosa, which may prevent a young girl from developing a mature, womanly body and may 
inhibit menstruation (Fredrickson & Roberts). Either way, girls’ and women’s often 
unhealthy attitudes toward eating and exercise can easily be linked to direct and indirect 
experiences of sexual objectification. 
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  The role of eating disorder symptomology in objectification theory has received 
ample research attention compared to the other two mental health risks (i.e., depression and 
sexual dysfunction) proposed by Fredrickson and Roberts (1997). The link between body 
shame and eating disorder symptoms is especially well-researched, and has been consistently 
supported in diverse samples of girls and women (Calogero et al., 2005; Greenleaf, 2005; 
Moradi & Rottenstein, 2007; Noll & Fredrickson, 1998; Slater & Tiggemann, 2002; 
Tiggemann & Kuring, 2004; Tiggemann & Slater, 2001). The relationship between 
appearance anxiety and eating disorder symptoms is less well-researched and has received 
mixed support (Greenleaf & McGreer, 2006; Slater & Tiggemann, 2002; Tiggemann & 
Kuring, 2004; Tiggemann & Lynch, 2001; Tiggemann & Slater, 2001). The link between 
flow and eating disorder symptoms has generally not been supported (Greenleaf, 2005; 
Greenleaf & McGreer, 2006; Tiggemann & Kuring, 2004; Tiggemann & Slater, 2001); 
however, much of the extant research on this relationship has used unconventional 
conceptualizations or measurements of flow (Moradi & Huang, 2008). The relationship 
between physical safety anxiety and eating disorder symptoms has received little empirical 
attention and was not addressed directly by Fredrickson and Roberts (1997). Finally, the 
relationship between internal bodily awareness and eating disorder symptoms has received 
mixed support in diverse samples of women (Daubenmier, 2005; Kozee & Tylka, 2006; 
Tiggemann & Kuring, 2004; Tiggemann & Slater, 2001; Tylka & Hill, 2004). Taken 
together, these results show a clear connection between the process of self-objectification and 
eating disorder symptoms through body shame; less well-understood are the roles of 
appearance anxiety, flow, internal bodily awareness, and physical safety anxiety. 
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  Depression. A depressive episode is a period of at least two weeks characterized by 
depressed mood or the loss of interest or pleasure in most activities (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2013). Other possible symptoms include change in weight or appetite; changes 
in sleeping patterns; psychomotor agitation or retardation; fatigue; feelings of worthlessness 
or guilt; trouble concentrating or indecisiveness; and recurrent thoughts of death (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2013). Experiences of depression are common among women and 
men, affecting about 7% of the United States population per year (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2013); however, women are about two times more likely than men, and girls are 
seven times more likely than boys, to experience depression (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2007). 
 Fredrickson and Roberts (1997) proposed that objectification theory may help explain 
women’s greater susceptibility to depression through the consequences for subjective 
experience in three different ways. First, recurrent and uncontrollable experiences of body 
shame, appearance anxiety, and physical safety anxiety may cause some women to feel that 
they lack control in their lives. They may feel helpless to change their bodies to match the 
cultural ideal or to control other people’s evaluations of their appearance. Because women 
are constantly reminded of the importance of solving these problems but feel that they have 
no means of doing so, they ruminate on them. Rumination, or excessive preoccupation with a 
stressor, is more common in women than men and has been shown to prolong depressive 
episodes (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991). So, Fredrickson and Roberts (1997) explained, “to the 
extent that a woman’s body generates feeling of helplessness, it can also induce depression” 
(p. 188). 
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 The effects of body shame and anxiety on depression within the framework of 
objectification theory have received consistent empirical support. The link between body 
shame and depression has consistently been supported for samples of predominantly White 
women and in samples of women that lack demographic data (e.g., Grabe, et al., 2007; 
Muehlenkamp et al., 2005; Szymanski & Henning, 2007; Tiggemann & Kuring, 2004). The 
relationship between appearance anxiety and depression has also been supported for samples 
of predominantly White women across the lifespan (Szymanski & Henning, 2007) and 
Australian undergraduates whose race/ethnicity was not reported (Tiggemann & Kuring, 
2004). Although physical safety anxiety has largely been ignored in empirical studies of 
objectification theory (Moradi & Huang, 2008), in one large-scale longitudinal study of 
middle aged adults in London, participants who reported greater fear of crime were 1.93 
times as likely to experience depression as participants who reported less fear of crime 
(Stafford, Chandola, & Marmot, 2007), suggesting that the proposed link between physical 
safety anxiety and depression is tenable. 
 The second way that objectification theory may help explain women’s greater 
susceptibility to depression is through reduced flow experiences (Fredrickson & Roberts, 
1997). Csikszentmihalyi (1990) explained that because experiencing flow is highly 
enjoyable, having fewer flow experiences reduces quality of life. Lewinsohn (1974, as cited 
in Fredrickson & Roberts, 1997), posited a link between “self-initiated positive experience” 
(p. 188) and depression from a biological perspective, such that having fewer of these 
positive experiences diminishes active behavior, resulting in the motivational deficits that are 
characteristic of depression. Fredrickson and Roberts (1997) elaborated on Lewinsohn’s 
(1974) model, explaining that women have less direct control over their positive experiences 
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 because their opportunities in relationships and work are often contingent on others’ 
evaluations of their appearance. Although the link between flow and depression within the 
framework of objectification theory has received mixed support (Szymanski & Henning, 
2007; Tiggemann & Kuring, 2004), flow demonstrated positive correlates with subjective 
wellbeing for a sample of male and female office workers (Bryce & Haworth, 2002) and with 
happiness for a sample of male and female Indian adults (Sahoo & Sahu, 2009), suggesting 
that this proposed relationship may be supported when flow is operationalized and measured 
according to Csikszentmihalyi’s (1990) original conceptualization. 
 Finally, objectification theory may help explain women’s greater susceptibility to 
depression because experiences of sexual victimization and harassment may contribute to 
symptoms of depression (Fredrickson & Roberts, 1997). Indeed, several theorists have 
proposed that women’s experiences of victimization may help explain up to one third of the 
gender disparity in depression (Cutler & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991; Hamilton & Jensvole, 
1992; Nolen-Hoeksema & Girgus, 1994). Taken together, theory and research on the effect 
of sexual objectification on women’s experiences of depression are provocative and 
deserving of additional empirical attention. 
 Sexual dysfunction. The term sexual dysfunction encompasses a variety of problems 
that individuals may experience related to engaging in sexual activities, including difficulties 
with sexual interest or desire, problems with sexual arousal, trouble achieving orgasm, and 
pain during sexual activity (Lewis et al., 2010). Although prevalence rates for sexual 
dysfunction vary widely depending on multiple factors (e.g., age, culture, duration, severity, 
distress), it is estimated that about 40-45% of adult women, compared to 20-30% of adult 
men, frequently experience at least one type of sexual dysfunction (Lewis et al., 2010). 
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 Women are physiologically as capable as men of achieving arousal and orgasm 
(Heiman & Verhulst, 1982), so physiological differences alone cannot explain women’s 
greater susceptibility to sexual dysfunction; instead, sociocultural experiences may be to 
blame (Fredrickson & Roberts, 1997). Increased body shame, increased appearance anxiety, 
reduced flow experiences, decreased awareness of internal bodily states, and increased 
physical safety anxiety may negatively affect the way that women experience their bodies 
during sexual encounters in three ways (Fredrickson & Roberts, 1997). First, as explained by 
the role of flow in objectification theory, engaging in body surveillance can prevent women 
from being fully immersed in their present-moment experiences. Taking the role of an 
outside observer can prevent women from being fully present during sexual encounters. 
Second, the emotions associated with body shame, appearance anxiety, and physical safety 
anxiety likely carry over into women’s sexual experiences, possibly reducing their 
enjoyment. Indeed, a recent meta-analysis of studies from the United States and abroad 
indicated that women experience more fear, anxiety, and guilt about sex than men (Petersen 
& Hyde, 2010). Third, decreased internal bodily awareness may cause women to feel 
disconnected from physical pleasure during sex (Fredrickson & Roberts, 2007). Combined 
with the effects of sexual abuse, assault, and harassment on sexual functioning and 
enjoyment experienced by many women (see Feldman-Summers, Gordon, & Maegher, 1979; 
Gordon & Riger, 1989; Martin, Warfield, & Braen, 1983), objectification theory may help 
explain why sexual dysfunction is more prevalent for women than men. 
Research on sexual dysfunction as an outcome variable of sexual objectification is 
limited but supportive. Steer and Tiggemann (2008) sampled undergraduate women in 
Australia to study relationships among body-related thoughts and feelings and sexual 
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 functioning. They found that body shame and appearance anxiety partially mediated the 
positive relationship between body surveillance and self-consciousness during sex in the 
expected direction. Self-consciousness during sex, in turn, predicted sexual functioning. 
Calogero and Thompson (2009) found support for a similar model using undergraduate 
women from the United Kingdom. In their model, internalization of the media’s standards of 
beauty predicted body surveillance, which predicted greater body shame and reduced sexual 
self-esteem, which in turn predicted less sexual satisfaction. In addition, body surveillance 
and body shame directly predicted sexual satisfaction. Likewise, in a sample of 
predominantly White college students, Aubrey (2007) found that body image self-
consciousness during physical intimacy was positively correlated with body shame and 
appearance anxiety. Likewise, sexual esteem was negatively correlated with body shame and 
appearance anxiety. Together, the results of these three studies support sexual dysfunction as 
an outcome of objectification theory as proposed by Fredrickson and Roberts (1997).  
Summary of mental health risks. Fredrickson and Roberts (1997) proposed that 
sexual objectification is implicated in the high prevalence of eating disorders, depression, and 
sexual dysfunction experienced by women relative to men. The majority of studies looking at 
these outcome variables have focused on eating disorders and eating disorder symptoms, 
although links with depression and sexual dysfunction have also been supported. The 
influence of body shame and appearance anxiety on these mental health risks has received 
more empirical attention than the influence of flow, internal bodily awareness, and physical 
safety anxiety; in studies in which flow and internal bodily awareness have been examined, 
the results have been inconsistent. Notably, the treatment of flow in these studies is troubling 
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 due to conceptualization and measurement approaches that are inconsistent with 
Csikszentmihalyi’s (1975) original conceptualization of the construct. 
Flow 
 In its simplest sense, the construct of flow can be defined as complete absorption in 
the task at hand. Csikszentmihalyi began studying flow in the 1960s while writing his 
dissertation on the creative process of artists (Nakamura & Csikszentmihalyi, 2002). He 
noticed that the artists he studied could remain focused on their work for hours, working 
single-mindedly and ignoring fatigue, discomfort, and even hunger, despite lack of external 
incentive (Nakamura & Csikszentmihalyi, 2002). Csikszentmihalyi (1975) identified this 
process as autotelic, or intrinsically rewarding (auto = self, telic = goal) for the artists. He 
went on to interview chess players, rock climbers, and dancers who emphasized enjoyment 
as their primary reason for engaging in these chosen activities, as well as surgeons, who also 
seemed to function with single-minded, all-consuming concentration (Csikszentmihalyi, 
1975; Nakamura & Csikszentmihalyi, 2002). Based on these interviews, Csikszentmihalyi 
(1975) introduced the construct of flow, defined as “the holistic sensation that people feel 
when they act with total involvement” (p. 36). He went on to explain: 
In the flow state, action follows upon action according to an internal logic that seems 
to need no conscious intervention by the actor. He experiences it as a unified flowing 
from one moment to the next, in which he is in control of his actions, and in which 
there is little distinction between self and environment, between stimulus and 
response, or between past, present, and future. (Csikszentmihalyi, 1975, p. 36) 
Csikszentmihalyi (1975) noted that some activities seem to enable flow more readily 
than others. Games, such as chess, and sports, such as rock climbing or dancing, in particular 
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 seem to be consistent flow activities (Csikszentmihalyi). However, the surgeons 
Csikszentmihalyi interviewed reported subjective experiences similar to those of the other 
interviewees while in a state of deep concentration and enjoyment. Csikszentmihalyi posited 
that although recreational flow activities may enable flow most easily for many people, flow 
can be experienced in a vast array of pursuits and settings. Creativity in general seems to 
enable flow, whether in art or science, for work or pure enjoyment; transcendental, religious, 
and ritual experiences can also engender flow (Csikszentmihalyi). Csikszentmihalyi noted 
that people can even experience flow in unlikely settings, such as in war, an assembly line, or 
a concentration camp, if they are engaged in an absorbing task. 
 Elements of the flow experience. Csikszentmihalyi (1975) found that across 
contexts, people’s reports of flow experiences are remarkably similar. He identified nine 
common themes of the flow experience, referred to as the nine elements or dimensions of 
flow. These include balance of challenge and skill, merging of action and awareness, high 
level of concentration, sense of control, loss of self-consciousness, clear goals, unambiguous 
feedback, transformation of time, and the autotelic experience. 
Balance of challenge and skill. Csikszentmihalyi (1975) noted that across activities, 
interviewees viewed their pursuits as challenging, but also believed that their skills were 
appropriate for the challenge at hand. An individual’s perception of an experience, rather 
than any objective measure of challenge or skill, is important, because flow is a subjective 
state (Csikszentmihalyi). Flow requires that an individual perceives the challenges presented 
by a task as balanced with her or his level of skill (Csikszentmihalyi). If an activity is viewed 
as too challenging for an individual’s skill, anxiety ensues; if an activity is viewed as not 
challenging enough, boredom is experienced (Csikszentmihalyi). Subsequent researchers 
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 have conceptualized additional affective states engendered by different ratios of challenge to 
skill (see Csikszentmihalyi, 1997); most notably, Csikszentmihalyi (1997) identified a fourth 
state, apathy, which is associated with low challenge paired with low skill. Based on this 
reconceptualization, Nakamura and Csikszentmihalyi (2010) posited that flow occurs “when 
both [challenge and skill] are above average levels for the individual” (p. 95). 
The balance of challenge and skill is arguably the hallmark feature of flow. Indeed, it 
is referenced in some basic definitions of flow, including Marszalek’s (2006), who explained 
that flow is “an optimal mental state that occurs when there is a balance between an 
individual’s perceived challenges and the individual’s skill level during some activity” (p. 
26). The balance of challenge and skill has been conceptualized by other researchers (e.g., 
Hoffman & Novak, 2009) as an antecedent of flow rather than a dimension of it; 
alternatively, in his first book about flow, Csikszentmihalyi (1975) described the balance of 
challenge and skill as the basic structure of flow activities rather than as an element of flow. 
Clearly, this subjective balance is integral to the experience of flow. 
Merging of action and awareness. A second dimension of flow, suggested to be the 
clearest indicator by Csikszentmihalyi (1975), is the merging of action and awareness. 
According to Csikszentmihalyi, “A person in flow has no dualistic perspective: he is aware 
of his actions but not of the awareness itself. . . . When awareness becomes split, so that one 
person perceives the activity from ‘outside,’ flow is interrupted” (p. 38). Csikszentmihalyi 
(1975) illustrated this phenomena with a quote from an expert rock climber: “You are so 
involved in what you are doing [that] you aren’t thinking of yourself as separate from the 
immediate activity . . . . You don’t see yourself as separate from what you’re doing” (p. 39). 
The merging of action and awareness requires a lack of metacognition, or a lack of thinking 
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 about one’s own mental state. (From this perspective, it would be impossible to think about 
being in flow and remain in flow, which poses an interesting problem for researchers 
measuring flow, as will be discussed in a later section.) The merging of action and awareness 
is enabled by a third element of flow, concentration (Csikszentmihalyi, 1975). 
Concentration. In order to achieve flow, an individual must be able to completely 
center her or his attention on a limited stimulus field (i.e., the task at hand; Csikszentmihalyi, 
1975). “I am really quite oblivious to my surroundings after I really get going,” a music 
composer interviewed by Csikszentmihalyi (1975) noted. “I think that the phone could ring, 
and the doorbell could ring, or the house burn down, or something like that. . . . When I start 
working, I really shut out the world” (p. 41). Some flow activities provide inducements that 
make concentrating on the task at hand easier, including competition (e.g., sports and games), 
the possibility of material gains (e.g., gambling), and even physical danger (e.g., rock 
climbing; Csikszentmihalyi). To an extent, raising the stakes of a situation can cause people 
to attend to it with undivided attention. Full concentration requires ignoring everything else 
in one’s environment. 
Sense of control. Complete control of one’s actions and environment is the fourth 
dimension of flow (Csikszentmihalyi, 1975). There is no conscious awareness of this control 
in the moment, but no worry of losing it either (Csikszentmihalyi). As one chess player 
whom Csikszentmihalyi interviewed put it, “I get a tyrannical sense of power. I feel 
immensely strong, as though I have the fate of another human in my grasp. I want to kill” (p. 
44)! A gentler explanation was offered by a dancer: “If I have enough space, I am in control. 
I feel I can radiate energy into the atmosphere. . . . I become one with the atmosphere” (p. 
44). Like the balance of challenge and skill, an individual’s perception of control is more 
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 important than any “objective” measure of control. A rock climber can feel in complete 
control of her experience, despite having no sway over the weather or the potential of falling 
rock; a driver can feel completely in control of his journey, despite having no control over his 
fellow drivers. 
Loss of self-consciousness. The fifth element of flow, loss of self-consciousness, also 
described as “loss of ego” and “self-forgetfulness,” requires an individual to temporarily 
forget about her or his social, or constructed, self (Csikszentmihalyi, 1975). The social self 
exists to manage the needs and expectations of others; however, Csikszentmihalyi (1975) 
explained, because many flow activities, such as games, rituals, and art, are based on freely 
accepted rules, they do not require the use of a social self. “What is usually lost in flow,” 
Csikszentmihalyi noted, “is not the awareness of one’s body or of one’s functions, but only 
the self construct, the intermediary which one learns to interpose between stimulus and 
response” (p. 43; italics in original). One of the composers interviewed by Csikszentmihalyi 
(1975) described this experience of self-forgetfulness vividly: “You yourself are in an 
ecstatic state to such a point that you feel as though you almost don’t exist,” he said. “I’ve 
experienced this time and time again. My hand seems devoid of myself, and I have nothing to 
do with what is happening. I just sit there watching it in a state of awe and wonderment. And 
it just flows out by itself” (p. 44). 
Clear goals. Being in flow requires having clear goals for the task at hand. This 
includes large goals, such as driving safely to one’s destination or reaching the top of the 
rock, but small goals are just as important. “When the rock climber senses the way, or when 
the author anticipates the next passage, the experience is likely to be associated with flow,” 
Rich (2013) wrote in an overview of flow theory. Csikszentmihalyi (1975) explained that the 
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 clear rules of many sports and games enable participants to see and set goals easily. When 
contradictory options are made possible, such as cheating in a game, the participant must 
reevaluate her or his goals, and the flow state is temporarily broken (Csikszentmihalyi). 
Unambiguous feedback. Csikszentmihalyi (1975) initially lumped together clear 
goals with the seventh element of flow, unambiguous feedback, explaining that flow “usually 
contains coherent, noncontradictory demands for action and provides clear, unambiguous 
feedback to a person’s actions” (p. 46). Csikszentmihalyi had separated unambiguous 
feedback from clear goals by 1990, perhaps because some situations allow for clear goals but 
provide confusing or minimal feedback. For example, Marszalek (2006) proposed that test-
takers may be able to enter flow easier while taking computerized tests that provide 
immediate feedback about their performance than while taking traditional paper-and-pencil 
tests. Csikszentmihalyi (1975) explained unambiguous feedback this way: “In the artificially 
reduced reality of a flow episode, one clearly knows what is ‘good’ and what is ‘bad’” (p. 
46). 
Transformation of time. The eighth dimension of flow is the alteration of time; 
seconds, minutes, and hours seem to move dramatically faster or slower than usual. Rich 
(2013) provided the example of a reader who becomes engrossed in a book late at night and 
is surprised to learn that she has been reading for many hours when the sun rises. In sports, 
time may seem to slow down, allowing an athlete to perform a complex move before her or 
his opponents realize what is happening (Csikszentmihalyi, 1975). Alternatively, time may 
seem to both speed up and slow down, as described by one of the surgeons interviewed by 
Csikszentmihalyi, Holcome, and Csikszentmihalyi (1975): “Time goes very fast; but 
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 afterwards, if it was a difficult operation, it may feel as if I had been working one hundred 
hours” (p. 132). 
The autotelic experience. Inherent in flow activities are their autotelic nature; flow 
activities need no extrinsic rewards because they are intrinsically rewarding. 
Csikszentmihalyi (1975) borrowed the word “flow” from the description of the autotelic 
experience given by one interviewee, who was both a poet and a rock climber: 
The mystique of rock climbing is climbing; you get to the top of a rock glad it’s over 
but really wish it would go forever. The justification of climbing is climbing, like the 
justification of poetry is writing; you don’t conquer anything except things in 
yourself. . . . The act of writing justifies poetry. Climbing is the same: recognizing 
that you are a flow. The purpose of the flow is to keep on flowing, not looking for a 
peak or utopia but staying in the flow. It is not a moving up but a continuous flowing; 
you move up only to keep the flow going. There is no possible reason for climbing 
except the climbing itself; it is a self-communication. (pp. 47-48) 
 In Csikszentmihalyi’s (1975) interviews, even highly accomplished individuals who 
had received monetary rewards or recognition for their achievements downplayed the nature 
of these extrinsic incentives. “The most rewarding thing is the competition, the satisfaction of 
pitting your mental prowess against someone else,” one top chess player said. “I’ve won . . . 
trophies and money . . . but considering the expenses of entry fees, chess associations, et 
cetera, I’m usually on the losing side financially” (p. 48). Flow is so enjoyable that, 
according to Csikszentmihalyi (1975), “. . . people are sometimes willing to forsake a 
comfortable life for its sake” (p. 37), such as the “starving artist” who struggles to pay the 
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 bills or the musician who tours the United States in an unreliable bus. Any material reward is 
secondary to the experience. 
 Summary of the flow experience. Across contexts, from making music to playing a 
sport to performing surgery, the subjective experience of flow seems to include nine common 
elements. It requires a perceived balance of challenge and skill, such that the task at hand is 
perceived as formidable but manageable. It elicits a merging of action and awareness, such 
that actions seem to happen effortlessly. One becomes completely concentrated on the task at 
hand and feels completely in control of her or his performance. Self-consciousness is lost. In 
the moment, the goals of the activity are clear and the feedback about one’s performance is 
unambiguous. Time may seem to move faster or slower than usual. Ultimately, the activity is 
extremely pleasurable, so much so that one would continue to participate without any 
extrinsic reward. 
 The nine elements of flow paint a picture of a highly enjoyable state of subjective 
experiencing. Flow is so enjoyable that Nakamura and Csikszentmihalyi (2002) posited that 
“a good life is one that is characterized by complete absorption in what one does” (p. 89); in 
other words, a good life is one spent in flow. Indeed, flow experiences have been associated 
with a variety of positive outcomes, including long-term persistence in an activity, skill 
development, academic performance, self-esteem, and even alleviation of physical pain (see 
Nakamura & Csikszentmihalyi, 2002, for an overview of the consequences of flow). 
Given that flow is such a positive experience, it would be ideal for everyone to 
experience flow multiple times a day; however, Rich (2013) reported that about one fifth of 
the population reports never having felt flow. In order to help all people achieve flow more 
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 easily, it is important to explore the differences between people who do and do not 
experience flow frequently.  
 Dispositional flow. Flow theory and associated research has largely focused on the 
in-the-moment phenomenology of the flow experience rather than the propensity to 
experience flow over time or across individuals (Nakamura & Csikszentmihalyi, 2002). 
Although the capacity to experience flow appears to be nearly universal, people vary 
considerably in the frequency and intensity with which they report entering flow states 
(Nakamura & Csikszentmihalyi, 2002). The tendency to experience flow is known as 
dispositional flow (Jackson & Eklund, 2002). Developing a better understanding of 
dispositional flow could be an important step toward creating interventions that will allow 
more people to experience flow more often. 
Dispositional flow is most commonly assessed by frequency of flow experiences, 
although quality of flow experiences has also been used as an indicator (Johnson, Keiser, 
Skarin, & Ross, 2014). Historically, researchers have looked at dispositional flow in a single 
domain; for example, Jackson, Kimiecik, Ford, and Marsh (1998) originally developed the 
Trait Flow Scale (later renamed the Dispositional Flow Scale; see Jackson, Thomas, Marsh, 
& Smethurst, 2001) to assess dispositional flow in sports. Participants were asked to indicate 
the frequency with which they experienced the nine dimensions of flow while participating in 
a specific sport or activity. Wang, Liu, and Khoo (2009) later adapted this measure to assess 
dispositional flow in internet gaming. However, Johnson et al. (2014) recently suggested that 
dispositional flow should be conceptualized as the propensity to experience flow across a 
wide range of activities. This conceptualization of dispositional flow as a cross-situational 
characteristic unites it with another closely related construct, the autotelic personality. 
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 The autotelic personality. Much of the extant research on dispositional flow has 
focused on individuals who experience flow frequently and intensely. People with high levels 
of dispositional flow are thought to possess an autotelic personality. An autotelic person 
“generally does things for their own sake, rather than in order to achieve some later external 
goal” (Csikszentmihalyi, 1997, p. 117). These people may possess either a greater ability or a 
greater desire (or both) to find challenges and build the associated skills (Baumann, 2012).  
The autotelic personality has received considerable attention from theorists interested 
in finding a personality-oriented explanation for differences in frequency and quality of flow 
experiences. Csikszentmihalyi (1997) suggested that finding challenges and building skills 
may require diverse, sometimes dialectical traits, including pure curiosity, a need to achieve, 
the capacity to experience enjoyment, persistence, openness to new experiences, narrow 
concentration, integration, differentiation, independence, and cooperation. Individuals who 
possess all of these traits—in other words, autotelic personalities—find challenges by 
opening their minds to new information, and build skills by concentrating on the aspects of 
these challenges that are slightly ahead of their current skills but still manageable. In this 
way, autotelic individuals continue to find challenges, build skills, and maintain flow states 
(Csikszentmihalyi, 1997). 
Csikszentmihalyi (1997) also framed the autotelic personality in terms of motivation 
orientation. He suggested that individuals with high levels of dispositional flow may have a 
high capacity for “disinterested interest.” Disinterested interest refers to the tendency to 
focus on task-inherent rather than purpose-related incentives, or a mastery-oriented approach 
rather than a performance-oriented approach. In other words, people with autotelic 
46 
 personalities focus on experiences themselves rather than the outcome or consequences of 
these experiences. 
Although studying the autotelic personality offers a fascinating glimpse into the 
minds of people who seem to have mastered the art of flow, it does not fully explain the 
challenges faced by people who experience flow less often. Indeed, the idea that personality 
characteristics alone explain differences in frequency and quality of flow experiences is 
likely to be criticized by some feminist theorists, who caution against locating the origin of 
psychological phenomena strictly within individuals. “We have already incorporated into 
feminist thinking generally the idea that the external world and the internal psychological 
world are intrinsically and intricately interrelated,” Lerman (1986, p. 8) wrote in a critique of 
traditional theories of personality. Following Lerman’s logic, it seems that the current body 
of research on the autotelic personality ignores situational factors that could inhibit some 
people from experiencing flow, such as pervasive environmental distractions or lack of 
available challenges or skill-building activities. In this way, conceptualizing dispositional 
flow simply as an individual’s propensity for experiencing flow across domains allows for 
the possibility of not only personality differences, but also situational and environmental 
differences in explaining why some people experience flow more or less frequently than 
others. However, studying dispositional flow is not without its own challenges; assessing 
dispositional flow can be difficult, and this problem seems to be exaggerated in extant 
research on flow within the objectification theory framework. 
Measuring dispositional flow. Measuring state flow is difficult because the very act 
of asking people to think about flow pulls them out of whatever flow state they might be 
experiencing at the time. Measuring dispositional flow, a more stable characteristic, should 
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 be much easier; however, there exist few measures of dispositional flow that have been 
evaluated for reliability and validity (Johnson et al., 2014). The two most frequently used 
measures of dispositional flow are the Experience Sampling Method (ESM) and the 
Dispositional Flow Scale-2 (DFS-2). 
The ESM. Csikszentmihalyi (1975) developed the ESM to capture individuals’ 
perception of the balance of challenge and skill in a naturalistic way. Using this method, 
participants carry pagers and are paged throughout the day by the researchers at random 
times. Whenever participants are paged, they complete brief questionnaires about their 
psychic states and activities, including their mood and their perceptions of the challenges 
presented, and the skills demanded by whatever task they are engaged in. From these reports, 
researchers can classify participants’ challenge-skill balance as indicative of one of the four 
subjective states prominent in flow theory: flow (high challenge, high skill), boredom (low 
challenge, high skill), apathy (low challenge, low skill), or anxiety (high challenge, low 
skill). Studies using the ESM have generally found that participants’ subjective experiences 
matched the subjective state predicted by their challenge-skill balance. For example, 
participants in the flow quadrant reported more positive experiences than participants in the 
other three quadrants (see Whalen, 1997, for a summary of the history of flow measurement, 
including an overview of the ESM). The ESM can be used to measure dispositional flow by 
measuring frequency or quality of high challenge, high skill experiences (Johnson et al., 
2014). 
According to Johnson et al. (2014), the ESM has become the standard of flow 
measurement due to its naturalistic methodology, its ability to identify the contingencies of 
behavior, and the limitations of the alternative retroactive self-report measures. Furthermore, 
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 the ESM has generally demonstrated good reliability and validity across studies of flow in a 
variety of contexts (Marszalek, 2009). The primary limitation of the ESM is that, like other 
measures of dispositional flow, it relies on respondents’ self-reports (Csikszentmihalyi & 
Larson, 1987). A second limitation of the ESM is that it is more cumbersome for researchers 
and more intrusive for participants than one-time self-report measures of flow proclivity. 
Finally, it is difficult to analyze data collected through the ESM, because it often violates 
basic assumptions of the General Linear Model. The data are within-subjects, but they do not 
have the same time intervals between measures. Furthermore, the data are often on the 
ordinal scale, and they often have missing observations. For these reasons, alternative 
methods of measuring flow are necessary. 
The DFS-2. Jackson and Marsh (1996) developed the Flow State Scale (FSS) to 
assess flow experiences within a specific sport. Respondents are asked to respond to items 
“in relation to your experience in the event that you have just completed” (p. 34). The FSS 
contains 36 items that load on nine factors that correspond with the nine elements of flow 
(i.e., challenge-skill balance, merging of action and awareness, clear goals, unambiguous 
feedback, concentration, sense of control, loss of self-consciousness, transformation of time, 
and the autotelic experience), as well as a single higher-order factor (Jackson & Marsh, 
1996). 
Jackson et al. (1998) adapted the FSS to create the Trait Flow Scale (TFS) by 
changing the wording of the instructions and items to create a measure of how frequently 
respondents experienced the dimensions of flow in general while participating in a specific 
sport or activity. For example, the FSS item “I was challenged, but I believed my skills 
would allow me to meet the challenge” was changed for the TFS to “I am challenged but I 
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 believe my skills will allow me to meet the challenge.” Jackson et al. (2001) changed the 
name of the TFS to the Dispositional Flow Scale (DFS) “to more accurately reflect what it 
purports to measure” (p. 136). 
Jackson and Eklund (2002) modified the FSS and the DFS to improve the 
measurement of some of the dimensions of flow that had performed poorly in previous 
studies, including sense of control, loss of self-consciousness, unambiguous feedback, and 
transformation of time. These modifications produced the Flow State Scale-2 (FSS-2) and the 
DFS-2. Johnson et al. (2014) modified the instructions of the DFS-2 to target “any activity in 
life” rather than respondents’ experiences in a specific activity, as had been done in most 
previous studies. 
The FSS-2 and the DFS-2 have strong psychometric properties of internal 
consistency, content validity, and factorial validity (Johnson et al., 2014). Jackson and 
Eklund (2002) reported that, consistent with Csikszentmihalyi’s conceptualization of the nine 
elements of flow, the scores produced by the FSS-2 and especially the DFS-2 fit a model 
with nine first-order factors (i.e., the nine dimensions of flow) better than a model with only 
one first-order factor and slightly better than a model with nine first-order factors and one 
higher order factor. 
The DFS-2 is limited by its reliance on retroactive self-report. However, self-report 
measures are commonly seen in the bodies of objectification theory and flow literature, 
presumably because they allow researchers to establish contact with a larger, more diverse 
sample of participants more easily than measures such as the ESM.  
 Summary of dispositional flow. Much of the extant research on flow theory focuses 
on the state experience; relatively little is known about dispositional flow, or an individual’s 
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 proclivity to experience flow in a variety of domains. Research on the autotelic personality 
suggests that high levels of dispositional flow may be related to other personality 
characteristics, including perseverance, curiosity, and mastery orientation; however, feminist 
theory would encourage researchers to look beyond these internal traits and consider the 
ways in which the external world may influence people’s ability to achieve flow states. 
Consequently, dispositional flow may be better conceptualized as simply the extent to which 
an individual experiences the nine dimensions of flow across domains. Several measures 
have been developed to assess dispositional flow, including the ESM and the DFS-2. 
Although the ESM is renowned for allowing researchers to access respondents’ subjective 
experiences in real time, the DFS-2 may be preferable for many researchers due to its ease of 
use and good reliability and validity. Consistent and proper use of the DFS-2 may be an 
important step in gaining a better understanding of the role of flow in objectification theory. 
 Flow and objectification theory. As discussed earlier, little empirical evidence 
exists to support Fredrickson and Roberts’s (1997) hypothesis that flow mediates the 
relationship between self-objectification and mental health risks. Studies that have assessed 
the role of flow are often limited by operationalization or measurement concerns (e.g., 
Greenleaf, 2005; Tiggemann & Kuring, 2004; Tiggemann & Slater, 2001). In order for a 
study to more accurately assess the role of flow in objectification theory, three conditions 
must be met: (a) flow must be conceptualized properly; (b) flow must be measured properly; 
and (c) dimensions of flow that are theorized to be more closely related to self-objectification 
must be given special attention. 
 Conceptualization of flow in the objectification literature. Whether or not they 
employ the term, most studies that explore the role of flow in the objectification theory 
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 framework are referring to dispositional flow. Studying dispositional flow rather than state 
flow is appropriate in this context because sexual objectification experiences and self-
objectification are chronic stressors that affect women on a daily basis, across situations. 
Although some experimental studies in which objectification was manipulated have used 
performance-related variables as proxies for state flow (e.g., Fredrickson et al., 1998; Hebl et 
al., 2004; Quinn et al., 2006), the majority of objectification theory studies that include the 
role of flow conceptualize objectification as a chronic, relatively stable factor, and flow as a 
dispositional, relatively stable factor (e.g., Greenleaf, 2005; Greenleaf & McGreer, 2006; 
Szymanski & Henning, 2007; Tiggemann & Kuring, 2004; Tiggemann & Slater, 2001; 
Tiggemann & Williams, 2012). In other words, within the objectification theory literature, 
the phrase “reduced flow experiences” often refers to reduced levels of dispositional flow. 
 Measurement of flow in the objectification literature. Within the objectification 
theory literature, there is little consistency in the measurement of dispositional flow. In their 
decade review of objectification theory literature, Moradi and Huang (2008) noted that some 
authors studying the role of flow in objectification theory have used the FSS or FSS-2, some 
have used the TFS/DFS or the DFS-2, some have developed study-specific measures, and 
some have developed new measures. Moradi and Huang (2008) concluded that “the breadth 
of these measures ranges from a narrow focus on concentration to assessing multiple 
dimensions [of flow] that include concentration, loss of self-consciousness, balance between 
challenge and skills, goal clarity, and other aspects of flow” (p. 384-385). In other words, 
different researchers are not only measuring dispositional flow in different ways, but they are 
also operationalizing it in different ways. Because of this inconsistency, it is difficult to draw 
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 any firm conclusions about the role of flow in objectification theory based on extant 
literature. 
When objectification theory researchers have used established flow scales, there is a 
tendency to use a global flow score without investigating subscale scores (e.g., Greenleaf, 
2005; Tiggemann & Kuring, 2004). This trend is problematic for several reasons. First, in 
Jackson and Eklund’s (2002) original validation study of the FSS-2 and the DFS-2, the 
models containing nine first-order factors or nine first-order factors and one higher order 
factor fit the data much better than a model with only one first-order global factor. Second, 
some dimensions of flow (i.e., high concentration, sense of control, and loss of self-
consciousness; see next section) may be more strongly affected by sexual objectification than 
other dimensions; using only a single global flow score may mask the unique effects on and 
of these dimensions. Indeed, Grotewiel and Marszalek (2013) found that scores on three 
dimensions of dispositional flow (i.e., high concentration, sense of control, and loss of self-
consciousness), but not a global dispositional flow score, were predicted by scores on 
measures of body surveillance and/or appearance anxiety. 
Another trend in the objectification literature is the creation of study-specific and new 
flow scales. Although these scales may be grounded in Csikszentmihalyi’s (1975) 
conceptualization of flow, they rarely follow his nine-dimensional model. For example, 
Tiggemann and Slater (2001) developed a study-specific measure of dispositional flow that 
has subsequently been used by other researchers (e.g., Greenleaf & McGreer, 2006). It 
contains four items: “I feel so involved that nothing else seems to matter;” “I concentrate 
without feeling self-conscious;” “I become so involved that I lose track of time;” and “I 
concentrate so intensely that I can’t think about anything else” (Tiggemann & Slater, 2001, p. 
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 59). These questions tap the dimensions of high concentration, loss of self-consciousness, 
and transformation of time, but neglect the other six dimensions of flow. Szymanski and 
Henning (2007) also developed a new measure of dispositional flow, the Flow Scale, which 
has been used by other researchers (e.g., Tiggemann & Williams, 2012). This self-report 
measure contains 18 items that load on three factors: intense concentration; lack of worry; 
and feedback, skills, and goals. Although Szymanski and Henning (2007) reported good 
internal consistency of their scale and significant correlations between the full scale score 
and scores on measures of habitual body monitoring and depression, the Flow Scale lacks 
validation with other measures of flow more concretely rooted in Csikszentmihalyi’s (1975) 
theory. 
Moradi and Huang (2008) declared that “operationalization of flow in objectification 
theory research can be advanced by attention to the broader literature on flow” (p. 392). This 
broader literature includes a number of well-established measures of dispositional flow, 
including the DFS-2, which would be preferable to the types of measures currently being 
used in the objectification theory literature because it most closely mirrors 
Csikszentmihalyi’s (1975) conceptualization of the construct. The broader literature on flow 
and objectification can also be combined to suggest dimensions of flow that may be most 
affected by objectification. 
Dimensions of flow most relevant to objectification theory. In their seminal article 
on objectification theory, Fredrickson and Roberts (1997) did not differentiate between the 
nine elements of flow. However, they did suggest ways in which objectification may reduce 
women’s levels of dispositional flow. First, a woman’s flow experience can be interrupted if 
someone calls attention to her body or appearance, or when she feels threatened that someone 
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 might. The interruption of experience implicates the concentration dimension of flow. The 
control dimension is also implicated, since women have little control over when, how, where, 
or by whom their appearance will be evaluated. Second, Fredickson and Roberts proposed 
that women’s internalization of an observer’s perspective on their appearance is a form of 
self-consciousness, which makes losing self-consciousness (a third dimension of flow) 
difficult for women even under ideal circumstances.  
Concentration. The sense of complete concentration inherent in a flow experience can 
be difficult for women to achieve in an objectifying culture for two reasons. First, research 
shows that as early as elementary school, girls’ activities and thoughts are frequently 
disrupted by boys, often with comments focused on “cooties,” “girl germs” or other fictitious 
or real aspects of their bodies (Thorne, 1993). As girls enter puberty, attention is increasingly 
called to their developing bodies, and they may feel the need to monitor the fit of their 
clothing, especially while playing sports or exercising. These overt instances of 
objectification are obviously distracting; however, self-objectification, as manifested through 
body surveillance, can be equally damaging to concentration. Any time a woman wonders if 
she looks fat, or questions whether her blouse is cut too low for work, or senses that a 
colleague may be evaluating her appearance, her concentration on the task at hand is broken. 
Sense of control. Women have little control over when or how they may be evaluated 
by others. This loss of control is posited to result in appearance anxiety (Fredrickson & 
Roberts, 1997). It may also make feeling in complete control in any situation difficult. For 
example, it may be challenging for a woman to feel in complete control over her performance 
on the basketball court if she feels that not just her athletic performance, but also her body is 
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 being evaluated by people in the stands. This lack of control may be reinforced if she hears 
spectators making comments about her physical appearance. 
Loss of self-consciousness. Loss of self-consciousness is an important aspect of the 
flow experience; yet, it can be very difficult for women used to functioning in a constant 
state of socially reinforced body surveillance to completely abandon an outside view of 
themselves. As Fredrickson and Roberts (1997) wrote, “Women’s internalization of an 
observer’s perspective on their bodies, by definition, creates a form of self-consciousness. . . . 
To be ‘doubled,’ as de Beauvoir put it, is simply incompatible with the single-mindedness of 
flow states” (p. 184). Indeed, Nakamura and Csikszentmihalyi (2002) defined loss of self-
consciousness as “loss of awareness of oneself as a social actor” (p. 90), an experience that 
would be difficult for a woman to achieve in a culture that incessantly objectifies the female 
body. For example, it could be difficult for a female orator to get lost in the experience of 
public speaking if she is distracted by concern about her physical appearance. 
Effects on mental health outcomes. Since there have been few studies that use a 
dimensional conceptualization of flow within the objectification theory framework, there is 
little research directly linking these three dimensions of flow to the mental health risks (i.e., 
disordered eating, depression, and sexual dysfunction). However, Fredrickson and Roberts 
(1997) posited that having fewer positive experiences (i.e., flow experiences) would increase 
susceptibility to depression. Similarly, Fredrickson and Roberts (1997) proposed that reduced 
ability to experience flow would make sexual experiences less satisfying and more anxiety-
provoking, resulting in sexual dysfunction. Reduced concentration, sense of control, and loss 
of self-consciousness may all contribute to these two outcomes. The link from flow 
dimensions to disordered eating is less obvious, but still tenable; for example, eating 
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 disorders, particularly anorexia nervosa, have been conceptualized as an attempt to gain 
control (Bruch, 1978). Attending to these three dimensions of flow that seem most relevant 
should illuminate they ways in which they function similarly and differently within the 
objectification theory framework. 
Summary of flow in objectification theory. Extant studies of flow in the 
objectification theory literature offer fertile ground for deepening understanding of this 
complex relationship. Attention to the measurement of flow is particularly needed. There is a 
need for studies that use the DFS-2 in the way that it was intended to be used, as a 36-item 
questionnaire that loads onto nine first-order factors or nine first-order factors and one 
higher-order factor. There is also a need for greater care in hypothesizing relationships 
between the different elements of the objectification theory framework and the nine 
dimensions of flow. 
 Understanding the role of flow in objectification theory using measures and 
hypotheses more consistent with flow theory will be a helpful step toward developing a 
clearer understanding of objectification theory itself. However, the relationship among 
objectification and flow is of little use without knowledge of ways in which this link can be 
weakened. The development of strategies to intervene in the link between self-objectification 
and flow—as well as the link between self-objectification and other objectification theory 
mediators—will require a better understanding of qualities that moderate this relationship. In 
the spirit of bringing together the interests of feminist and positive psychology, it seems 
appropriate to focus on potential strength-based moderators. 
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 Strength-Based Moderators 
In their review of the literature on sexual objectification of women, Szymanski, Carr, 
and Moffitt (2011) called for research exploring potential moderators of the objectification-
mental health link. They suggested a variety of potential moderators, ranging from 
personality traits to cognitive ability to social support to feminist, racial, and sexual minority 
identity (Szymanski, Carr, & Moffitt, 2011). Several researchers have answered this call. 
Watson et al. (2013) examined the moderating role of an internalized multiculturally 
inclusive racial identity for African American women. They found that internalized 
multiculturally inclusive racial identity attitudes moderated the relationship between sexually 
objectifying experiences and internalization of dominant cultural standards of beauty, such 
that participants were more likely to internalize these standards when sexually objectifying 
experiences were high and internalized multiculturally inclusive racial attitudes were low. 
Higher internalization of dominant standards of beauty was associated with increased body 
surveillance, body shame, appearance anxiety, and disordered eating, as well as with 
decreased internal bodily awareness. Watson et al. suggested that these results could be used 
to develop interventions to assist African American women in developing a positive, salient 
racial identity to buffer against the effects of sexual objectification. 
Szymanski and Feltman (2014) studied the moderating role of resilience in the links 
between sexual objectification experiences and psychological distress and coping with sexist 
oppression via internalization, self-objectification, and internalization of cultural standards of 
beauty. Their sample consisted of heterosexual women ages 18-23, the majority of whom 
identified as White. Szymanski and Feltman (2014) defined resilience as “an individual’s 
ability to successfully manage or overcome adverse experiences, manage stress, and rise 
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 above disadvantages” (p. 161) and did not specify whether they were conceptualizing it as a 
personality trait or a behavioral method of adaptation. Results of a path analysis showed that 
resilience moderated a) the direct effect of sexually objectifying experiences on coping via 
internalization and b) the conditional indirect effects of objectifying experiences on 
psychological distress, such that both of these relationships were not significant for women 
with high (versus low or moderate) levels of resilience. 
Beyond these two studies, there is a need to investigate additional moderators of the 
objectification-mental health link. The focus on integrating Csikszentmihalyi’s (1975) 
conceptualization of flow into the objectification theory framework is an attempt to bring 
together two complimentary camps of psychological research that both emphasize strength-
based conceptualization and treatment, positive psychology and feminist psychology. It is 
fitting, then, to consider potential strength-based moderators of the objectification-mental 
health link. It is important to explore positive traits that women could cultivate through 
counseling and other intervention programs as groundwork before developing these 
programs. Two cultivatable strengths that have been receiving increased research attention 
are mindfulness and self-compassion. 
 Mindfulness. The practice of mindfulness in a therapeutic context has been gaining 
popularity in the fields of counseling and clinical psychology since the early 1980s (Bishop 
et al., 2004). Within this context, mindfulness has been defined as “nonjudgmental moment-
to-moment awareness” (Miller, Fletcher, & Kabat-Zinn, 1995, p. 193) or “paying attention in 
a particular way: on purpose, in the present moment, and nonjudgmentally” (Kabat-Zinn, 
1994, p. 4). The growth of mindfulness-based therapeutic strategies can be traced to the 
introduction of Mindfulness-Based Stress Reduction (MBSR), a manualized treatment 
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 program originally developed to treat chronic pain (Kabat-Zinn, 1982). MSBR is now used to 
treat emotional and behavioral disorders and the psychological symptoms associated with 
physical illness (Bishop et al., 2004). Mindfulness has origins in Eastern spirituality and the 
teachings of Buddha in particular, and it is a component of many religious practices. 
However, anyone can learn and practice mindfulness as a skill, regardless of faith affiliation 
(Brown, Marquis, & Guiffrida, 2013). 
 Theoretical and empirical background. Empirical research on mindfulness was 
relatively limited until the early 2000s, when a panel of mindfulness researchers convened to 
develop an operational definition of the construct (Bishop et al., 2004). Using descriptions 
from qualitative studies of mindfulness, as well as descriptions of meditation from outside 
the field of psychology, Bishop et al. (2004, p. 233) proposed a two-component model of 
mindfulness consisting of (a) “the self-regulation of attention so that it is maintained on 
immediate experience, thereby allowing for increased recognition of mental events in the 
present moment” and (b) “adopting a particular orientation toward one’s experience in the 
present moment, an orientation that is characterized by curiosity, openness, and acceptance.” 
Later theorists further deconstructed this two-component conceptualization. Feldman, Hayes, 
Kumar, Greeson, and Laurenceau (2006) identified four components of mindfulness in 
Bishop et al.’s (2004) definition: attention regulation, orientation to the present experience, 
awareness of the present experience, and acceptance of the present experience. Alternatively, 
Baer et al. (2008) identified five components: observing, describing, acting with awareness, 
nonjudging of inner experience, and nonreactivity to inner experience. Still other researchers, 
such as Brown and Ryan (2004), have contended that mindfulness is best conceptualized as a 
unidimensional construct, positing that awareness of the present moment is impossible 
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 without acceptance of the present moment. Scales have been developed to reflect all four of 
these conceptualizations of mindfulness, and all remain popular in the literature (American 
Mindfulness Research Association, 2014). 
 Regardless of the specific conceptualization or scale used, the documented benefits of 
mindfulness in general are numerous. Mindfulness has been shown to have affective benefits 
(including improved emotion regulation, decreased reactivity, and increased response 
flexibility), interpersonal benefits, and benefits related to frontal lobe functioning (see Davis 
& Haynes, 2011, for an overview of empirical literature on mindfulness). Similarly, in a 
review of the literature on mindfulness-based interventions in counseling, Brown et al. 
(2013) cited studies documenting the efficacy of mindfulness in alleviating the symptoms of 
generalized anxiety disorder, depression relapse, borderline personality disorder, eating 
disorders, and drug addiction, as well as improving general well-being.  
 Many studies on mindfulness, especially within the counseling environment, focus on 
the effects of mindfulness interventions. However, theorists have also proposed that 
individuals may naturally vary in their tendencies toward mindful (versus mindless) states 
(see Dijkstra & Barelds, 2011). Dispositional mindfulness refers to an individual’s proclivity 
to practicing mindfulness on a day-to-day basis. Indeed, Bishop et al.’s (2004) 
conceptualization of mindfulness as consisting of self-regulation of attention and orientation 
to experience, as well as many of the subsequent conceptualizations and scales that emerged 
from it, was developed to address the “general tendency to be mindful in daily life” (Baer et 
al., 2008, p. 330). Mindfulness is distinct from a similar personality characteristic, 
conscientiousness, in that there is no element of responsibility (to self or others) associated 
with mindfulness. Indeed, in a meta-analysis of the relationships among mindfulness and the 
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 Big Five personality traits, Giluk (2009) found only a moderate correlation between 
mindfulness and conscientiousness. Like conscientiousness and dispositional flow, 
dispositional mindfulness is a relatively stable personality characteristic, but it is amenable to 
change through education and practice (Brown et al., 2013).  
 Mindfulness and objectification theory. Dijkstra and Barelds (2011) proposed 
several theoretical reasons why dispositional mindfulness may be related to objectification 
theory. First, the mindfulness construct of non-judgment is incompatible with comparing 
oneself against societal standards of attractiveness; highly mindful women would be 
expected to pass less judgment on their own bodies. Second, higher levels of mindfulness 
should be associated with better concentration, which may be associated with greater 
dispositional flow. Highly mindful individuals may be better able to fully focus their 
attention on the task at hand and block out distractions, including intrusive thoughts related 
to their appearance. 
 Several studies have explored on the benefits of dispositional mindfulness as they 
relate to body concerns. Dijkstra and Barelds (2011) studied the links between dispositional 
mindfulness, body comparison, and body dissatisfaction using a sample of Dutch women. 
They defined dispositional mindfulness as “being conscious and intentional in what you do, 
being open and creative with possibilities, or being aware of the present moment without 
grasping onto judgments” (p. 420). The results of their descriptive study indicated that 
dispositional mindfulness was negatively correlated with body comparison and positively 
correlated with body satisfaction, suggesting that as women are more mindful, they engage in 
less body comparison and are more satisfied with their bodies. Dijkstra and Barelds also 
tested two mediational models; for the first model, body comparison was hypothesized to 
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 partially mediate the positive relationship between mindfulness and body satisfaction, and for 
the second model, mindfulness was hypothesized to partially mediate the negative 
relationship between body comparison and body satisfaction. Both models produced 
significant indirect effects, suggesting partial mediation; however, the mediation effect of the 
second model was slightly stronger, suggesting that it was a better fit for the data.  
 Dekeyser et al. (2008) studied the relationships among mindfulness and interpersonal 
and intrapersonal feelings and performance, including body satisfaction. They defined 
mindfulness as the extent to which an individual practices each of four mindfulness skills: 
mindful observation, mindful action, mindful acceptance, and mindful description. Using a 
student sample consisting of predominantly female college students enrolled in a psychology 
class at a university in Belgium, and a parent sample consisting of predominantly female 
parents from Belgium and the Netherlands, they looked at the associations of the four 
components of mindfulness with a variety of interpersonal and intrapersonal thoughts and 
feelings. Their results indicated that body satisfaction was positively correlated with all four 
elements of mindfulness, except for mindful observation in the student sample. Other aspects 
of mindfulness were positively associated with expressing oneself in various social 
situations, empathy, and identification and description of feelings, and negatively associated 
with social anxiety and distress contagion. 
 The results of Dijkstra and Barelds’ (2011) and Dekeyser et al.’s (2008) studies 
provide good support for a link between mindfulness and the body-related concerns included 
in objectification theory, such as body surveillance and body shame. This inverse relationship 
is likely due to the nonjudgment component of mindfulness, as explained by Dijkstra and 
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 Barelds (2011). There is also theory and evidence to suggest that mindfulness may affect two 
of the proposed mediators of objectification theory: flow and internal bodily awareness. 
 There is considerable conceptual overlap between dispositional mindfulness and 
dispositional flow: both involve focused attention and orientation to the present-moment 
experience. However, dispositional mindfulness involves active, intentional regulation of 
attention, whereas dispositional flow reflects perceived capacity for having flow experiences. 
It is likely that (state) mindfulness enables (state) flow experiences, and also likely that 
people with higher levels of dispositional mindfulness would report higher levels of 
dispositional flow. A positive relationship between mindfulness and flow has been 
documented in two studies conducted with student athletes. Kee and Wang (2008) proposed 
that the present-moment focus of mindfulness may enable athletes to enter and remain in 
flow states. Focusing on the present moment may positively affect several dimensions of 
flow, including concentration, merging of action and awareness, clear goals, loss of self-
consciousness, challenge seeking, and skill building. Indeed, in a sample of student athletes, 
Kee and Wang found that participants with a high level of dispositional mindfulness scored 
higher on the DFS-2 subscales of challenge-skill balance, merging of action and awareness, 
clear goals, concentration, and loss of self-consciousness compared to students low in 
dispositional mindfulness. Similarly, using a between-groups experimental design with a 
sample of student athletes, Aherne et al. (2011) found that students who participated in an 
experimental mindfulness group scored significantly higher on the clear goals, sense of 
control, and global flow factors of the FSS-2 post-treatment compared to a control group. 
The relationship between mindfulness and internal bodily awareness has also been 
explored. Silverstein, Brown, Roth, and Britton (2011) proposed that by practicing 
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 attentional focusing on bodily sensations during mindfulness meditation, women could 
cultivate a nonjudgmental moment-to-moment awareness of their internal bodily state. 
Silverstein et al. were specifically interested in using meditation to improve women’s 
interoceptive awareness of sexual arousal, since women are significantly more likely than 
men to report feeling unaroused even when their bodies show objective signs of sexual 
arousal. To test their hypothesis that mindfulness training would help women improve their 
interoceptive awareness, Silverstein et al. compared the post treatment interoceptive 
awareness of women who participated in a 12-week mindfulness meditation course to the 
post treatment interoceptive awareness of women who participated in two control conditions. 
Between-groups analyses showed that treatment group participants developed significantly 
better interoceptive awareness of sexual arousal than participants in the control groups. 
 These studies offer a promising starting point for studying dispositional mindfulness 
as a potential moderator in the links between self-objectification and dispositional flow and 
internal bodily awareness. If this proposed buffering relationship is supported empirically, 
there is promising evidence that it can be used to inform treatments to prevent or ameliorate 
the consequences of objectification. For example, studies suggest that yoga, a meditative 
practice that has been shown to increase mindfulness (Brisbon & Lowery, 2009), may be a 
useful intervention for reducing body image concerns. Using a sample of predominantly 
White women, Daubenmier (2005) found that women who practiced yoga reported greater 
awareness and responsiveness to bodily sensations, lower self-objectification, greater body 
satisfaction, and fewer disordered eating attitudes than women involved in aerobic exercise 
or no exercise. Impett et al. (2006) also found that participation in a two-month yoga 
immersion program decreased self-objectification for a sample of women and increased body 
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 awareness, positive affect, and life satisfaction for women and men. Despite these promising 
studies, research on the role of mindfulness in self-objectification is still relatively limited, 
and there is a need to test the potential effects of mindfulness within the full model of 
objectification theory. 
 Self-compassion. A second potential moderator that has often been studied alongside 
mindfulness is self-compassion. Self-compassion has been defined as “being touched by and 
open to one’s own suffering, not avoiding or disconnecting from it, generating the desire to 
alleviate one’s suffering and to heal oneself with kindness” (Neff, 2003b, p. 87). Like 
mindfulness, self-compassion has roots in Buddhist philosophy (Neff, 2003b). It has been 
conceptualized as an Eastern take on a similar Western trait, self-esteem. Whereas self-
esteem is characterized by judgments and comparisons of oneself against others, self-
compassion involves viewing one’s own experiences in the context of the larger, shared 
human experience (Neff, 2003b). It consists of forgiving one’s own failings, respecting 
oneself as a human, and recognizing the interconnectedness and equality of all people (Neff, 
2003b).  
 Theoretical and empirical background. Neff (2003b) proposed that self-compassion 
is comprised of three components: self-kindness, “extending kindness and understanding to 
oneself rather than harsh judgment and self-criticism;” common humanity, “seeing one’s 
experiences as part of the larger human experience rather than seeing them as separate and 
isolated,” and mindfulness, “holding one’s painful thoughts and feelings in balanced 
awareness rather than over-identifying with them” (p. 89). Neff argued that a certain degree 
of mindfulness is necessary to allow individuals to experience enough space between their 
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 negative thoughts and their self-evaluations to allow feelings of self-kindness and common 
humanity to develop. 
 Despite these conceptual similarities, however, mindfulness and self-compassion are 
two distinct constructs in theory and application. Whereas mindfulness focuses on present 
moment awareness and nonjudgmental experiencing, self-compassion is an active process of 
engaging in self-soothing behavior when confronted with suffering (Bluth & Blanton, 2013). 
In other words, mindfulness is applicable across situations, whereas self-compassion is most 
relevant to moments of pain, anger, or embarrassment (Bluth & Blanton, 2013). Bluth and 
Blanton (2013) created a simple distinction between the two constructs when they wrote, 
“mindfulness brings awareness to one’s suffering and. . . self-compassion addresses and 
ameliorates that suffering” (p. 3). Due to these conceptual differences, recent research on the 
interplay between mindfulness and self-compassion have conceptualized and measured them 
as discrete constructs (see Baer, Lykins, & Peters, 2012; Bluth & Blanton, 2013; Keng, 
Smoski, & Robins, 2011; Kuyken et al., 2010; Robins, Keng, Ekblad, & Brantley, 2012; Van 
Dam, Sheppard, Forsyth, & Earleywine., 2011).  
 Scholarly work on self-compassion has gained traction since Neff (2003b) first 
introduced the construct as an alternative to self-esteem. MacBeth and Gumley (2012) 
conducted a meta-analysis of 20 samples from 14 different studies that looked at the 
relationship between self-compassion and different facets of psychopathology. They 
observed a large effect size for the relationship between self-compassion and 
psychopathology, suggesting that higher levels of self-compassion were associated with 
fewer symptoms of depression, anxiety, and stress. Other researchers have found positive 
correlations between self-compassion and life satisfaction (Neff, 2003a), self-worth (Neff & 
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 Vonk, 2009), happiness (Neff & Vonk, 2009), optimism (Neff & Vonk, 2009), positive affect 
(Neff & Vonk, 2009), emotional intelligence (Heffernan, Griffin, McNulty, & Fitzpatrick, 
2010), coping skills (Leary, Tate, Adams, Batts Allen, & Hancock, 2007; Neff, Hsieh, & 
Dejitterat, 2005), mastery goals (Neff et al., 2005) self-improvement motivation (Breines & 
Chen, 2012), and overall psychological well-being (Baer et al., 2012; Neely, Schallert, 
Mohammed, Roberts, & Chen, 2009; Neff, Kirkpatrick, & Rude, 2007) in both community 
samples and undergraduates. The connection between self-compassion and facets of 
objectification theory has not been explored as thoroughly as the connection between 
mindfulness and objectification theory; however, several studies have investigated the 
relationship between self-compassion and body shame and appearance anxiety. 
 Self-compassion and objectification theory. Albertson et al. (2014) explained how 
the three components of self-compassion outlined by Neff (2003b) could reduce body 
dissatisfaction and associated constructs, such as body shame and eating disorder behaviors. 
First, self-kindness directly counters the root of body dissatisfaction, the tendency to criticize 
one’s own body rather than accept it as it is. Second, a sense of common humanity may help 
women think about their bodies from a broader perspective, mitigating body dissatisfaction 
and body shame. Third, mindfulness should enable women to acknowledge their negative 
thoughts and feelings about their bodies without fixating on them. To test this theory, 
Albertson et al. (2014) conducted a mixed between- and within-groups experiment with a 
sample of predominantly White women. Participants in the treatment group listened to self-
compassion meditation audio recordings. Results suggested that participants in the treatment 
group experienced significantly greater reductions in body dissatisfaction, body shame, and 
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 contingent self-worth based on appearance, and significantly greater increases in self-
compassion and body appreciation, compared to the control group. 
 Several other researchers have also used Neff’s (2003b) conceptualization of self-
compassion to explore its relationship with other body- and eating-related concerns. 
Wasylkiw et al. (2012) studied the association between self-compassion and body-related 
concerns using a cross-sectional design. Using samples of predominantly White 
undergraduate women in Canada, they found that greater self-compassion predicted fewer 
body concerns, fewer weight concerns, less body preoccupation, and less eating guilt. 
Furthermore, self-compassion partially mediated the relationship between body 
preoccupation (a construct similar to body surveillance) and depressive symptoms. Wasylkiv 
et al. concluded that self-compassion plays a unique role in women’s self-acceptance of their 
bodies. 
 In a multi-part study, Breines, Tool, Tu, and Chen (2014) studied the relationships 
among self-compassion, body image, and disordered eating using both a naturalistic and a 
laboratory study. In the first study, a sample of female undergraduates of diverse racial/ethnic 
backgrounds completed daily records of appearance-related self-compassion, self-esteem, 
and disordered eating behaviors. Results of a hierarchical linear modeling analysis showed 
that participants reported less disordered eating on days when they reported higher levels of 
self-compassion. In the second study, a second sample of female undergraduates of diverse 
racial/ethnic backgrounds were primed to think about a perceived body flaw, then completed 
measures of state appearance-related self-compassion, state self-esteem, state body shame, 
and anticipated disordered eating behaviors. Participants were then given the choice to 
consume chocolate candies while completing a neutral word search task; those participants 
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 who did not eat any candies or who indicated that they ate fewer candies than they wanted 
completed an additional questionnaire assessing restrained eating. A structural equation 
model indicated that body shame partially mediated the negative relationship between self-
compassion and two measures of disordered eating (i.e., anticipated disordered eating and 
weight-gain concern motives for restrained eating), such that self-compassion predicted less 
body shame, and less body shame predicted less disordered eating. They concluded that self-
compassion may serve as a protective factor against negative body image and disordered 
eating. 
Ferreira, Pinto-Gouvelia, and Duarte (2013) studied the relationships among self-
compassion, external shame, and eating disordered behaviors and attitudes (including drive 
for thinness, bulimia, and body dissatisfaction) in a sample of female patients with eating 
disorders and a community sample of women, both from Portugal. Regression analysis 
indicated that self-compassion partially mediated the positive relationship between external 
shame and drive for thinness in the community sample, such that higher levels of self-
compassion lessened the positive effect of external shame on drive for thinness. In the 
clinical sample, self-compassion partially mediated the positive relationship between external 
shame and drive for thinness as well as the relationship between body image dissatisfaction 
and drive for thinness. In other words, among women diagnosed with eating disorders, higher 
levels of self-compassion lessened the positive effects of external shame and body image 
dissatisfaction on drive for thinness. Ferreira et al. concluded that cultivating self-compassion 
is important in combatting eating disordered attitudes and behaviors, especially for women 
diagnosed with eating disorders. 
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 Mosewich, Kowalski, Sabiston, Sedgwick, and Tracy (2011) explored the 
relationships among self-compassion, proneness to self-conscious emotions, and unhealthy 
self-evaluation thoughts and behaviors in a sample of young women athletes. They found that 
self-compassion uniquely predicted variance in shame proneness, objectified body 
consciousness, fear of failure, and fear of negative evaluation, such that greater self-
compassion was associated with lower levels of these four variables.   
Together, the results of these six studies provide strong support for exploring the 
relationships among self-compassion and body surveillance, body shame, and disordered 
eating. Specifically, the results of Breines et al.’s (2014) second study and Ferreira et al.’s 
(2013) study suggest that self-compassion may moderate the relationship between body 
surveillance and body shame. Self-compassion may help women treat their bodies more 
kindly, think about their bodies as connecting them to all of humanity, and keep a healthy 
distance from critical thoughts or feelings about their bodies.  
There is also evidence to suggest that self-compassion may affect women’s 
experiences of appearance anxiety. Neff (2003b) theorized that self-compassion may protect 
against anxiety in general by decreasing self-judgment and increasing self-supportiveness. 
Indeed, Neff (2003a) found that scores on a measure of self-compassion that she developed 
were negatively correlated with scores on a measure of trait anxiety. Mindfulness has also 
been shown to negatively correlate with anxiety (see Brown et al., 2013); some researchers 
have found that mindfulness is a more robust predictor of reduced anxiety than self-
compassion (e.g., Bergen-Cico & Cheon, 2013; Soysa & Wilcomb, 2013), whereas others 
(e.g., Van Dam et al., 2011) have found self-compassion to be a better predictor. However, in 
light of Bluth and Blanton’s (2013) explication of the conceptual differences between 
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 mindfulness and self-compassion (i.e., mindfulness is a way of acknowledging emotions, 
whereas self-compassion is a way of addressing them, especially self-conscious emotions), it 
seems that self-compassion may better predict appearance anxiety due to its specific self-
evaluative component. Indeed, in a large-scale study using a community sample of men and 
women, Neff and Vonk (2009) found that self-compassion was negatively correlated with 
appearance-contingent self-worth, a construct similar to appearance anxiety. 
 Summary of strength-based moderators. Mindfulness and self-compassion are two 
ways of relating to oneself and one’s experiences in a noncritical, appreciative, holistic way. 
Both constructs have been shown to be inversely correlated with negative body-related 
thoughts and behaviors, including body dissatisfaction, body shame, disordered eating 
thoughts, and disordered eating behaviors. Mindfulness has also been shown to be positively 
associated with dispositional flow and internal bodily awareness; all three of these constructs 
are associated with women’s experiences of themselves within the present moment. Self-
compassion has been shown to be negatively associated with body shame and appearance 
anxiety; all three of these constructs involve a woman’s affective evaluation of herself. 
Results of several intervention studies (e.g., Albertson et al., 2014; Aherne et al., 2011; 
Impett et al., 2006; Silverstein et al., 2011) suggest that programs and treatments that 
incorporate mindfulness and self-compassion could help buffer against or ameliorate some of 
the negative effects of objectification.  
Purpose of the Study 
 The purpose of the present study was twofold. First, we attempted to establish a 
clearer understanding of the role of flow in objectification theory by addressing some of the 
methodological limitations of previous studies. Specifically, we used a dispositional, 
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 dimensional conceptualization of flow; measured it using an appropriate, well-validated 
instrument (i.e., the DFS-2) developed from Csikszentmihalyi’s (1975) theory; and selected 
the three most relevant dimensions to analyze. Second, we investigated the moderating 
effects of (a) mindfulness on the links from body surveillance to flow and body 
responsiveness and (b) self-compassion on the links from body surveillance to body shame 
and appearance anxiety. Addressing these concerns contributes to the understanding of 
objectification theory and can provide direction for developing individual- and community-
level strength-based interventions that are rooted in positive psychology and consistent with 
feminist psychology’s goal of ameliorating the consequences of objectification. In 
accordance with objectification theory, flow theory, and prior research on mindfulness and 
self-compassion, the following relationships were predicted: 
1. Concentration will mediate the relationships between (a) body surveillance and 
disordered eating; (b) body surveillance and depression symptoms; and (c) body 
surveillance and sexual functioning (see Figure 2). 
2. Sense of control will mediate the relationships between (a) body surveillance and 
disordered eating; (b) body surveillance and depression symptoms; and (c) body 
surveillance and sexual functioning (see Figure 2). 
3. Loss of self-consciousness will mediate the relationships between (a) body 
surveillance and disordered eating; (b) body surveillance and depression symptoms; 
and (c) body surveillance and sexual functioning (see Figure 2). 
4. Dispositional mindfulness will moderate the relationships between (a) body 
surveillance and concentration; (b) body surveillance and sense of control; (c) body 
surveillance and loss of self-consciousness; and (d) body surveillance and body 
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Figure 2. Proposed model of the mediating role of three dimensions of flow in objectification theory.
 
 responsiveness, such that these relationships will be weaker for women with higher 
levels of dispositional mindfulness (see Figure 3). 
5. Dispositional mindfulness will moderate the mediation of the links between body 
surveillance and (a) disordered eating, (b) depression symptoms, and (c) sexual 
functioning by concentration, such that the relationship between body surveillance 
and these outcome variables through concentration will be weaker for women with 
higher levels of dispositional mindfulness (see Figure 3). 
6. Dispositional mindfulness will moderate the mediation of the links between body 
surveillance and (a) disordered eating, (b) depression symptoms, and (c) sexual 
functioning by control, such that the relationship between body surveillance and 
these outcome variables through control will be weaker for women with higher 
levels of dispositional mindfulness (see Figure 3). 
7. Dispositional mindfulness will moderate the mediation of the links between body 
surveillance and (a) disordered eating, (b) depression symptoms, and (c) sexual 
functioning by loss of self-consciousness, such that the relationship between body 
surveillance and these outcome variables through loss of self-consciousness will be 
weaker for women with higher levels of dispositional mindfulness (see Figure 3). 
8. Dispositional mindfulness will moderate the mediation of the links between body 
surveillance and (a) disordered eating, (b) depression symptoms, and (c) sexual 
functioning by body responsiveness, such that the relationship between body 
surveillance and these outcome variables through body responsiveness will be 
weaker for women with higher levels of dispositional mindfulness (see Figure 3). 
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Figure 3. Proposed model of the moderating role of dispositional mindfulness in objectification theory.
 
 9. Within the objectification theory model, dispositional mindfulness will moderate the 
following links: body surveillance and concentration, body surveillance and sense of 
control, body surveillance and loss of self-consciousness, and body surveillance 
body responsiveness, resulting in first-stage moderated mediation of disordered 
eating, depression symptoms, and sexual functioning (see Figure 3). 
10. Self-compassion will moderate the relationships between (a) body surveillance and 
body shame and (b) body surveillance and appearance anxiety, such that these 
relationships will be weaker for women with higher levels of self-compassion. 
11. Self-compassion will moderate the mediation of the links between body surveillance 
and (a) disordered eating, (b) depression symptoms, and (c) sexual functioning by 
body shame, such that the relationship between body surveillance and these outcome 
variables through body shame will be weaker for women with higher levels of self-
compassion (see Figure 4). 
12. Self-compassion will moderate the mediation of the links between body surveillance 
and (a) disordered eating, (b) depression symptoms, and (c) sexual functioning by 
appearance anxiety, such that the relationship between body surveillance and these 
outcome variables through appearance anxiety will be weaker for women with 
higher levels of self-compassion (see Figure 4). 
13. Within the objectification theory model, self-compassion will moderate the 
following links: body surveillance and body shame and body surveillance and 
appearance anxiety, resulting in first-stage moderated mediation of disordered 
eating, depression symptoms, and sexual functioning (see Figure 4). 
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Figure 4. Proposed model of the moderating role of self-compassion in objectification theory.
 
 CHAPTER 3 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
The present study employed a quantitative descriptive correlational design using 
structural equation modeling (SEM). 
Participants 
Fredrickson and Roberts (1997) suggested that although objectification affects women 
throughout the lifespan, its effects are felt most acutely during adolescence and middle-age. 
In order to control for the effects of age, participation in this study was limited to women 
ages 18-50. Objectification theory was also developed specifically to explain women’s 
experiences in Western cultures; to control for the effects of culture, participation in the 
proposed study was limited to women who identified as United States citizens. The 
accessible population included women ages 18-50 who identified as United States citizens 
and were a) enrolled in an undergraduate psychology class at UMKC, b) using MTurk, or c) 
accessible through social media websites. 
 The projected sample size of this study was 600 women. Although adequate sample 
size for path analysis can be difficult to determine, a generally accepted heuristic is at least 5-
10 participants per free parameter and no fewer than 100 participants total (Norman & 
Streiner, 2003). The most complex hypothesized moderation model (i.e., the proposed model 
of the moderating role of dispositional mindfulness; see Figure 3) contains 55 free 
parameters. Sampling at least 550 women ensured that there would be enough usable cases to 
garner meaningful interpretations from the data. 
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 Procedure 
Recruitment. Approval was received from the UMKC Social Sciences Institutional 
Review Board prior to recruiting participants. Participants were recruited from three sources: 
Psych Pool, MTurk, and chain-referral sampling through social media websites. Using 
multiple methods of recruitment helped reach a larger, more diverse sample and allowed for 
comparisons to be made among groups recruited in different ways. 
UMKC Psych Pool. Psych Pool is the online participant recruitment system at 
UMKC. Its goals are to “facilitate recruitment of research participants by Department of 
Psychology researchers” and to “enhance student education by facilitating participating in 
psychology research” (University of Missouri-Kansas City, 2014b). In fall 2013, 65% of 
students enrolled at UMKC identified their race/ethnicity as White, 13% identified as 
Black/African American, 7% identified as Asian, 7% identified as Non-resident 
International, 5% identified as Hispanic/Latino, and 2% identified as two or more ethnicities 
(University of Missouri-Kansas City, 2014a). As anticipated based on data gathered by 
Grotewiel and Marszalek (2013), students who identify as White were overrepresented in our 
sample, and students with “other” racial/ethnic/cultural identities were overrepresented. The 
average age of participants recruited through Psych Pool was 22.11 years (SD = 4.15); age 
ranged from 18 through 36 years.  
MTurk. Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) is an online marketplace that connects 
“requesters” (i.e., task creators) and “workers” (i.e., paid task completers) to facilitate task 
creation, labor recruitment, compensation, and data collection (Buhrmester, Kwang, & 
Gosling, 2011). Paolacci and Chandler (2014) reported that the MTurk workforce is currently 
80 
 
 comprised of more than 500,000 workers from 190 countries, with three-quarters of workers 
residing in the United States or India. Workers tend to be diverse but not representative of 
their country’s larger populations: They tend to be younger (around 30 years old), 
overeducated, underemployed, less religious, and more liberal than the general population 
(Paolacci & Chandler). Within the United States, Asian individuals are overrepresented in the 
MTurk worker pool and Black and Hispanic individuals are underrepresented (Paolacci & 
Chandler). Several reviews of studies using MTurk for participant recruitment have 
concluded that MTurk workers are more diverse than college samples and that MTurk is a 
high-quality alternative to more traditional methods of convenience sampling for 
psychological research (Buhrmester et al., 2011; Paolacci & Chander, 2014). The average 
age of participants recruited through MTurk was 31.71 years (SD = 7.67); age ranged from 
18 through 50 years.  
Social media websites. Snowball sampling through social media platforms such as 
Facebook and Reddit is a modern form of chain-referral sampling. Chain-referral sampling 
acknowledges the roles of relationships and shared environment (problems also inherent but 
rarely discussed explicitly in college student samples) and provides easier access to “hidden” 
populations not traditionally accessible through other methods of convenience sampling. The 
primary websites used for this sampling procedure were the social networking website 
Facebook and the entertainment, social networking, and news website Reddit. On Reddit, the 
specific community that was targeted was r/SampleSize, which is described as “a community 
dedicated to the scientific, fun, and creative surveys produced by redditors” (Reddit, Inc., 
2014). For this study, it was anticipated that chain-referral sampling would help reach 
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 participants who are older than participants recruited through PsychPool and MTurk and do 
not live in the Midwestern United States The average age of participants recruited through 
social media websites was 30.09 years (SD = 7.12); age ranged from 18 through 50 years.  
Participant procedure. Participants completed the study entirely online, in one 
sitting, wherever and whenever they chose from the time the study launched until data 
collection was complete. The study was in survey format and hosted on SurveyMonkey. The 
survey opened to an informed consent document, which participants were asked to read and 
required to agree to before moving forward in the study. The next three pages that 
participants saw were screening questions that asked participants to select their gender 
identification, age range, and whether or not they were United States citizens to confirm that 
they met inclusion criteria. Participants who failed any of these screening questions were 
directed to the debriefing screen. Participants who passed all three of these questions were 
taken to the study survey. 
The first page of survey questions included a brief demographic questionnaire used to 
collect participants’ sex assigned at birth, gender identity, age, race/ethnicity, sexual 
orientation, educational attainment, annual income, height, and weight. The following 11 
pages (approximately 160 questions) in the study consisted of the measures of body 
surveillance, body shame, appearance anxiety, physical safety anxiety, dispositional flow, 
body responsiveness, disordered eating, depression symptoms, sexual functioning, 
dispositional mindfulness, and self-compassion. Measures were presented in the same order 
to all participants. The final page contained a debriefing statement, including contact 
information for the researcher, the UMKC Counseling Center (for UMKC participants), 
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 and/or hotline information, as well as a link to a separate survey for participants to follow for 
compensation for their participation. The pages containing the demographic survey and the 
other measures contained links to the debriefing screen as well so that participants had the 
option of exiting the survey at any time without penalty (with the exception of the MTurk 
participants, who were required to complete the survey in order to be compensated). The 
survey was anticipated to take approximately 45 minutes to complete. 
Participants were compensated for their time and as a way to prevent attrition. Psych 
Pool participants received one Psych Pool credit for their psychology class. MTurk 
participants received a small ($0.90) payment consistent with MTurk standards for 
completing survey work that takes between 30 minutes and one hour (see Buhrmester et al., 
2011). Participants recruited through social media websites had the option of following a link 
to a separate webpage to enter a raffle for one of four $25 gift cards to Amazon.com. 
Identifying information for the raffle was collected separately and could not be connected to 
survey responses. 
Measures 
Demographic data. Demographic information was collected using a questionnaire 
designed by the researchers that asked participants to disclose their biological sex assigned at 
birth, gender identification, age, race/ethnicity/cultural identity, sexual orientation, height, 
and weight (see Appendix A). 
Body surveillance. Body surveillance was measured using the body surveillance 
subscale of the Objectified Body Consciousness Scale (OBC; McKinley & Hyde, 1996). The 
full OBC contains 24 self-report items that measure the extent to which responders view their 
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 bodies as objects and endorse related beliefs (i.e., objectified body consciousness). The 
response format is a 7-point scale used to indicate endorsement of an objectified body 
consciousness (1 = strongly disagree through 7 = strongly agree) with the option of marking 
an item as not applicable as well. Participants’ scores are considered invalid when they mark 
two or more questions not applicable. Scores are determined by participants’ average score 
on all completed items. Higher scores indicate higher levels of objectified body 
consciousness. Results of a Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) of the OBC suggested the 
presence of three factors: body control, body shame, and body surveillance.  
The eight items that comprise the body surveillance subscale (OBC-Surv; see 
Appendix C) measure how frequently participants think about their bodies and to what extent 
they judge their bodies based on how they look rather than how they feel. In McKinley and 
Hyde’s (1996) scale development study, Cronbach’s alpha for the body surveillance subscale 
was .89. Convergent validity for the body surveillance subscale has been evidenced by a 
negative correlation with scores on the Body Esteem Scale (Franzoi & Shields, 1984), a 
strong positive correlation with scores on the body shame subscale of the OBC, and a 
moderate positive correlation with scores on the body control beliefs subscale of the OBC 
(McKinley & Hyde). Construct validity has been demonstrated by a strong correlation with 
scores on the public self-consciousness subscale of the Self-Consciousness Scale (Fenigstein, 
Scheier, & Buss, 1975) and by a positive correlation with a measure of personal endorsement 
of cultural standards (McKinley & Hyde, 1996). Discriminant validity has been evidenced by 
the lack of correlation with scores on the private self-consciousness and social anxiety 
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 subscales of the Self-Consciousness Scale (McKinley & Hyde, 1996). An example item from 
the body surveillance subscale is, “I rarely think about how I look” (reverse-scored). 
Body shame. Body shame was measured using the body shame subscale of the OBC 
Scale (OBC-Shame; McKinley & Hyde, 1996; see Appendix C). Cronbach’s alpha for the 
OBC-Shame with McKinley and Hyde’s (1996) original sample of undergraduate women 
was .75. Convergent validity for the subscale has been evidenced by a strong positive 
correlation with the OBC-Surv, a small positive correlation with the body control subscale of 
the OBC Scale, and a strong negative correlation with body esteem (McKinley & Hyde). 
Construct validity has been demonstrated by a positive correlation with personal 
endorsement of cultural standards (McKinley & Hyde). An example item from the body 
shame subscale is, “When I can't control my weight, I feel like something must be wrong 
with me.” 
Appearance anxiety. Appearance anxiety was measured using the Social 
Appearance Anxiety Scale (SAAS; Hart et al., 2008), a 16 item self-report measure (see 
Appendix D). The SAAS was developed from other measures of social anxiety, body image 
dissatisfaction, and body dysmorphic disorder and normed on several samples of 
undergraduate college students (Hart et al., 2008). The response format is a 5-point scale 
used to indicate agreement with statements about appearance anxiety (1 = not at all to 5 = 
extremely), with higher scores indicating higher levels of appearance anxiety. Item scores are 
summed to create a scale score. Results of an Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) and a CFA 
analysis from the scale development study support a unidimensional factor structure (Hart et 
al., 2008). Hart et al. (2008) reported strong internal consistency estimates of at least .94 for 
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 three samples and a one-month test-retest reliability correlation of .84. Convergent validity 
was evidenced by positive correlations with other measures of social anxiety, depression, and 
body image disturbance (Hart et al., 2008). The SAAS was shown to predict a unique 
proportion of variability in social anxiety above and beyond negative body image and social 
anxiety, evidencing discriminant validity (Hart et al., 2008). An example item is, “I feel 
comfortable with the way I appear to others” (reverse-scored). 
Dispositional flow. Dispositional flow was measured using the Dispositional Flow 
Scale-2 Long Form (DFS-2; Jackson & Eklund, 2002), a 36 item self-report measure (see 
Appendix E). The DFS-2 is based on the nine elements of flow proposed by 
Csikszentmihalyi (1990) and was developed from the Trait Flow Scale (TFS; Jackson et al., 
1998), which was created from the Flow State Scale (FSS; Jackson & Marsh, 1996). The 
DFS-2 contains four questions about the degree to which participants experience each of the 
nine elements of flow; results of two CFAs supported this nine first-order factor model, 
which is consistent with Csikszentmihalyi’s conceptualization of the nine elements of flow. 
The response format of the DFS-2 is a 5-point scale used to indicate agreement with 
statements about the frequency of flow experiences (1 = never through 5 = always), with 
higher scores indicating increased levels of dispositional flow. Item scores are summed to 
create subscale scores. Jackson et al. (2001) reported strong internal consistency estimates for 
every subscale of the DFS-2: challenge skill balance = .81, action awareness = .87, clear 
goals = .80, unambiguous feedback = .87, concentration on task = .85, sense of control = .83, 
loss of self-consciousness = .89, transformation of time = .87, and autotelic experience = .83. 
Cross-validation reliability estimates ranged from .78 to .86, with a mean alpha of .82 
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 (Jackson et al.). The full DFS-2 was administered to participants, although only scores on the 
Concentration, Control, and Loss of Self-Consciousness subscales were analyzed for this 
study. An example item from the Concentration subscale is, “My attention is focused entirely 
on what I am doing.” An example item from the Control subscale is, “I have a sense of 
control over what I am doing.” An example item from the Loss of Self-Consciousness 
subscale is, “I am not concerned with what others may be thinking of me.” 
The original DFS-2 was created to measure propensity for experiencing flow in a 
specific activity. For the purposes of this study, the instructions were modified to target “any 
activity in life” rather than experiences in a single activity. Using these modified instructions 
with an undergraduate sample, Johnson et al. (2014) found coefficient alphas ranging from 
.80 for the autotelic experience subscale to .91 for the clear goals subscale. As evidence of 
criterion-related validity, Johnson et al. (2014) demonstrated that scores on the DFS-2 could 
be predicted from scores on measures of neuroticism (inversely related to dispositional flow) 
and conscientiousness (positively related to dispositional flow), and that time spent in flow 
could be predicted from DFS-2 scores. 
Physical safety anxiety. Physical safety anxiety was assessed using three items taken 
from Ferraro’s (1996) Fear of Crime scale (see Appendix F). The three questions on this 
modified measure of physical safety anxiety (PSA) ask respondents to use a 10-point scale to 
indicate how afraid they are of being raped or sexually assaulted, attacked by someone with a 
weapon, or being robbed or mugged on the street (1 = not afraid at all to 10 = very afraid).  
Higher scores indicate greater physical safety anxiety. Item scores are summed to create a 
scale score. Ferraro (1996) reported that women scored higher on all three of these items than 
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 men. Furthermore, consistent with objectification theory, scores on all three of these items 
could be predicted from indirect victimization (i.e., awareness of a friend’s or family 
member’s recent victimization). An example item assesses fear of “being raped or sexually 
assaulted.” 
Body responsiveness. Body responsiveness was measured using Daubenmier’s 
(2005) body responsiveness (BR) scale, a 7-item self-report measure (see Appendix G).  
Daubenmier developed this scale to measure body responsiveness within the context of 
objectification theory. Unlike a more commonly used measure of internal bodily awareness, 
the Body Awareness Questionnaire (BAQ; Shields, Mallory, & Simon, 1989), this measure 
reflects Daubenmier’s (2005) conceptualization of the construct of internal bodily awareness 
as including responsiveness to bodily sensations. The scale was normed on a predominantly 
White sample of women who were yoga practitioners, aerobic exercisers, and non-exercisers. 
The response format is a 7-point scale used to indicate agreement with statements about body 
responsiveness (1 = not at all true about me to 7 = very true about me), with higher scores 
indicating greater levels of body responsiveness. Item scores are averaged to create a scale 
score. Martin et al. (2013) used this scale as a measure of internal bodily awareness and 
found that scores on this measure mediated the relationship between yoga participation and 
both mindful eating and disordered eating. Daubenmier (2005) found that scores on this 
measure mediated the relationship between self-objectification and disordered eating 
attitudes, whereas scores on the BAQ did not. Daubenmier (2005) reported a Cronbach’s 
alpha of .83 and Martin et al. (2013) reported a Cronbach’s alpha of .77 for this scale. 
Convergent validity was evidenced by a positive correlation with the BAQ (Daubenmier, 
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 2005). An example item is, “I am confident that my body will let me know what is good for 
me.” 
Eating disorder attitudes and behaviors. Eating disorder attitudes and behaviors 
were measured using the Eating Attitudes Test-26 (EAT-26; Garner, Olmsted, Bohr, & 
Garfinkel, 1982; see Appendix H). The EAT-26 is a 26-item scale derived from the original 
Eating Attitudes Test-40. The EAT-26 contains three factors: dieting (13 items), bulimia and 
food preoccupation (6 items), and oral control (7 items), although a total has been supported 
and was used for this study (Garner et al., 1982). The response format is a 6-point scale used 
to indicate frequency of eating disordered thoughts and behaviors (1 = never through 6 = 
always). Consistent with Kozee and Tylka (2006) and Watson, Grotewiel, Farrell, Marshik, 
and Schneider’s (2015) scoring methodology, we calculated total scores by summing all 
responses in order to avoid floor effects associated with Garner et al.’s (1982) scoring in 
nonclinical samples. Higher scores indicate greater eating disorder attitudes and behaviors. 
Garner et al. (1982) reported a Cronbach’s alpha of .83 for the entire EAT-26 for a sample of 
undergraduate women and a Cronbach’s alpha of .90 for a sample of women receiving 
treatment for anorexia nervosa. Construct validity of the EAT-26 was evidenced by positive 
correlations with body size estimate, body dissatisfaction, body-image, and symptoms on the 
Hopkins Symptom Checklist (HSCL; Derogatis, Lipman, Rickets, Uhlenhuth, & Covi, 1974) 
and a negative correlation with ideal body size estimate for the anorexia nervosa sample 
(Garner et al., 1982). An example item is, “[I] am terrified about being overweight.” 
Depressive symptoms. Depressive symptoms were assessed using the Center for 
Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale Short Form (CES-D-SF; Cole, Rabin, Smith, & 
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 Kaufman, 2004; see Appendix I). The CES-D is a 10-item self-report measure developed to 
assess depressive symptomology in non-clinical populations for research purposes. It was 
developed from the 20-item CES-D (Radloff, 1977). The full CES-D scale was normed on 
predominantly White clinical and nonclinical adult samples. The CES-D-SF was developed 
with an undergraduate sample without reported demographic data and normed on a 
nonclinical multiethnic community sample (Cole et al., 2004). In line with Radloff’s (1977) 
original conceptualization of the CES-D, Cole et al. (2004) found support for a single-factor 
structure of the CES-D-SF. The response format of the CES-D-SF is a 4-point scale used to 
indicate frequency of experiences associated with depression in the past two weeks (1 = 
rarely or none of the time to 4 = most or all of the time), with higher scores indicating greater 
depressive symptomology. Item scores are summed to create a scale score. Cole et al. (2004) 
reported a Cronbach’s alpha .82 for the undergraduate sample and .75 for the community 
sample. The correlation between scores on the CES-D-SF and the Beck Depression Inventory 
(Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock, & Erbaugh, 1961) for the community sample was .74, 
evidencing strong convergent validity. An example item is, “I was bothered by things that 
usually don’t bother me.” 
Sexual functioning. An adapted version of the Female Sexual Function Index (FSFI; 
Rosen et al., 2000; see Appendix J) was used to assess sexual functioning. The complete 
FSFI is a self-report measure that produces a total score and subscale scores on five factors: 
desire/arousal, lubrication, orgasm, satisfaction, and pain. As suggested by Steer and 
Tiggemann (2008), the items related to lubrication and pain were omitted because they may 
feel too intrusive for some participants. Two questions related to satisfaction with a sexual 
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 partner were also omitted to allow women without a partner to complete the scale. Similarly, 
the wording of the questions was changed from Rosen et al.’s (2000) reference to sexual 
experiences during the past four weeks to Steer and Tiggemann’s (2008) reference to sexual 
experiences in general. This change was intended to allow women who were not currently 
sexually active to complete the scale. The response choices for these items ranged from 1 to 
5 with varying anchor terms (e.g., 1 = almost never or never to 5 = almost always or always; 
1 = very high to 5 = very low or none at all), with higher scores indicating greater sexual 
functioning. Item scores are summed to create a scale score. 
Steer and Tiggemann (2008) reported good internal consistency of their adapted 
version of the FSFI. Rosen et al. (2000) reported high two-to-four week test-retest reliability 
for their original five subscales (r = .79 to .86). In Rosen et al.’s (2000) study, construct 
validity was demonstrated by a significant difference in mean FSFI scores between a group 
of women diagnosed with female sexual arousal disorder and a control group. Divergent 
validity was demonstrated with low or non-significant correlations between scores on the 
FSFI subscales and scores on a measure of marital satisfaction. An example item is, 
“Generally, how often do you feel sexual desire or interest?” 
We added two additional items asking participants to indicate whether or not they 
considered themselves currently sexually active or sexually active sometime in the past. 
These items were not used in this analysis but could be useful in future analyses to explore 
differences between women who do and do not consider themselves sexually active. 
Dispositional mindfulness. Dispositional mindfulness was measured using the 
Freiburg Mindfulness Inventory-Short Form (FMI-SF; Walach, Buchheld, Buttenmuller, 
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 Kleinknect, & Schmidt, 2006; see Appendix K). The FMI-SF is a 14 item self-report measure 
developed as a shorter, alternative version of the Freiburg Mindfulness Inventory. It 
measures mindfulness as a general construct with interrelated attentional, awareness, and 
acceptance facets (Walach et al., 2006). The Short Form was specifically developed for use 
with a general population not necessarily familiar with Buddhism or meditation (Walach et 
al., 2006). The response format is a 4-point scale used to indicate frequency of mindful 
experiencing (1 = rarely to 4 = almost always), with higher scores indicating greater levels of 
dispositional mindfulness. Item scores are summed to create a scale score. Walach et al. 
(2006) reported an acceptable Cronbach’s alpha level of .79 for a general population sample. 
As evidence of construct validity, they reported that scores on the FMI-SF positively 
correlated with scores on measures of self-awareness and self-knowledge as well as years of 
meditation experience. An example item is, “I am open to the experience of the present 
moment.” 
Self-compassion. Self-compassion was assessed using the Self-Compassion Scale—
Short Form (SCS-SF; Raes, Pommier, Neff, & Gucht, 2011; see Appendix L). The SCS-SF is 
a 12 item self-report scale developed from the Self-Compassion Scale (SCS; Neff, 2003a) to 
assess overall self-compassion more efficiently. Like the SCS, the SCS-SF assesses six 
domains of self-compassion: self-kindness, self-judgment, common humanity, isolation, 
mindfulness, and over-identification; however, Raes et al. (2011) recommended that only the 
total score of the SCS-SF be used. The response format is a 5-point scale used to indicate 
frequency of self-compassion experiences (1 = almost never to 5 = almost always), with 
higher scores indicating greater levels of self-compassion. Item scores are summed to create 
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 a scale score. Raes et al. (2011) reported a Cronbach’s alpha value of .86 for a sample of 
undergraduate students in the United States Scores on the SCS-SF correlated nearly perfectly 
with scores on the SCS (r = .98). As evidence of construct validity of the SCS, Neff (2003a) 
reported that the mean total score of a group of practicing Buddhists was significantly higher 
than the mean total score of an undergraduate control group. Furthermore, SCS scores 
correlated with years of Buddhist practice for the Buddhist group. As evidence of convergent 
validity, Neff (2003a) reported moderate positive correlations with other measures of positive 
self-regard, including measures of self-esteem, self-acceptance, and self-determination. As 
evidence of discriminant validity, Neff (2003a) reported a non-significant correlation 
between the SCS and the Narcissistic Personality Inventory. An example item is, “When I 
fail at something important to me I become consumed by feelings of inadequacy” (reverse-
scored). 
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 CHAPTER 4 
RESULTS 
Missing Data 
 In total, 590 individuals accessed the survey. Fifteen would-be participants were 
prevented from completing the survey because they did not meet the inclusion criteria (i.e., 
two identified as men, five identified as over 50 years old, five did not identify as United 
States citizens, and three exited the survey before answering all of the screening questions). 
In addition, 13 respondents were removed for not identifying as women on the demographics 
form (i.e., 3 only identified as gender fluid, 1 only identified as genderqueer, 3 only 
identified as gender non-binary, and 6 did not respond to this item). Three were removed for 
identifying their age as over 50 years on the demographics form, and eight were removed for 
not indicating age. Three respondents were removed for not identifying height and/or weight, 
and 47 respondents were removed because they neglected to complete one or more entire 
scales. Finally, one participant was removed because she exhibited a suspicious response 
pattern (e.g., indicated the same value for each item on multiple inventories, including 
reverse-scored items). Therefore, a total of 500 cases were included in the data analysis 
moving forward. Although 550 participants were desired in order to create a 10:1 ratio of 
cases to free parameters, a sample size of 500 was deemed sufficient because it surpassed the 
minimum recommended ratio of 5:1 (Norman & Streiner, 2003). With 500 participants and 
55 free parameters, the cases to free parameters ratio in this study was 9.1:1. 
  We examined the data for nonignorable patterns of missing responses and found 
none. Notably, no variable was missing more than 5% of its data. Using listwise deletion 
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 would have resulted in the loss of 158 cases, so expectation maximization (EM) was used to 
impute missing-item level data instead.  
Participant Description 
 Data from 500 women between ages 18-50 who reported living in the United States 
were analyzed. Most participants (497; 99.4%) identified their sex assigned at birth as 
female; two (0.4%) reported their sex assigned at birth as male, and one (0.2%) did not 
respond to this question. The average age was 30.59 years (SD = 7.91); age ranged from 18 
through 50 years. For gender identity, race/ethnicity/cultural identity, and sexual orientation, 
participants were asked to select all identities with which they identified, so percentages sum 
to greater than 100%. For gender identity, all 500 participants (100.0%) identified as women; 
two participants (0.4%) also identified as gender queer; one participant (0.2%) also identified 
as gender fluid, and one participant (0.2%) also identified as gender non-binary. 
 For race/ethnicity/cultural identity, the majority of participants (n = 382; 76.4%) 
identified as Caucasian/White/European American. Respondents also identified as 
Asian/Pacific Islander (n = 39; 7.8%), Hispanic/Latina (n = 38; 7.6%), Black/African 
American (n = 32; 6.4%), Native American/American Indian/Alaskan Native (n = 29; 5.8%), 
Multiracial/Multiethnic (n = 15; 3.0%), East Indian (n = 2; 0.4%), Middle Eastern (n = 1; 
0.2%), and West Indian (n = 1; 0.2%). Racial/ethnic makeup of the entire sample was 
checked against comparable United States Census data (United States Census Bureau, 2015). 
The United States Census categorizes Hispanic ethnicity as a separate construct than race, 
such that there is no Hispanic/Latina racial category. In 2014, of the 70,059,476 United 
States women ages 18-50 included in the Census, 73.7% identified as White, 14.7% 
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 identified as Black or African American, 1.3% identified as American Indian or Alaska 
Native, 6.7% identified as Asian, .3% identified as Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific 
Islander, and 2.4% identified as Two or More Races. Of all United States women, 83.1% 
identified as non-Hispanic. When differences in operationalization of Hispanic ethnicity are 
considered, our sample is fairly representative of the United States population of women 
within this age range. 
 For sexual orientation, the majority of participants identified as straight/heterosexual 
(n = 426; 85.2%). Respondents also identified as bisexual (n = 54; 10.8%), lesbian (n = 10; 
2.0%), queer (n = 7; 1.4%), pansexual (n = 2; 0.4%), questioning (n = 2; 0.4%), and other 
sexual orientation (self-identifying as asexual, n = 5, 1.0%; biromantic asexual, n = 1, 0.2%; 
and straight, n = 1, 0.2%). Sexual orientation identity of the entire sample was checked 
against comparable data from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (Ward, 
Dahlhamer, Galinsky, & Joestl, 2014). Within a nationally representative sample of 118,833 
adult women, 97.7% identified as heterosexual, 1.5% identified as gay or lesbian, and 0.9% 
identified as bisexual. Compared to these national statistics, women who identify as 
heterosexual were underrepresented in our study and women who identify as lesbian or 
bisexual were overrepresented. 
 Regarding racial/ethnic/cultural identity and sexual orientation identity within this 
study, proportions were similar across recruitment methods: For PsychPool, 83.7% of 
participants identified as Caucasian/White/European American and 81.6% identified as 
heterosexual; for MTurk, 74.5% of participants identified as Caucasian/White/European 
96 
 
 American and 85.4% identified as heterosexual; and for social media, 88.5% of participants 
identified as Caucasian/White/European American and 78.2% identified as heterosexual. 
 Participants were also asked to select categories that best described their highest 
education and annual income level. The highest percentage of respondents reported that they 
held a bachelor’s degree (n = 184; 36.8%). Other respondents reported some college, no 
degree (n = 110; 22.0%); master’s degree (n = 83; 16.6%); associate’s degree (n = 54; 
10.8%); high school diploma (n = 32; 6.4%); vocational or trade school (n = 13; 2.6%); 
doctorate degree (n = 12; 2.4%); professional degree (n = 7; 1.4%); or GED (n = 3; 0.6%); 
with two participants (0.4%) not responding. Regarding annual income, 97 (19.4%) 
respondents reported $0-9,999; 59 (11.8%) reported $10,000-19,999; 76 (15.2%) reported 
$20,000-29,999; 70 (14.0%) reported $30,000-39,000; 69 (13.8%) reported $40,000-49,000; 
39 (7.8%) reported $50,000-59,000; 28 (5.6%) reported $60,000-69,000; 20 (4.0%) reported 
$70,000-79,000; 6 (1.2%) reported $80,000-89,000; 11 (2.2%) reported $90,000-99,000; 22 
(4.4%) reported $100,000 or more; and 3 (0.6%) did not respond to this question. 
 Participants were asked to enter their height in inches and weight in pounds. The 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s (2015) formula was used to calculate body 
mass index (BMI), and their classification system was used to sort BMIs into four categories: 
BMIs below 18.5 indicate underweight; BMIs 18.5-24.9 indicate normal or healthy weight; 
BMIs 25.0-29.9 indicate overweight; and BMIs 30.0 and above indicate obese. The average 
BMI of our sample was 26.12. Twenty-eight (5.6%) participants were classified as 
underweight, 252 (50.4%) were classified as normal or healthy weight, 102 (20.4%) were 
classified as overweight, and 118 (23.6%) were classified as obese. BMI classification of the 
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 entire sample was checked against comparable data by the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention in 2005-2006 analyzed by Sharma (n.d.). Within a nationally representative 
sample of 118,833 women ages 20-49, 3.1% were classified as underweight, 39.1% were 
classified as normal weight, 22.6% were classified as overweight, and 35.2% were classified 
as obese. Compared to these national statistics, women classified as normal weight were 
overrepresented in our study and women classified as obese were underrepresented. 
Data Screening 
 As suggested by Warner (2011), continuous scores were screened for normality and 
violation of assumptions prior to performing inferential statistical analyses. Z-scores were 
examined for univariate outliers. Seven z-scores for BMI and two z-scores for other scales 
from two participants fell between |3.00| and |3.50|. Because these data were not severely 
non-normal, and because SEM is robust to minor violations of normality, we did not remove 
these cases. All scale skewness values were less than |3.00| and all kurtosis values were less 
than |10.00|, suggesting that data were normally distributed. Visual inspection of univariate 
histograms also demonstrated normal distribution. 
 Finally, normality of the relationships among variables was assessed. Scatter plots 
evidenced bivariate linearity, or at least no curvilinearity. Homoscedasticity was 
demonstrated using a scatterplot of standardized residual values by predicted values. 
Mahalonobis values were examined to assess for multivariate normality. Amos (Arbuckle, 
2012) provides two Mahalonobis p values that indicate multivariate outliers: p1, which is the 
probability of an observation from a multivariate normal distribution being that far from the 
centroid, and p2 <, which is the probability of the ordered values of N distances being that far 
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 from the centroid. Cases that are significant at both p1 and p2 are interpreted as multivariate 
outliers; there were 48 such cases in the data. Models were analyzed using all 500 cases and 
the 452 cases with multivariate outliers removed; local and global fit was comparable, so 
multivariate outliers were retained. 
Exploratory Factor Analyses 
The dimensionality and reliability of each scale and subscale were assessed. A 
principal factors analysis (also known as principal axis factoring, or PAF) was conducted 
with all scales to verify that their dimensional structures were appropriate for this sample. 
Direct oblimin rotation was used to permit correlations between factors (Field, 2013). The 
number of factors extracted for each measure was determined by theory specific to the 
constructs measured, previous research, the Kaiser-Meyer-Oklin (KMO) measure of 
sampling adequacy, and scree plots. We looked for factor loadings of .32 and above and no 
or few crossloadings (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2012). Cronbach’s alpha was then calculated for 
each scale or subscale to assess internal consistency. Structural characteristics for all scales 
are indicated in Table 1. 
 OBC-Surv. For the eight items on this scale, KMO = .84, suggesting “meritorious” 
sampling adequacy (Hutcheson & Sofroniou, 1999). Bartlett’s test of sphericity was 
significant, χ2(28) = 1,517.11, p < .001, demonstrating that the correlations between items 
were sufficiently large for EFA. Examination of the scree plot suggested a single factor 
solution that explained 42.65% of the scale variance and is consistent with conventional 
scoring procedures. It is important to note that analyses for this scale used pairwise deletion 
99 
 
 100 
Table 1 
Structural Characteristics of Instruments 
 
N  Items KMO Bartlett’s test 
Perecent var. 
explained α 
Objectified Body Consciousness Scale--
Body Surveillance 
456a 8 .84 1,517.11(28)** 42.65 .85 
Objectified Body Consciousness Scale--
Body Shame 
451a 8 .84 1,398.33(28)** 42.34 .84 
Social Appearance Anxiety Scale 500 16 .96 6,902.54(120)** 60.84 .96 
Dispositional Flow Scale-2 Long Form, 
Concentration subscale 
500 4 .79 841.31(6)** 58.08 .84 
Dispositional Flow Scale-2 Long Form, Control 
subscale 
500 4 .78 644.50(6)** 51.94 .81 
Dispositional Flow Scale-2 Long Form, Loss of 
Self-Consciousness subscale 
500 4 .80 728.51(6)** 55.18 .83 
Daubenmier’s body responsiveness scale 500 7 .75 1,363.73(21)** 58.09 .86 & .74b 
Physical safety anxiety scale 500 3 .70 1,378.98(3)** 82.55 .93 
Eating Attitudes Test-26 500 26 .92 234.98(3)**b 41.17 .93 
Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression 
Scale Short Form 
500 10 .90 1,880.82(45)** 41.07 .87 
Female Sexual Function Index 500 10 .89 3,638.07(45)** 55.03 .92 
Freiburg Mindfulness Inventory--Short Form 500 14 .92 2,592.66(91)** 37.57 .89 
Self-Compassion Scale—Short Form 500 12 .92 3,053.93(66)** 43.29 .90 
Note: All scales except BR yielded a single-factor solution. KMO = Kaiser- Meyer-Olkin; α = Cronbach’s alpha. 
a. Missing data for the Objectified Body Consciousness Scale subscale scores was imputed at the scale rather than item-level, resulting in smaller 
sample sizes for these exploratory factor analyses. b. BR yielded a two-factor solution, BR-Congruence and BR-Incongruence. 
 
 
 
 
 
 of items to handle “N/A” and truly missing responses. Cronbach’s alpha using the PFA 
correlation matrix was .85. 
 OBC-Shame. For the eight items on this scale, KMO = .84, suggesting “meritorious” 
sampling adequacy (Hutcheson & Sofroniou, 1999). Bartlett’s test of sphericity was 
significant, χ2(28) = 1,398.33, p < .001. Examination of the scree plot suggested a single 
factor solution that explained 42.34% of the scale variance and is consistent with 
conventional scoring procedures. Cronbach’s alpha was .84. It is important to note that 
analyses for this scale used pairwise deletion of items to handle “N/A” and truly missing 
responses. Cronbach’s alpha using the PFA correlation matrix was .84. 
 SAAS. For the 16 items on this scale, KMO = .96, suggesting “marvelous” sampling 
adequacy (Hutcheson & Sofroniou, 1999). Bartlett’s test of sphericity was significant, 
χ2(120) = 6,902.54, p < .001. Examination of the scree plot suggested a single factor 
solution, which is consistent with the conventional scoring procedure. This single factor 
solution explained 60.84% of the variance with all items retained. Cronbach’s alpha was .96. 
 DFS-2 Concentration. Three separate PFAs were conducted for the three DFS-2 
subscales used in the primary analysis. For the four items on the Concentration (CONC) 
subscale, the KMO = .79, suggesting “middling” (but acceptable) sampling adequacy 
(Hutcheson & Sofroniou, 1999). Bartlett’s test of sphericity was significant, χ2(6) = 841.31, 
p < .001. Examination of the scree plot suggested a single factor solution, which is consistent 
with the conventional scoring procedure. This single factor solution explained 58.08% of the 
variance with all items retained. Cronbach’s alpha was .84.
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  DFS-2 Control. For the four items on the Control (CONT) subscale, the KMO = .78, 
suggesting “middling” sampling adequacy (Hutcheson & Sofroniou, 1999). Bartlett’s test of 
sphericity was significant, χ2(6) = 644.50, p < .001. Examination of the scree plot suggested 
a single factor solution, which is consistent with the conventional scoring procedure. This 
single factor solution explained 51.94% of the variance with all items retained. Cronbach’s 
alpha was .81. 
 DFS-2 Loss of Self-Consciousness. For the four items on the Loss of Self-
Consciousness (LOSS) subscale, the KMO = .80, suggesting “meritorious” sampling 
adequacy (Hutcheson & Sofroniou, 1999). Bartlett’s test of sphericity was significant, χ2(6) 
= 728.51, p < .001. Examination of the scree plot suggested a single factor solution, which is 
consistent with the conventional scoring procedure. This single factor solution explained 
55.18% of the variance with all items retained. Cronbach’s alpha was .83. 
 PSA. For the three items on this scale, the KMO = .70, suggesting “middling” 
sampling adequacy (Hutcheson & Sofroniou, 1999). Bartlett’s test of sphericity was 
significant, χ2(3) = 1,378.98, p < .001. Examination of the scree plot suggested a single 
factor solution, which explained 82.55% of the variance with all items retained. Cronbach’s 
alpha was .93. 
 BR. For the seven items on this scale, the KMO = .75, suggesting “middling” 
sampling adequacy (Hutcheson & Sofroniou, 1999). Bartlett’s test of sphericity was 
significant, χ2(21) = 1,363.73, p < .001. Examination of the scree plot suggested a two factor 
solution that explained 58.09% of the variance. Items 1, 5, 6, and 7 loaded on Factor 1, 
labeled Mind-Body Congruence; these items all assess trust and appreciation for bodily 
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 feelings. Items 2, 3, and 4 loaded on Factor 2, labeled Mind-Body Incongruence; these items 
all assess discrepancies between thoughts and bodily feelings or sensations. Because the 
three items on Factor 2 were originally reverse-scored, we considered the possibility of an 
artifact effect; however, the correlations among the items from different factors are very low, 
suggesting that the factors truly are measuring different constructs. For theoretical 
consistency, original rather than reversed scores were used for this subscale, such that higher 
scores indicate greater mind-body incongruence. Cronbach’s alpha for the Mind-Body 
Congruence subscale was .86. Cronbach’s alpha for the Mind-Body Incongruence subscale 
was .74.  
 EAT-26. For the 26 items on this scale, the KMO = .92, suggesting “marvelous” 
sampling adequacy (Hutcheson & Sofroniou, 1999). Bartlett’s test of sphericity was 
significant, χ2(325) = 7,262.75, p < .001. Examination of the scree plot suggested that a 
three-factor solution would fit the data well and explain 50.34% of the variance. The three 
factors that emerged somewhat paralleled the three factors identified by Garner et al. (1982). 
Items 1, 3, 4, 10, 11, 12, 14, 18, 21, and 22 loaded on Factor 1, which may be described as 
bulimic behaviors and food preoccupation. Items 2, 5, 8, 9, 13, 15, 20, 24, and 26 loaded on 
Factor 2, which included restrictive behaviors and a social pressure to eat. Items 6, 7, 16, 17, 
19, and 23 loaded on Factor 3, which may be described as diet behaviors. Item 25, “[I] enjoy 
trying rich new foods” (reverse-scored), did not load on any factor. An alternative, single 
factor solution explained 35.29% of the variance. All items other than 25 and 19 (“[I] display 
self-control around food”) loaded on this single factor with loadings of .32 or greater. Both of 
these items correlated poorly with the rest of the scale: for Item 25, r = -.07, and for Item 19, 
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 r = .13. We determined that removing these two items would not change the nature of the 
scale. Item 25 was only tangentially related to eating disordered thoughts and behaviors; 
many people choose to try or abstain from rich new foods for reasons unrelated to eating 
issues. Likewise, Item 19 was worded with a positive valence, but not reverse-scored, and 
thus a participant’s response to this item may be unrelated to their responses to the rest of the 
scale. After removing these two items, the single factor solution explained 37.60% of the 
variance. Garner et al. (1982) postulated that a multi-factor approach to the EAT-26 may be 
helpful in predicting treatment responsiveness; however, we were interested in overall 
severity of eating-related thoughts and behaviors. For this reason, we chose to retain the 24 
item single factor solution. Cronbach’s alpha for the single-factor scale was .93. 
 CES-D. For the ten items on this scale, the KMO = .90, suggesting “marvelous” 
sampling adequacy (Hutcheson & Sofroniou, 1999). Bartlett’s test of sphericity was 
significant, χ2(45) = 1,880.82, p < .001. Examination of the scree plot suggested a single 
factor solution, which explained 41.07% of the variance with all items retained and was 
consistent with conventional scoring procedure. Cronbach’s alpha was .87. 
 FSFI. For the ten items on this scale, the KMO = .89, suggesting “meritorious” 
sampling adequacy (Hutcheson & Sofroniou, 1999). Bartlett’s test of sphericity was 
significant, χ2(45) = 3,638.07, p < .001. Examination of the scree plot suggested a single 
factor solution, which explained 55.03% of the variance with all items retained and was 
consistent with conventional scoring procedure. Cronbach’s alpha was .92. 
 FMI. For the 14 items on this scale, the KMO = .92, suggesting “marvelous” 
sampling adequacy (Hutcheson & Sofroniou, 1999). Bartlett’s test of sphericity was 
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 significant, χ2(91) = 2,592.66, p < .001. Examination of the scree plot suggested a single 
factor solution, which explained 37.57% of the variance. Item 13, “I am impatient with 
myself and with others,” the only reverse-scored item, did not load on this factor at our 
threshold of .32; however, we decided to retain it because it correlated with the rest of the 
scale at r = .24, suggesting that a participant’s response to this item was related to their 
responses to other items. Further, if this item were deleted, the scale variance would decrease 
from 58.72 to 54.94, and Cronbach's alpha would remain the same. The low factor loading is 
likely due to a measurement artifact (i.e., the reverse-scoring wording). Cronbach’s alpha for 
this scale was .89. 
 SCS. For the 12 items on this scale, the KMO = .92, suggesting “marvelous” 
sampling adequacy (Hutcheson & Sofroniou, 1999). Bartlett’s test of sphericity was 
significant, χ2(66) = 3,053.93, p < .001. Examination of the scree plot suggested a two factor 
solution that explained 55.51% of the variance; however, all of the reverse-scored items 
loaded on one factor and all of the other items loaded on the second factor, suggesting that 
this solution was the result of differences in item wording rather than item functioning. The 
analysis was rerun forcing a single factor solution. This solution explained 43.29% of the 
scale variance with all items retained. Cronbach’s alpha was .90. 
Descriptive Analyses 
Mean scores, standard deviations, minimum and maximum values, and 95% 
confidence intervals for continuous demographic variables and scales for the entire sample 
are reported in Table 2. Score means and ranges were consistent with those reported in scale  
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Table 2 
Means, Standard Deviations, Minimum and Maximum Values, and 95% Mean Confidence Intervals Among All Variables (N = 
500) 
 M SD Minimum Maximum 95% CI 
Age 30.59 7.91 18.00 50.00 (29.90, 31.29) 
BMI 26.12 7.11 10.30 63.50 (25.49, 26.74) 
OBC-Surv 4.31 1.23 1.00 7.00 (4.20, 4.42) 
OBC-Shame 3.74 1.32 1.00 7.00 (3.63, 3.86) 
SAAS 43.61 15.11 16.00 80.70 (42.28, 44.94) 
CONC 13.80 3.04 6.00 20.00 (13.53, 14.07) 
CONT 14.08 2.95 5.00 20.00 (13.82, 14.34) 
LOSS 11.09 3.47 4.00 20.00 (10.78, 11.39) 
BR-Con 4.66 1.31 1.00 7.00 (4.54, 4.77) 
BR-Incon 3.62 1.41 1.00 7.00 (3.49, 3.74) 
PSA 16.75 8.46 3.00 30.00 (16.02, 17.50) 
EAT-26 68.17 21.25 26.00 131.00 (66.30, 70.04) 
CES-D 9.37 6.38 0.00 30.00 (8.81, 9.93) 
FSFI 34.39 8.72 10.00 50.00 (33.62, 35.16) 
FMI-SF 36.80 7.66 17.00 56.00 (36.13, 37.47) 
SCS-SF 35.49 9.43 12.00 60.00 (34.66, 36.31) 
Note: BMI = Body Mass Index; OBC-Surv = Objectified Body Consciousness Scale, Body Surveillance subscale; OBC-Shame = Objectified Body 
Consciousness Scale, Body Shame subscale; SAAS = Social Appearance Anxiety Scale; CONC = Dispositional Flow Scale-2 Long Form, 
Concentration subscale; CONT = Dispositional Flow Scale-2 Long Form, Control subscale; LOSS = Dispositional Flow Scale-2 Long Form, Loss of 
Self-Consciousness subscale; BR-Con = Daubenmier’s body responsiveness scale, mind-body congruence subscale; BR-Incon = Daubenmier’s body 
responsiveness scale, mind-body incongruence subscale; PSA = Physical safety anxiety scale; EAT-26 = Eating Attitudes Test-26; CES-D = Center for 
Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale Short Form; FSFI = Female Sexual Function Index; FMI-SF = Freiburg Mindfulness Inventory-Short Form; 
SCS-SF = Self-Compassion Scale—Short Form.
 
 
 development studies as well as Grotewiel and Marszalek (2013), which used some of the 
same measures. 
 Correlations, covariances, and variances for the entire sample are reported in Table 3. 
Significant correlations among scale variables were generally in the expected directions, with 
the exception of a small, positive correlation between mind-body congruence and physical 
safety anxiety (r = .10, p < .05), which may have been spurious or due to errors in the 
measurement of physical safety anxiety. In general, correlations with mental health outcome 
variables were significant, with the exception of the following pairs: concentration and 
disordered eating; body surveillance and sexual functioning; physical safety anxiety and 
sexual functioning. 
 Age and BMI were not analyzed in the path analysis, but attention to their 
relationships with other variables could be useful to future researchers in this area. Older age 
was generally associated with more desirable scale scores, including significant positive  
correlations with concentration and self-compassion and significant negative correlations 
with body surveillance, mind-body incongruence, physical safety anxiety, disordered eating, 
and depression symptoms. Higher BMI was generally associated with less desirable scale 
scores, including positive correlations with body shame, appearance anxiety, and mind-body 
incongruence and negative correlations with mind-body congruence, dispositional 
mindfulness, and self-compassion. Age and BMI were positively correlated. 
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Table 3 
Correlations and Variances Among All Variables (N = 500) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1. Age 62.50                
2.  BMI .19** 50.59               
3. OBC-Surv -.10* .01 1.51              
4. OBC-Shame -.04 .24** .45** 1.74             
5. SAAS -.05 .29** .44** .70** 228.41            
6. CONC .11* -.01 -.20** -.18** -.24** 9.23           
7. CONT .06 -.07 -.21** -.30** -.42** .70** 8.70          
8. LOSS .03 -.05 -.51** -.39** -.45** .43** .47** 12.03         
9. BR-Con .02 -.17** -.25** -.26** -.36** .38** .45** .35** 1.72        
10. BR-Incon -.18** .16** .13** .40** .42** -.20** -.23** -.15** -.16** 1.99       
11. PSA -.17** -.04 .09 .17** .18** .09 -.02 -.08 .10* .13** 71.51      
12. EAT-26 -.11* .07 .24** .61** .50** -.03 -.16** -.13** -.09* .45** .28** 451.48     
13. CES-D -.23** .05 .17** .41** .53** -.36** -.47** -.30** -.29** .46** .21** .44** 40.64    
14. FSFI .05 -.03 -.05 -.21** -.25** .20** .27** .17** .30** -.09* -.02 -.16** -.22** 76.06   
15. FMI-SF .06 -.10* -.31** -.40** -.48** .51** .60** .51** .53** -.25** -.06 -.16** -.52** .34** 58.72  
16. SCS-SF .14** -.10* -.38** -.49** -.56** .40** .47** .45** .42** -.37** -.18** -.31** -.63** .30** .77** 88.83 
Note: BMI = Body Mass Index; OBC-Surv = Objectified Body Consciousness Scale, Body Surveillance subscale; OBC-Shame = Objectified Body 
Consciousness Scale, Body Shame subscale; SAAS = Social Appearance Anxiety Scale; CONC = Dispositional Flow Scale-2 Long Form, 
Concentration subscale; CONT = Dispositional Flow Scale-2 Long Form, Control subscale; LOSS = Dispositional Flow Scale-2 Long Form, Loss of 
Self-Consciousness subscale; PSA = Physical safety anxiety scale; BR-Con = Daubenmier’s body responsiveness scale, mind-body congruence 
subscale; BR-Incon = Daubenmier’s body responsiveness scale, mind-body incongruence subscale; EAT-26 = Eating Attitudes Test-26; CES-D = 
Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale Short Form; FSFI = Female Sexual Function Index; FMI-SF = Freiburg Mindfulness Inventory-
Short Form; SCS-SF = Self-Compassion Scale—Short Form. Diagonal with underlined coefficients represents scale variances.  
* = p < .05, ** = p < .0
 
 
 Inferential Statistical Tests 
A 1 X 3 multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was conducted to test for 
differences on 14 scale and subscale scores based on sampling method. Results of the Box’s 
M test were significant, Box’s M = 250.80, F(182, 49,724.97) = 1.26, p < .05, suggesting that 
the assumption of equality of covariances was violated. Because of this violation, instead of 
interpreting the results of the MANOVA, we conducted 14 analyses of variance (ANOVA; 
i.e., one for each scale or subscale) using a Bonferroni adjusted alpha coefficient of .004 (i.e., 
.05/14 = .004). Levene’s test was used to evaluate the homogeneity of variances for all 
analyses. For 12 analyses, this statistic was not significant at p = .004, indicating that equal 
variances could be assumed across groups (see Table 4). For two analyses (i.e., eating 
disordered behaviors and depression), Levene’s statistic was significant, p < .004. Because 
equal variances could not be assumed for these two analyses, Welch’s statistic was 
interpreted in place of the F statistic. Results showed no significant differences among 
groups. For eating disordered behaviors, Welch’s F(2, 107.09) = 1.98, p > .05. For 
depression, Welch’s F(2, 101.65) = 1.72, p > .05. Because results of all 14 ANOVAs showed 
no differences on any mean scale or subscale scores between groups, we chose to perform 
SEM using the entire sample. 
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 Table 4 
Analyses of Variance in Scale Scores by Recruitment Method 
      Levene’s Test 
Scale df1 df2 F p η2 Statistic df1 df2 p 
3. OBC-Surv 2 497 1.41 .246 .01 3.30 2 497 .038 
4. OBC-Shame 2 497 1.59 .205 .01 0.27 2 497 .764 
5. SAAS 2 497 1.69 .185 .01 1.88 2 497 .154 
6. CONC 2 497 6.06 .003 .02 0.99 2 497 .371 
7. CONT 2 497 2.83 .060 .01 0.67 2 497 .514 
8. LOSS 2 497 1.12 .326 .00 0.72 2 497 .487 
9. BR-Con 2 497 3.34 .036 .01 2.59 2 497 .076 
10. BR-Incon 2 497 1.48 .229 .01 2.68 2 497 .069 
11. PSA 2 497 0.73 .482 .00 2.17 2 497 .115 
12. EAT-26 2 497 1.51 .222 .01 9.26 2 497 .000 
13. CES-D 2 497 1.51 .222 .01 6.25 2 497 .002 
14. FSFI 2 497 0.42 .657 .00 1.02 2 497 .361 
15. FMI-SF 2 497 2.48 .084 .01 0.91 2 497 .402 
16. SCS-SF 2 497 1.73 .178 .01 3.32 2 497 .037 
Note: OBC-Surv = Objectified Body Consciousness Scale, Body Surveillance subscale; OBC-Shame = 
Objectified Body Consciousness Scale, Body Shame subscale; SAAS = Social Appearance Anxiety Scale; 
CONC = Dispositional Flow Scale-2 Long Form, Concentration subscale; CONT = Dispositional Flow Scale-2 
Long Form, Control subscale; LOSS = Dispositional Flow Scale-2 Long Form, Loss of Self-Consciousness 
subscale; PSA = Physical safety anxiety scale; BR-Con = Daubenmier’s body responsiveness scale, mind-body 
congruence subscale; BR-Incon = Daubenmier’s body responsiveness scale, mind-body incongruence subscale; 
EAT-26 = Eating Attitudes Test-26; CES-D = Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale Short Form; 
FSFI = Female Sexual Function Index; FMI-SF = Freiburg Mindfulness Inventory-Short Form; SCS-SF = Self-
Compassion Scale—Short Form.
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 Structural Equation Models 
 The purposes of this study were to: (a) establish a clearer understanding of the role of 
flow in objectification theory, and (b) investigate the moderating effects of dispositional 
mindfulness and self-compassion on the relationships between body surveillance and flow, 
body shame, appearance anxiety, and body responsiveness. The model depicted in Figure 2 
was proposed to examine the role of flow; the model depicted in Figure 3 was proposed to 
examine the role of dispositional mindfulness; and the model depicted in Figure 4 was 
proposed to examine the role of self-compassion. Note that these proposed models included 
conceptualization of body responsiveness as two constructs, mind-body congruence and 
mind-body incongruence, as suggested by the EFA. Also, we included the following 
correlations in all models based on previous research and theory: (a) body shame and 
appearance anxiety (Grotewiel & Marszalek, 2013; Tiggemann & Williams, 2012); (b) 
concentration, sense of control, and loss of self-consciousness (Csikszentmihalyi, 1975; 
Jackson & Eklund, 2002); and (c) disordered eating, depression symptoms, and sexual 
functioning (Tiggemann & Williams, 2012). 
 All models were estimated and evaluated using maximum likelihood estimation in 
Amos v23.0 (Arbuckle, 2012). The appropriateness of each structural regression model for 
the data was measured by the following global indices of goodness-of-fit: the chi-square 
goodness-of-fit index, the Comparative Fit Index (CFI), the root mean square error of 
approximate (RMSEA), and standard root mean square residual (SRMR; Kline, 2016). The 
chi-square statistic indicates the amount of difference between expected and observed 
covariance matrixes for the model; a value close to 0 with a probability value greater than .05 
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 suggests that the model is a good fit for the data. The CFI is an incremental fit index and 
goodness-of-fit statistic. It compares departure from close fit of the data to the model against 
a null model. A CFI value over .95 indicates good fit (Kline, 2016). RMSEA assesses model 
departure from assumed close fit; values less than .05 indicate close fit and values greater 
than .10 indicate poor fit (Kline, 2016). RMSEA is usually reported with a 90% confidence 
interval; a 90% confidence interval is used rather than the more traditional 95% confidence 
interval because if RMSEA = 0 (which indicates perfect fit), the lower bound value of the 
confidence interval would also equal 0, creating a one-sided confidence interval, which is 
analogous to conducting a one-tailed hypothesis test. SRMR assesses the mean absolute 
covariance residual. An SRMR of 0 indicates perfect model fit, and values greater than .10 
may indicate poor fit (Kline, 2016). Finally, good local fit of the data is demonstrated by 
standardized residual covariances less than or equal to |2.00| (Arbuckle, 2012). 
Model 1: The mediating role of flow. Model fit statistics were examined to verify 
adequacy of the hypothesized model demonstrating the role of flow in the objectification 
theory framework (Figure 2). This model was theoretically identified (i.e., a recursive path 
model with df  > 0; Kline, 2016). Using Kline’s (2016) criteria, fit statistics for this model 
were poor: χ2(27) = 376.54, p < .001, CFI = .84, RMSEA = .16, 90% CI [.15, .18], and 
SRMR = .13. Many standardized residual covariances were greater than |2.00|, evidencing 
poor local fit. Together, these results suggested that the model should be modified to 
incorporate direct pathways or covariances between variables with large standardized 
residual covariances in cases in which a relationship would be theoretically supported. Paths 
were added one by one and fit statistics were examined after the addition of each path. For 
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 purposes of parsimony, however, paths are discussed in small, thematic groups in this 
section. 
The relationships between the two indicators of body responsiveness, mind-body 
congruence and mind-body incongruence, and other consequences for women’s subjective 
experiences were modified first. Direct paths were added from body shame to mind-body 
congruence (standardized residual covariance = -3.34) and mind-body incongruence (residual 
covariance = 7.54); it is likely that higher levels of body shame would decrease one’s 
motivation and/or ability to cue into internal bodily signals. This link is supported by the 
findings of Tylka and Hill (2004), who demonstrated that body shame predicted unique 
variance in poor awareness of hunger, satiety, and emotions. The confidence about bodily 
messages inherent in mind-body congruence is inconsistent with high levels of body-related 
anxiety, suggesting a negative effect of appearance anxiety on mind-body congruence 
(residual covariance = -5.54) and an exacerbating effect on mind-body incongruence 
(residual covariance = 8.02). Direct pathways were added from the body responsiveness 
variables to sense of control (residual covariance = 8.82 for mind-body congruence and 
residual covariance = -4.57 for mind-body incongruence). This aspect of dispositional flow 
taps into one’s feelings of control over his or her body; it is likely that sense of control is 
affected by one’s ability to sense and respond to their bodily feelings. Similarly, direct 
pathways were added from the body responsiveness variables to loss of self-consciousness; 
lack of mind-body congruence (residual covariance = 4.94) and mind-body incongruence 
(residual covariance = 1.95) may contribute to an increased reliance on others’ evaluations of 
one’s body and performance. Finally, the body responsiveness variables were allowed to 
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 correlate with concentration due to the overlaps with the other dispositional flow variables 
and high standardized residual covariances (7.40 for mind-body congruence and -3.84 for 
mind-body incongruence). Fit statistics for this alternate model were χ2(17) = 98.49, p < .001, 
CFI = .96, RMSEA = .10, 90% CI [.08, .12], and SRMR = .06. Although this model fits the 
data significantly better than the original model, Δχ2(10) = 278.05, p < .001, it is still a poor 
global fit based on Kline’s (2016) criteria. In addition, several standardized covariance 
residuals were still greater than |2.00|. 
The next set of modifications were made around appearance anxiety based on 
findings in Grotewiel and Marszalek’s (2013) study. In this study, social appearance anxiety 
was found to be associated with loss of self-consciousness, sense of control, and 
concentration as well or better than body surveillance. Drawing from work on the role of 
affect on evaluations of experiences (e.g., Klaaren, Hodges, & Wilson, 1994), it was assumed 
that affect (in this case, appearance anxiety) would influence whether or not a person 
experiences flow. For example, a woman therapist who fears that her appearance is being 
evaluated by a client may have difficulty getting into flow because she appraises the situation 
as threatening. These effects are likely to carry over to the trait level. Thus, direct pathways 
were added from appearance anxiety to concentration (standardized residual covariance = -
3.31), control (standardized residual covariance = -3.89), and loss of self-consciousness 
(standardized residual covariance = -3.25). Fit statistics for this alternate model were χ2(14) = 
59.95, p < .001, CFI = .98, RMSEA = .08, 90% CI [.06, .10], and SRMR = .04. This model 
again fit the data significantly better than the previous model, Δχ2(3) = 38.54, p < .001, but it 
still had poor local fit and mixed indicators of global fit. 
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 The final set of modifications were made around physical safety anxiety. Like body 
responsiveness, physical safety anxiety has received relatively less empirical attention than 
other consequences for women’s subjective experience. Theoretically, it is possible that 
women who have experienced threats to their physical safety (i.e.., being raped, assaulted, 
attacked, robbed, or mugged) will have higher levels of physical safety anxiety as well as 
higher levels of shame. Thus, physical safety anxiety and body shame were allowed to 
correlate (standardized residual covariance = 2.91). Furthermore, high levels of physical 
safety anxiety are likely associated with high levels of anxiety across the board, including 
social appearance anxiety, so physical safety anxiety and social appearance anxiety were 
allowed to correlate (standardized residual covariance = 3.15). A path was added from 
physical safety anxiety to concentration due to its distracting effect (standardized residual 
covariance = 2.28). Finally, physical safety anxiety was allowed to correlate with the body 
responsiveness variables (for mind-body congruence, 2.70 and for mind-body incongruence, 
2.64). It is likely that a reciprocal effect exists between physical safety anxiety and body 
responsiveness, such that high levels of physical safety anxiety (including vigilance) make 
listening and responding to one’s own body more difficult, whereas high levels of body 
responsiveness (e.g., feeling in touch with and control over one’s own body) may decrease 
physical safety anxiety. Fit statistics for this alternate model were χ2(9) = 16.17, p > .05, CFI 
= 1.0, RMSEA = .04, 90% CI [.00, .07], and SRMR = .01. This model again fit the data 
significantly better than the previous model, Δχ2(5) = 43.78, p < .001. Global model fit was 
improved overall. Local fit was also improved, with no standardized covariance residuals 
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 greater than |2.00|. This final model, with a total addition of 18 paths and correlations, was 
retained. 
Summary of retained Model 1. Departures from the original Model 1 include the 
addition of paths from body shame to (1) mind-body congruence and (2) mind-body 
incongruence; appearance anxiety to (3) mind-body congruence and (4) mind-body 
incongruence, as well as (5) concentration, (6) control, and (7) loss of self-consciousness; 
mind-body congruence to (8) control and (9) loss of self-consciousness; mind-body 
incongruence to (10) control and (11) loss of self-consciousness; and physical safety anxiety 
to (12) concentration. Correlations were added between (1) mind-body congruence and 
concentration; (2) mind-body incongruence and concentration; (3) physical safety anxiety 
and body shame; (4) physical safety anxiety and social appearance anxiety; (5) physical 
safety anxiety and mind-body congruence; and (6) physical safety anxiety and mind-body 
incongruence. 
 Combined, all predictors in this final model accounted for 48% of the variance in 
disordered eating, 43% of the variance in depression symptoms, and 13% of the variance in 
sexual functioning. Variance estimates and squared multiple correlations (R2) for all variables 
are summarized in Table 5. Using Cohen’s (1988) guidelines for interpreting effect size (i.e., 
.01 = small, .09 = medium, .25 = large), the combined predictors had a large effect on 
disordered eating and depression symptoms, and a medium effect on sexual functioning. 
Most direct effects were significant with small or medium effect sizes (see Table 6). 
Seventeen hypothesized paths were not supported by the model. These paths were from body 
surveillance to (1) control and (2) physical safety anxiety; body shame to (3) mind-body  
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 Table 5 
Variance Estimates of the Final Path Model 1 
Variable Unstandardized coefficient (SE) R2 
OBC-Surv 1.51**  (0.10)  
error 1 (OBC-Shame) 1.35** (0.09) .22 
error 2 (SAAS) 184.56** (11.68) .19 
error 3 (CONC) 8.43** (0.53) .09 
error 4 (CONT) 6.26** (0.40) .28 
error 5 (LOSS) 7.83** (0.50) .35 
error 6 (BR-Con) 1.48** (0.09) .14 
error 7 (BR-Incon) 1.58** (0.10) .21 
error 8 (PSA) 70.83** (4.48) .01 
disturbance 1 (EAT-26) 236.20** (14.95) .48 
disturbance 2 (CES-D) 23.00** (1.45) .43 
disturbance 3 (FSFI) 66.10** (4.18) .13 
Note: OBC-Surv = Objectified Body Consciousness Scale, Body Surveillance subscale; OBC-Shame = 
Objectified Body Consciousness Scale, Body Shame subscale; SAAS = Social Appearance Anxiety Scale; 
CONC = Dispositional Flow Scale-2 Long Form, Concentration subscale; CONT = Dispositional Flow Scale-2 
Long Form, Control subscale; LOSS = Dispositional Flow Scale-2 Long Form, Loss of Self-Consciousness 
subscale; BR-Con = Daubenmier’s body responsiveness scale, mind-body congruence subscale; BR-Incon = 
Daubenmier’s body responsiveness scale, mind-body incongruence subscale; PSA = Physical safety anxiety 
scale; EAT-26 = Eating Attitudes Test-26; CES-D = Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale Short 
Form; FSFI = Female Sexual Function Index. 
* = p < .05, ** = p < .01. 
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 Table 6 
Direct Path Coefficients of the Final Path Model 1 
Path Unstandardized coefficient (SE) Standardized coefficient 
OBC-Surv  OBC-Shame 0.47** (0.04) .44 
OBC-Surv  SAAS 5.37** (0.52) .44 
OBC-Surv  CONC -0.29* (0.12) -.12 
OBC-Surv  CONT 0.01 (0.11) .00 
OBC-Surv  LOSS -1.03** (0.13) -.36 
OBC-Surv  BR-Con -0.12* (0.06) -.11 
OBC-Surv  BR-Incon -0.12* (0.06) -.10 
OBC-Surv  PSA 0.60 (0.32) .09 
OBC-Shame  BR-Con -0.04 (0.06) -.04 
OBC-Shame  BR-Incon 0.24** (0.07) .23 
OCB-Shame  EAT-26 7.69** (0.09) .12 
OCB-Shame  CES-D 0.06 (0.27) .01 
OCB-Shame  FSFI -0.53 (0.40) -.08 
SAAS  CONC -0.04** (0.01) -.21 
SAAS  CONT -0.05** (0.01) -.27 
SAAS  LOSS -0.05** (0.01) -.23 
SAAS  BR-Con -0.03** (0.01) -.29 
SAAS  BR-Incon 0.03** (0.01) .30 
SAAS  EAT-26 0.17* (0.09) .12 
SAAS  CES-D 0.12** (0.03) .28 
SAAS  FSFI -0.05 (0.04) -.09 
CONC  EAT-26 .57 (0.34) .08 
CONC  CES-D -.24* (0.10) -.11 
CONC  FSFI .05 (0.19) .02 
CONT  EAT-26 0.36* (0.36) -.05 
CONT  CES-D -0.45** (0.13) -.21 
CONT  FSFI -0.38 (0.20) .12 
LOSS  EAT-26 0.80** (0.27) .13 
LOSS  CES-D 0.08 (0.08) .05 
LOSS  FSFI -0.08 (0.15) -.03 
BR-Con  CONT 0.77** (0.11) .34 
BR-Con  LOSS 0.47** (0.12) .18 
BR-Con  EAT-26 0.78 (0.68) .05 
BR-Con  CES-D -0.18 (0.21) -.04 
BR-Con  FSFI 1.39** (0.36) .21 
BR-Incon  CONT -0.14 (0.10) -.07 
BR-Incon  LOSS 0.05 (0.11) .02 
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 Table 6--Continued   
Path Unstandardized coefficient (SE) Standardized coefficient 
BR-Incon  EAT-26 3.29** (0.59) .22 
BR-Incon  CES-D 1.13** (0.19) .25 
BR-Incon  FSFI 0.26 (0.30) .04 
PSA  CONC 0.05** (0.01) .13 
PSA  EAT-26 0.37** (0.09) .15 
PSA  CES-D 0.10** (0.03) .14 
PSA  FSFI -0.03 (0.05) -.02 
Note: OBC-Surv = Objectified Body Consciousness Scale, Body Surveillance subscale; OBC-Shame = 
Objectified Body Consciousness Scale, Body Shame subscale; SAAS = Social Appearance Anxiety Scale; 
CONC = Dispositional Flow Scale-2 Long Form, Concentration subscale; CONT = Dispositional Flow Scale-2 
Long Form, Control subscale; LOSS = Dispositional Flow Scale-2 Long Form, Loss of Self-Consciousness 
subscale; BR-Con = Daubenmier’s body responsiveness scale, mind-body congruence subscale; BR-Incon = 
Daubenmier’s body responsiveness scale, mind-body incongruence subscale; PSA = Physical safety anxiety 
scale; EAT-26 = Eating Attitudes Test-26; CES-D = Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale Short 
Form; FSFI = Female Sexual Function Index.  
* = p < .05, ** = p < .01 
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 congruence, (4) depression symptoms, and (5) sexual functioning; appearance anxiety to (6) 
sexual functioning; control to (7) eating disorder symptoms; concentration to (8) eating 
disorder symptoms and (9) sexual functioning; loss of self-consciousness to (10) depression 
symptoms and (11) sexual functioning; mind-body congruence to (12) disordered eating and 
(13) depressive symptoms; mind-body incongruence to (14) control, (15) loss of self- 
consciousness, and (16) sexual functioning; and physical safety anxiety to (17) sexual 
functioning (see Figure 5).  
 Mediation effects in retained model 1. In order to evaluate the mediation effects 
proposed in Hypotheses 1 through 3, the direct paths comprising these relationships were 
examined first. For cases in which all implicated direct effects were significant, Preacher and 
Leonardelli’s (2016) interactive calculation tool for the Aroian version of the Sobel (1982) 
test equation was used to examine significance of indirect effects. The Aroian version of the 
equation was chosen because it incorporates the standard error of the implicated regression 
coefficients (Preacher & Leonardelli, 2016). This is important because internal, 
psychological mediators are likely to be measured with error; omitting the error terms often 
results in an underestimate of the effect of the mediator and an overestimate of the 
independent variable (often an exogenous variable), ultimately resulting in successful 
mediation being falsely rejected (Baron & Kenny, 1986).  
 Hypothesis 1, that concentration would mediate relationships between body 
surveillance and health consequences, was not supported. Body surveillance had a small 
direct effect on concentration, b = -0.29, SE = 0.12, β = -.12, p < .05, and concentration had a 
small direct effect on depression symptoms, b = -0.24, SE = 0.10, β = -.11, p < .05. The  
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Figure 5. Retained model of the mediating role of three dimensions of flow (i.e., concentration, loss of self-consciousness, 
sense of control) in objectification theory. Solid lines indicate significant pathways (p < .05). Dotted lines indicate pathways 
that are not significant (p > .05). Bolded solid and dashed lines indicate pathways added to the proposed model in the 
modification process.
 
 
 indirect effect of body surveillance on depression symptoms mediated by concentration was 
not significant, however, b = .07, SE = .04, β = .01, z = 1.64, p  > .05. Furthermore, the 
practical significance of this indirect effect was very small. Concentration did not have a 
significant direct effect on disordered eating or sexual functioning. Hypothesis 2, that sense 
of control would mediate relationships between body surveillance and the mental health 
consequences, was not supported because body surveillance did not have a significant direct 
effect on sense of control. Hypothesis 3, that loss of self-consciousness would mediate 
relationships between body surveillance and the mental health outcomes, was partially 
supported. Body surveillance had a moderate direct effect on loss of self-consciousness, b = -
1.03, SE = 0.13, β = -.36, p < .01, and loss of self-consciousness had a small direct effect on  
disordered eating, b = 0.80, SE = 0.27, β = .13, p < .05. The indirect effect of body 
surveillance on depression symptoms mediated by concentration was statistically significant 
but practically very small, b = -0.82, SE = .29, β = -.05, z = -2.77, p  < .01. Loss of self-
consciousness did not have a significant direct effect on depression symptoms or sexual 
functioning. 
 Model 2: The moderating role of dispositional mindfulness. Hypotheses 5-10 dealt 
with the moderating role of dispositional mindfulness within the objectification theory 
framework. We initially hypothesized that dispositional mindfulness would moderate the 
links from body surveillance to concentration, control, loss of self-consciousness, and body 
responsiveness. We also hypothesized that dispositional mindfulness would moderate the 
mediating relationships between these variables (i.e., concentration, control, loss of self-
consciousness, and body responsiveness) and the body surveillance-mental health outcome  
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  (i.e., disordered eating, depression symptoms, and sexual functioning) links. Before testing, 
we amended the original hypothesized Model 2 (Figure 3) based on the modifications we 
made to Model 1. See Figure 6 for the amended hypothesized Model 2. 
 Model fit statistics were examined to verify the adequacy of Model 2, which was 
theoretically identified. Fit statistics for this model were poor: χ2(21) = 178.70, p < .001, CFI 
= .94, RMSEA = .12, 90% CI [.11, .15], and SRMR = .08. Several standardized residual 
covariances were greater than |2.00|, evidencing poor local fit. Together, these results 
suggested that the model should be modified to incorporate direct pathways or covariances  
with large standardized residual covariances in cases in which a relationship would be 
theoretically supported. Examination of standardized residual covariances suggested that 
there should be links from dispositional mindfulness to body shame (standardized residual 
covariance = -5.66) and appearance anxiety (standardized residual covariance = -7.69). These 
relationships are theoretically supported. Previous studies have demonstrated links between 
mindfulness and other body-related cognitive processes, including body comparison and 
body dissatisfaction (Dekeyser et al., 2008; Dijkstra & Barelds, 2011). Furthermore, 
mindfulness has been shown throughout multiple studies to negatively predict anxiety (see 
Brown et al., 2013). We also added pathways to check for moderation by dispositional 
mindfulness of the mediating effects of body shame (standardized residual covariance = -
1.34) and appearance anxiety (standardized residual covariance = -2.64) of body surveillance 
on the mental health outcomes. Finally, we also added paths from dispositional mindfulness 
to depression symptoms and sexual functioning. These pairs had large standardized residual 
covariances (-6.39 for mindfulness-depression and 3.59 for mindfulness-sexual functioning).
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Figure 6. Modified proposed model of the moderating role of dispositional mindfulness in objectification theory. 
 
 
 Conceptually, mindfulness has repeatedly been linked to depression (see Brown et al., 2013), 
and it is not surprising that concentration, sense of control, loss of self-consciousness, and 
body responsiveness may not fully mediate the relationship between these two variables. 
Likewise, mindfulness training has recently been explored as a treatment for women 
experiencing sexual dysfunction, with promising results (Brotto, Bassoon, & Luria, 2008; 
Brotto, Heiman, et al., 2008; Brotto et al., 2012; Silverstein et al., 2011); it may affect female 
functioning directly. Fit of this model was much better than the previous model, χ2(15) = 
27.59, p = .02,  CFI = 1.0, RMSEA = .04, 90% CI [.02, .07], SRMR = .01, Δχ2(6) = 151.11, 
p < .001, with all standardized residual covariances less than |2.00|. However, a significant 
chi square value indicated that there was a significant difference between expected and 
observed covariance matrixes for the model, prompting further modification. 
 Modification indexes were checked for further recommendations to improve fit. The 
addition of a pathway from body surveillance to sexual functioning was suggested 
(modification index = 4.65, parameter change = .61). When controlling for the moderating 
and mediating effects of dispositional mindfulness in the model, body surveillance had a 
direct effect on sexual functioning. In other words, body surveillance directly affects sexual 
functioning when all other variables in the model, including dispositional mindfulness and 
the interaction of dispositional mindfulness and body surveillance, are held constant. Fit of 
this model was much better than the previous model, with good global and local fit indices: 
χ2(14) = 20.72, p = .11, CFI = 1.0, RMSEA = .03, 90% CI [.00, .06], SRMR = .01, Δχ2(1) = 
6.87, p < .01, all standardized residual covariances less than |2.00|. This final model was 
retained. 
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 Summary of Retained Model 2. From the original hypothesized model, the modified 
Model 2 that was retained included the same changes made to Model 1 (i.e., the same 
addition of 18 paths and correlations). To the amended Model 2 that was initially tested, an 
additional seven paths were added: dispositional mindfulness to (1) body shame and (2) 
appearance anxiety; dispositional mindfulness to the mediating path from body surveillance 
to disordered eating, depression symptoms, and sexual functioning through (3) body shame 
and (4) appearance anxiety; dispositional mindfulness to (5) depression symptoms and (6) 
sexual functioning; and body surveillance to (7) sexual functioning. 
 Combined, all predictors in this final model accounted for 48% of the variance in 
disordered eating, 47% of the variance in depression symptoms, and 16% of the variance in 
sexual functioning. Variance estimates and squared multiple correlations (R2) for all variables 
are summarized in Table 7. The combined predictors had a large effect on disordered eating 
and depression symptoms and a medium effect on sexual functioning. With the interaction of 
body surveillance and dispositional mindfulness in the model, most direct effects were 
significant with small or medium effect sizes (see Table 8). Thirty hypothesized paths were 
not supported by the model. These paths were from body surveillance to (1) concentration, 
(2) control, (3) mind-body congruence, and (4) physical safety anxiety; the interaction of 
body surveillance and dispositional mindfulness to (5) body shame, (6) concentration, (7) 
control, (8) loss of self-consciousness, (9) mind-body congruence, and (10) mind-body 
incongruence; dispositional mindfulness to (11) mind-body incongruence; body shame to  
(12) mind-body congruence, (13) depression symptoms, and (14) sexual functioning; 
appearance anxiety to (15) concentration, (16) mind-body congruence, and (17) sexual  
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 Table 7 
Variance Estimates of the Final Path Model 2 
Variable Unstandardized coefficient (SE) R2 
OBC-Surv 1.51**  (0.10)  
FMI-SF 58.6** (3.71)  
OBC-Surv x FMI-SF 96.45** (6.11)  
error 1 (OBC-Shame) 1.22** (0.08) .29 
error 2 (SAAS) 152.00** (9.62) .33 
error 3 (CONC) 6.68** (0.42) .28 
error 4 (CONT) 5.22** (0.33) .40 
error 5 (LOSS) 7.08** (0.45) .41 
error 6 (BR-Con) 1.20** (0.08) .30 
error 7 (BR-Incon) 1.58** (0.10) .21 
error 8 (PSA) 70.83** (4.48) .01 
disturbance 1 (EAT-26) 236.20** (14.95) .48 
disturbance 2 (CES-D) 21.61** (1.37) .47 
disturbance 3 (FSFI) 63.56** (4.02) .16 
Note: OBC-Surv = Objectified Body Consciousness Scale, Body Surveillance subscale; FMI-SF = Freiburg 
Mindfulness Inventory-Short Form; OBC-Shame = Objectified Body Consciousness Scale, Body Shame 
subscale; SAAS = Social Appearance Anxiety Scale; CONC = Dispositional Flow Scale-2 Long Form, 
Concentration subscale; CONT = Dispositional Flow Scale-2 Long Form, Control subscale; LOSS = 
Dispositional Flow Scale-2 Long Form, Loss of Self-Consciousness subscale; BR-Con = Daubenmier’s body 
responsiveness scale, mind-body congruence subscale; BR-Incon = Daubenmier’s body responsiveness scale, 
mind-body incongruence subscale; PSA = Physical safety anxiety scale; EAT-26 = Eating Attitudes Test-26; 
CES-D = Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale Short Form; FSFI = Female Sexual Function 
Index. 
* = p < .05, ** = p < .01. 
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 Table 8 
Direct Path Coefficients of the Final Path Model 2 
Path 
Unstandardized coefficient 
(SE) Standardized coefficient 
OBC-Surv  OBC-Shame 0.39** (0.05) .36 
OBC-Surv  SAAS 4.04** (0.51) .33 
OBC-Surv  CONC -0.14 (0.11) -.05 
OBC-Surv  CONT 0.09 (0.10) .04 
OBC-Surv  LOSS -0.97** (0.13) -.34 
OBC-Surv  BR-Con -0.08 (0.05) -.07 
OBC-Surv  BR-Incon -0.13* (0.06) -.12 
OBC-Surv  PSA 0.60 (0.32) .09 
OBC-Surv  FSFI 0.96** (0.35) .14 
FMI-SF  OBC-Shame -0.05** (0.01) -.28 
FMI-SF  SAAS -0.74** (0.08) -.37 
FMI-SF  CONC 0.20** (0.02) .50 
FMI-SF  CONT 0.17** (0.02) .44 
FMI-SF  LOSS 0.14** (0.02) .32 
FMI-SF  BR-Con 0.08** (0.01) .46 
FMI-SF  BR-Incon -0.01 (0.01) -.06 
FMI-SF  CES-D -0.25** (0.05) -.29 
FMI-SF  FSFI 0.24** (0.07) .21 
OBC-Surv x FMI-SF  OBC-Shame -0.01 (0.01) -.05 
OBC-Surv x FMI-SF  SAAS -0.15* (0.06) -.10 
OBC-Surv x FMI-SF  CONC 0.01 (0.01) .00 
OBC-Surv x FMI-SF  CONT 0.00 (0.01) .00 
OBC-Surv x FMI-SF  LOSS 0.00 (0.02) .03 
OBC-Surv x FMI-SF  BR-Con 0.01 (0.01) .07 
OBC-Surv x FMI-SF  BR-Incon 0.00 (0.01) .03 
OBC-Shame  BR-Con 0.00 (0.06) .00 
OBC-Shame  BR-Incon 0.24** (0.07) .23 
OCB-Shame  EAT-26 7.69** (0.91) .48 
OCB-Shame  CES-D -0.04 (0.25) -.01 
OCB-Shame  FSFI -0.65 (0.40) -.10 
SAAS  CONC 0.00 (0.01) .01 
SAAS  CONT -0.03** (0.01) -.14 
SAAS  LOSS -0.03** (0.01) -.14 
SAAS  BR-Con -0.01 (0.01) -.10 
SAAS  BR-Incon 0.03** (0.01) .29 
SAAS  EAT-26 0.17* (0.09) .12 
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 Table 8--Continued   
Path Unstandardized Coefficient 
(SE) 
Standardized coefficient 
SAAS  CES-D 0.10** (0.03) .24 
SAAS  FSFI -0.05 (0.04) -.08 
CONC  EAT-26 0.57 (0.34) .08 
CONC  CES-D -0.15 (0.11) -.07 
CONC  FSFI -0.01 (0.19) .00 
CONT  EAT-26 -0.38 (0.36) -.05 
CONT  CES-D -0.30* (0.13) -.14 
CONT  FSFI 0.15 (0.20) .05 
LOSS  EAT-26 .08** (0.27) .13 
LOSS  CES-D 0.17* (0.08) .09 
LOSS  FSFI -0.03 (0.15) -.01 
BR-Con  CONT 0.37** (0.11) .17 
BR-Con  LOSS 0.13 (0.13) .05 
BR-Con  EAT-26 0.78 (0.68) .05 
BR-Con  CES-D 0.18 (0.21) .04 
BR-Con  FSFI 1.09** (0.37) .17 
BR-Incon  CONT -.09 (0.09) -.04 
BR-Incon  LOSS .09 (0.11) .04 
BR-Incon  EAT-26 3.29** (0.59) .22 
BR-Incon  CES-D 1.11** (0.18) .25 
BR-Incon  FSFI 0.35 (0.30) .06 
PSA  CONC 0.04** (0.01) .11 
PSA  EAT-26 0.37** (0.09) .15 
PSA  CES-D 0.09** (0.03) .12 
PSA  FSFI -0.02 (0.05) -.02 
Note: OBC-Surv = Objectified Body Consciousness Scale, Body Surveillance subscale; FMI-SF = Freiburg 
Mindfulness Inventory-Short Form; OBC-Shame = Objectified Body Consciousness Scale, Body Shame 
subscale; SAAS = Social Appearance Anxiety Scale; CONC = Dispositional Flow Scale-2 Long Form, 
Concentration subscale; CONT = Dispositional Flow Scale-2 Long Form, Control subscale; LOSS = 
Dispositional Flow Scale-2 Long Form, Loss of Self-Consciousness subscale; BR-Con = Daubenmier’s body 
responsiveness scale, mind-body congruence subscale; BR-Incon = Daubenmier’s body responsiveness scale, 
mind-body incongruence subscale; PSA = Physical safety anxiety scale; EAT-26 = Eating Attitudes Test-26; 
CES-D = Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale Short Form; FSFI = Female Sexual Function 
Index.  
* = p < .05, ** = p < .01. 
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 functioning; concentration to (18) eating disorder symptoms, (19) depression, and (20) sexual 
functioning; control to (21) eating disorder symptoms and (22) sexual functioning; loss of 
self-consciousness to (23) sexual functioning; mind-body congruence to (24) loss of self-
consciousness, (25) eating disorder symptoms, and (26) sexual functioning; mind-body 
incongruence to (27) control, (28) loss of self-consciousness, and (29) sexual functioning; 
and physical safety anxiety to (30) sexual functioning (see Figure 7).  
 Moderation effects. In order to evaluate the moderation effect proposed in 
Hypothesis 5 and the mediated moderation effects proposed in Hypotheses 6 through 10, the 
direct effects of the interaction of body surveillance and dispositional mindfulness on 
concentration, control, loss of self-consciousness, mind-body congruence, and mind-body 
incongruence were first examined. Counter to these hypotheses, none of these proposed 
relationships achieved statistical significance. Dispositional mindfulness did not appear to 
moderate the effect of body surveillance on these variables or to moderate the mediating 
effect of these variables on the relationship between body surveillance and the mental health 
outcomes. 
 As part of the model modification process, moderation by dispositional mindfulness 
of the mediation of the effect of body surveillance on the mental health outcomes by body 
shame and appearance anxiety was also tested. The moderating effect of dispositional 
mindfulness on the relationship between body surveillance and body shame was not 
significant. Analysis revealed a significant but small moderating effect on the relationship 
between body surveillance and appearance anxiety, β = -.10, p < .05, such that the negative 
effect of body surveillance on appearance anxiety was stronger for participants with lower 
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Figure 7. Retained model of the moderating role of dispositional mindfulness in objectification theory. Solid lines indicate 
significant pathways (p < .05). Dotted lines indicate pathways that are not significant (p > .05). Bolded solid and dashed lines 
indicate pathways added to the proposed model in the modification process. 
 
 
 levels of dispositional mindfulness (see Figure 8). Appearance anxiety had a significant, 
medium direct effect on depression symptoms, β = .24, p < .05, evidencing that dispositional 
mindfulness moderated the mediating effect of appearance anxiety on the relationship 
between body surveillance and depression symptoms. 
 Direct effects. In order to explore the direct effects of dispositional mindfulness on 
the mediating variables, the retained model was analyzed without the interaction term (i.e., 
body surveillance by dispositional mindfulness) included. This model was a good fit for the 
data, χ2(10) = 17.12, p = .07, CFI = 1.0, RMSEA = .04, 90% CI [.00, .07], SRMR = .01, all 
standardized residual covariances less than |2.00|. Dispositional mindfulness had significant, 
medium to large direct effects in the expected directions on body shame, β = -.28, p < .05, 
appearance anxiety, β = -.38, p < .01; concentration, β = .50, p < .01; control, β = .44, p <  
.01; loss of self-consciousness, β = .32, p < .01; and mind-body congruence, β = .46, p < .01. 
All direct effects for the final Model 2 are reported in Table 9. 
 Model 3: The moderating role of self-compassion. Hypotheses 11-14 dealt with the 
moderating role of self-compassion within the objectification theory framework. We initially 
hypothesized that self-compassion would moderate the links from body surveillance to body 
shame and appearance anxiety. We also hypothesized that self-compassion would moderate 
the mediating relationships between these variables (i.e., body shame and appearance 
anxiety) and the body surveillance-mental health outcome (i.e., disordered eating, depression 
symptoms, and sexual functioning) links. We amended the original hypothesized Model 3 
(Figure 4) based on the modifications we made to Model 1. See Figure 9 for the amended 
hypothesized Model 3. 
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Figure 8. Effect of the interaction of body surveillance and dispositional mindfulness of 
appearance anxiety. OBC-Surv = Objectified Body Consciousness Scale; FMI-SF = Freiburg 
Mindfulness Inventory-Short Form; SAAS = Social Appearance Anxiety Scale. 
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 Table 9 
Direct Effects of Model 2 
Path Unstandardized coefficient 
(SE) 
Standardized coefficient 
OBC-Surv  OBC-Shame 0.38** (0.04) .36 
OBC-Surv  SAAS 9.91** (0.48) .32 
OBC-Surv  CONC -0.14 (0.11) -.06 
OBC-Surv  CONT 0.09 (0.09) .04 
OBC-Surv  LOSS -0.95** (0.11) -.34 
OBC-Surv  BR-Con -0.06 (0.05) -.06 
OBC-Surv  BR-Incon -0.13* (0.05) -.11 
OBC-Surv  PSA 0.60 (0.31) .09 
OBC-Surv  FSFI 0.96** (0.37) .14 
FMI-SF  OBC-Shame -0.05** (0.01) -.28 
FMI-SF  SAAS -0.75** (0.08) -.38 
FMI-SF  CONC 0.20** (0.02) .50 
FMI-SF  CONT 0.17** (0.02) .44 
FMI-SF  LOSS 0.14** (0.02) .32 
FMI-SF  BR-Con 0.08** (0.01) .46 
FMI-SF  BR-Incon -0.01 (0.01) -.06 
FMI-SF  CES-D -0.25** (0.04) -.29 
FMI-SF  FSFI 0.24** (0.07) .21 
OBC-Shame  BR-Con 0.00 (0.05) .00 
OBC-Shame  BR-Incon 0.24** (0.06) .23 
OCB-Shame  EAT-26 7.69** (0.75) .48 
OCB-Shame  CES-D -0.04 (0.23) -.01 
OCB-Shame  FSFI -0.65 (0.40) -.10 
SAAS  CONC 0.00 (0.01) .01 
SAAS  CONT -0.03** (0.01) -.14 
SAAS  LOSS -0.03** (0.01) -.14 
SAAS  BR-Con -0.01 (0.01) -.10 
SAAS  BR-Incon 0.03** (0.01) .29 
SAAS  EAT-26 0.17* (0.09) .12 
SAAS  CES-D 0.10** (0.03) .24 
SAAS  FSFI -0.05 (0.04) -.08 
CONC  EAT-26 0.57 (0.33) .08 
CONC  CES-D -0.15 (0.10) -.07 
CONC  FSFI -0.03 (0.14) -.01 
CONT  EAT-26 -0.38 (0.36) -.05 
CONT  CES-D -0.30* (0.11) -.14 
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 Table 9--Continued   
Path Unstandardized coefficient 
(SE) 
Standardized coefficient 
CONT  FSFI 0.15 (0.19) .05 
LOSS  EAT-26 .08** (0.25) .13 
LOSS  CES-D 0.17* (0.08) .09 
LOSS  FSFI -0.03 (0.14) -.01 
BR-Con  CONT 0.37** (0.19) .17 
BR-Con  LOSS 0.14 (0.11) .05 
BR-Con  EAT-26 0.78 (0.62) .05 
BR-Con  CES-D 0.18 (0.20) .04 
BR-Con  FSFI 1.09** (0.34) .17 
BR-Incon  CONT -.09 (0.08) -.04 
BR-Incon  LOSS .09 (0.09) .04 
BR-Incon  EAT-26 3.29** (0.55) .22 
BR-Incon  CES-D 1.11** (0.17) .25 
BR-Incon  FSFI 0.35 (0.29) .06 
PSA  CONC 0.04** (0.01) .11 
PSA  EAT-26 0.37** (0.09) .15 
PSA  CES-D 0.09** (0.03) .12 
PSA  FSFI -0.02 (0.04) -.02 
Note: OBC-Surv = Objectified Body Consciousness Scale, Body Surveillance subscale; FMI-SF = Freiburg 
Mindfulness Inventory-Short Form; OBC-Shame = Objectified Body Consciousness Scale, Body Shame 
subscale; SAAS = Social Appearance Anxiety Scale; CONC = Dispositional Flow Scale-2 Long Form, 
Concentration subscale; CONT = Dispositional Flow Scale-2 Long Form, Control subscale; LOSS = 
Dispositional Flow Scale-2 Long Form, Loss of Self-Consciousness subscale; BR-Con = Daubenmier’s body 
responsiveness scale, mind-body congruence subscale; BR-Incon = Daubenmier’s body responsiveness scale, 
mind-body incongruence subscale; PSA = Physical safety anxiety scale; EAT-26 = Eating Attitudes Test-26; 
CES-D = Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale Short Form; FSFI = Female Sexual Function 
Index.  
* = p < .05, ** = p < .01.
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Figure 9. Modified proposed model of the moderating role of self-compassion in objectification theory.
 
 
 Model fit statistics were examined to verify the adequacy of Model 3, which was 
theoretically identified. Fit statistics for this model were poor: χ2(27) = 244.24, p < .001, CFI 
= .92, RMSEA = .13, 90% CI [.11, .14], and SRMR = .06. Several standardized residual 
covariances were greater than |2.00|, evidencing poor local fit. Together, these results 
suggested that the model should be modified to incorporate direct pathways or covariances  
between variables with large standardized residual covariances in cases in which a 
relationship would be theoretically supported. 
 Examination of standardized residual covariances suggested that there should be links 
from self-compassion to concentration (standardized residual covariance = 5.28), control  
(standardized residual covariance = 5.12), loss of self-consciousness (standardized residual 
covariance = 3.24), mind-body congruence (standardized residual covariance = 4.37), and  
mind-body incongruence (standardized residual covariance = -2.85). These relationships are 
theoretically supported. Self-compassion consists of self-kindness, common humanity, and 
mindful awareness; it is conceptually similar to and highly correlated with mindfulness 
(Neff, 2003b). Previous studies have shown mindfulness and flow (Aherne et al., 2011; Kee 
& Wang, 2008) and internal bodily awareness (Silverstein et al., 2011) to be highly 
correlated. A direct path from self-compassion to physical safety anxiety (standardized 
residual covariance = -1.88) was also added. Like body shame and appearance anxiety, 
physical safety anxiety involves worry, which may be ameliorated by higher levels of self-
compassion. Broadly, self-compassion has been shown to negatively correlate with anxiety 
(see MacBeth & Gumley, 2012). More specific to concern about physical safety, Mantzios 
(2013) found that self-compassion was negatively related to worrying in a study of military 
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 recruits. We did not test for moderation of the mediating effects of these variables (i.e., 
concentration, control, loss of self-consciousness, mind-body congruence, mind-body 
incongruence, and physical safety anxiety) since moderated mediation was generally not 
supported in Model 2 and standardized residual covariances were low in this model. 
 We also added paths from self-compassion to depression symptoms (standardized 
residual covariance = -7.41) and sexual functioning (standardized residual covariance = 
3.43). Like the relationship between mindfulness and these outcome variables, it is not 
surprising that the relationships between self-compassion and depression symptoms and 
sexual functioning are not fully mediated by the consequences for women’s subjective 
experiences (i.e., body shame, appearance anxiety, concentration, control, loss of self-
consciousness, body responsiveness, and physical safety anxiety). Across studies, higher 
levels of self-compassion have repeatedly been associated with lower levels of depression 
symptoms (see MacBeth & Gumley, 2012). The relationship between self-compassion and 
sexual functioning has been less well researched; however, it is likely that the affective 
components of self-compassion that may affect sexual functioning (e.g., forgiving one’s own 
failings; respecting oneself as a human) are not fully captured by the proposed mediating 
variables. Fit of this model was much better than the previous model, χ2(19) = 46.03 p < .05, 
CFI = .99, RMSEA = .05, 90% CI [.03, .07], SRMR = .02, Δχ2(8) = 198.21, p < .001. 
However, a significant chi square value indicated that there was a significant difference 
between expected and observed covariance matrixes for the model, prompting further 
modification. 
138 
 
 Modification indexes were checked for further recommendations to improve fit. The 
addition of pathways from body surveillance to depression (modification index = 7.30, 
parameter change = -.42) and sexual functioning (modification index = 5.34, parameter 
change = .68) were suggested. When controlling for the moderating and mediating effects of 
self-compassion in the model, body surveillance had direct effects on depression symptoms 
and sexual functioning. In other words, body surveillance directly affects depression and 
sexual functioning when all other variables in the model, including self-compassion and the 
interaction of self-compassion and body surveillance, are held constant. Fit of this model was 
much better than the previous model, with good global and local fit indices: χ2(17) = 25.81, p 
= .08, CFI = 1.0, RMSEA = .03, 90% CI [.00, .06], SRMR = .02, Δχ2(2) = 20.22, p < .01. 
Two standardized covariance residuals, between (a) the interaction of body surveillance and 
self-compassion and mind-body congruence and (b) the interaction of body surveillance and 
self-compassion and physical safety anxiety, remained greater than |2.00| at 2.10 and 2.17, 
respectively; however, because testing pathways between these variables could not be 
justified without testing similar pathways involving concentration, control, loss of self-
consciousness, and mind-body incongruence, they were left untested. This final model was 
retained. 
Summary of retained Model 3. From the original hypothesized model, the modified 
Model 3 that was retained included the same changes made to Model 1 (i.e., the same 
addition of 18 paths and correlations). To the Model 3 that was first tested, an additional 10 
paths were added: self-compassion to (1) concentration, (2) control, (3) loss of self-
consciousness, (4) mind-body congruence, (5) mind-body incongruence, and (6) physical 
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 safety anxiety; and self-compassion to (7) depression and (8) sexual functioning; and body 
surveillance to (9) depression and (10) sexual functioning. 
 Combined, all predictors in this final model accounted for 48% of the variance in 
disordered eating, 53% of the variance in depression symptoms, and 16% of the variance in 
sexual functioning. Variance estimates and squared multiple correlations (R2) for all variables 
are summarized in Table 10. The combined predictors had a large effect on disordered eating 
and depression symptoms, and a medium effect on sexual functioning. With the interaction 
of body surveillance and self-compassion in the model, most direct effects were significant 
with small or medium effect sizes (see Table 11). Twenty-four hypothesized paths were not 
supported by the model. These paths were from body surveillance to (1) concentration, (2) 
control, (3) mind-body congruence, and (4) physical safety anxiety; the interaction of body 
surveillance and self-compassion to (5) body shame and (6) appearance anxiety; body shame 
to (7) mind-body congruence, (8) depression symptoms, and (9) sexual functioning; 
appearance anxiety to (10) concentration and (11) sexual functioning; concentration to (12) 
disordered eating, (13) depression symptoms, and (14) sexual functioning; control to (15)  
disordered eating and (16) sexual functioning; loss of self-consciousness to (17) depression 
symptoms and (18) sexual functioning; mind-body congruence to (19) disordered eating and 
(20) depression; mind-body incongruence to (21) control, (22) loss of self-consciousness, and 
(23) sexual functioning; and physical safety anxiety to (24) sexual functioning (see Figure 
10).  
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 Table 10 
Variance Estimates of the Final Path Model 3 
Variable Unstandardized coefficient (SE) R2 
OBC-Surv 1.51**  (0.10)  
SCS 88.65** (5.61)  
OBC-Surv x SCS 169.60** (10.74)  
error 1 (OBC-Shame) 1.15** (0.07) .34 
error 2 (SAAS) 142.36** (9.01) .38 
error 3 (CONC) 7.59** (0.48) .18 
error 4 (CONT) 5.90** (0.37) .32 
error 5 (LOSS) 7.56** (0.48) .37 
error 6 (BR-Con) 1.37** (0.09) .20 
error 7 (BR-Incon) 1.54** (0.10) .23 
error 8 (PSA) 70.18** (4.44) .02 
disturbance 1 (EAT-26) 236.20** (14.95) .48 
disturbance 2 (CES-D) 19.02** (1.21) .53 
disturbance 3 (FSFI) 63.95** (4.05) .16 
Note: OBC-Surv = Objectified Body Consciousness Scale, Body Surveillance subscale; SCS-SF = Self-
Compassion Scale—Short Form; OBC-Shame = Objectified Body Consciousness Scale, Body Shame subscale; 
SAAS = Social Appearance Anxiety Scale; CONC = Dispositional Flow Scale-2 Long Form, Concentration 
subscale; CONT = Dispositional Flow Scale-2 Long Form, Control subscale; LOSS = Dispositional Flow Scale-
2 Long Form, Loss of Self-Consciousness subscale; BR-Con = Daubenmier’s body responsiveness scale, mind-
body congruence subscale; BR-Incon = Daubenmier’s body responsiveness scale, mind-body incongruence 
subscale; PSA = Physical safety anxiety scale; EAT-26 = Eating Attitudes Test-26; CES-D = Center for 
Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale Short Form; FSFI = Female Sexual Function Index.  
* = p < .05, ** = p < .01. 
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 Table 11 
Direct Path Coefficients of the Final Path Model 3 
Path Unstandardized coefficient 
(SE) 
Standardized coefficient 
OBC-Surv  OBC-Shame 0.33** (0.05) .30 
OBC-Surv  SAAS 3.27** (0.51) .27 
OBC-Surv  CONC -0.14 (0.12) -.06 
OBC-Surv  CONT 0.10 (0.10) .04 
OBC-Surv  LOSS -0.94** (0.14) -.33 
OBC-Surv  BR-Con -0.07 (0.06) -.07 
OBC-Surv  BR-Incon -0.15** (0.06) -.13 
OBC-Surv  PSA 0.34 (0.34) .05 
OBC-Surv  CES-D -0.67** (0.19) -.13 
OBC-Surv  FSFI 1.07** (0.36) .15 
SCS-SF  OBC-Shame -0.05** (0.01) -.37 
SCS-SF  SAAS -0.73** (0.06) -.46 
SCS-SF  CONC 0.12** (0.02) .37 
SCS-SF  CONT 0.08** (0.02) .26 
SCS-SF  LOSS 0.07** (0.02) .20 
SCS-SF  BR-Con 0.04** (0.01) .31 
SCS-SF  BR-Incon -0.03** (0.01) -.19 
SCS-SF  PSA -0.09* (0.04) -.10 
SCS-SF  CES-D -0.29** (0.03) -.42 
SCS-SF  FSFI 0.16** (0.05) .18 
OBC-Surv x SCS-SF  OBC-Shame 0.00 (0.00) .02 
OBC-Surv x SCS-SF  SAAS  -0.07 (0.04) -.06 
OBC-Shame  BR-Con 0.01 (0.06) .01 
OBC-Shame  BR-Incon 0.22** (0.07) .20 
OCB-Shame  EAT-26 7.69** (0.91) .48 
OCB-Shame  CES-D -0.08 (0.25) -.02 
OCB-Shame  FSFI -0.60 (0.91) -.09 
SAAS  CONC -0.01 (0.01) -.03 
SAAS  CONT -0.04** (0.01) -.18 
SAAS  LOSS -0.04** (0.01) -.17 
SAAS  BR-Con -0.01** (0.01) -.16 
SAAS  BR-Incon 0.02* (0.01) .23 
SAAS  EAT-26 0.17* (0.09) .12 
SAAS  CES-D 0.09** (0.02) .21 
SAAS  FSFI -0.04 (0.04) -.07 
CONC  EAT-26 0.57 (0.34) .08 
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 Table 11--Continued   
Path Unstandardized coefficient 
(SE) 
Standardized coefficient 
CONC  CES-D -0.15 (0.10) -.07 
CONC  FSFI 0.02 (0.19) .01 
CONT  EAT-26 -0.38 (0.36) -.05 
CONT  CES-D -0.31** (0.12) -.15 
CONT  FSFI 0.24 (0.20) .08 
LOSS  EAT-26 0.80** (0.27) .13 
LOSS  CES-D 0.09 (0.07) .05 
LOSS  FSFI 0.01 (0.15) .01 
BR-Con  CONT 0.63** (0.11) .28 
BR-Con  LOSS 0.35** (0.12) .13 
BR-Con  EAT-26 0.78 (0.68) .05 
BR-Con  CES-D 0.10 (0.20) .02 
BR-Con  FSFI 1.27** (0.36) .19 
BR-Incon  CONT -0.05 (0.10) -.03 
BR-Incon  LOSS 0.13 (0.11) .05 
BR-Incon  EAT-26 3.29** (0.59) .22 
BR-Incon  CES-D 0.85** (0.17) .19 
BR-Incon  FSFI 0.47 (0.30) .08 
PSA  CONC 0.05** (0.01) .13 
PSA  EAT-26 0.37** (0.09) .15 
PSA  CES-D 0.09** (0.03) .12 
PSA  FSFI -0.02 (0.09) -.02 
Note: OBC-Surv = Objectified Body Consciousness Scale, Body Surveillance subscale; SCS-SF = Self-
Compassion Scale—Short Form; OBC-Shame = Objectified Body Consciousness Scale, Body Shame subscale; 
SAAS = Social Appearance Anxiety Scale; CONC = Dispositional Flow Scale-2 Long Form, Concentration 
subscale; CONT = Dispositional Flow Scale-2 Long Form, Control subscale; LOSS = Dispositional Flow Scale-
2 Long Form, Loss of Self-Consciousness subscale; BR-Con = Daubenmier’s body responsiveness scale, mind-
body congruence subscale; BR-Incon = Daubenmier’s body responsiveness scale, mind-body incongruence 
subscale; PSA = Physical safety anxiety scale; EAT-26 = Eating Attitudes Test-26; CES-D = Center for 
Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale Short Form; FSFI = Female Sexual Function Index.  
* = p < .05, ** = p < .01. 
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Figure 10. Retained model of the moderating role of self-compassion in objectification theory. Solid lines indicate significant 
pathways (p < .05). Dotted lines indicate pathways that are not significant (p > .05). Bolded solid and dashed lines indicate 
pathways added to the proposed model in the modification process.
 
 
  Moderation effects. In order to examine the moderation effect proposed in 
Hypothesis 11 and the mediated moderation effects proposed in Hypotheses 12 through 14, 
the direct paths comprising these relationships were examined. Counter to these hypotheses, 
none of these proposed relationships achieved statistical significance. When controlling for 
other variables in the model, self-compassion did not appear to moderate the effect of body 
surveillance on these variables or to moderate the mediating effect of these variables on the 
relationship between body surveillance and the mental health outcomes (see Figure 10). 
 Direct effects. In order to explore the direct effects of self-compassion on the 
mediating variables, the retained model was analyzed without the interaction term (i.e., body 
surveillance by self-compassion) included. This model was a good fit for the data, χ2(8) = 
5.59, p = .69, CFI = 1.0, RMSEA = .00, 90% CI [.00, .04], SRMR = .01, all standardized 
residual covariances less than |2.00|. Self-compassion had significant, medium to large direct 
effects in the expected directions on body shame, β = -.37, p < .01; appearance anxiety, β = -
.46, p < .01; concentration, β = .37, p < .01; control, β = .26, p < .01; loss of self-
consciousness, β = .20, p < .01; mind-body congruence, β = .31, p < .01; mind-body 
incongruence, β = -.19, p < .01; and physical safety anxiety, β = -.10, p < .05. All direct 
effects for the final model 3 are reported in Table 12. 
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 Table 12 
Direct Effects of Model 3 
Path Unstandardized coefficient 
(SE) 
Standardized coefficient 
OBC-Surv  OBC-Shame 0.33** (0.05) .30 
OBC-Surv  SAAS 3.27** (0.51) .27 
OBC-Surv  CONC -0.14 (0.12) -.06 
OBC-Surv  CONT 0.10 (0.10) .04 
OBC-Surv  LOSS -0.94** (0.14) -.33 
OBC-Surv  BR-Con -0.07 (0.06) -.07 
OBC-Surv  BR-Incon -0.15** (0.06) -.13 
OBC-Surv  PSA 0.34 (0.33) .05 
OBC-Surv  CES-D -0.67** (0.19) -.13 
OBC-Surv  FSFI 1.07** (0.36) .15 
SCS-SF  OBC-Shame -0.05** (0.01) -.37 
SCS-SF  SAAS -0.74** (0.06) -.46 
SCS-SF  CONC 0.12** (0.02) .37 
SCS-SF  CONT 0.08** (0.02) .26 
SCS-SF  LOSS 0.07** (0.02) .20 
SCS-SF  BR-Con 0.04** (0.01) .31 
SCS-SF  BR-Incon -0.03** (0.01) -.19 
SCS-SF  PSA -0.09* (0.04) -.10 
SCS-SF  CES-D -0.29** (0.03) -.42 
SCS-SF  FSFI 0.16** (0.05) .18 
OBC-Shame  BR-Con 0.01 (0.06) .01 
OBC-Shame  BR-Incon 0.22** (0.07) .20 
OCB-Shame  EAT-26 7.69** (0.91) .48 
OCB-Shame  CES-D -0.08 (0.25) -.02 
OCB-Shame  FSFI -0.60 (0.91) -.09 
SAAS  CONC -0.01 (0.01) -.03 
SAAS  CONT -0.04** (0.01) -.18 
SAAS  LOSS -0.04** (0.01) -.17 
SAAS  BR-Con -0.01** (0.01) -.17 
SAAS  BR-Incon 0.02** (0.01) .23 
SAAS  EAT-26 0.17* (0.07) .12 
SAAS  CES-D 0.09** (0.02) .21 
SAAS  FSFI -0.04 (0.04) -.07 
CONC  EAT-26 0.57 (0.33) .08 
CONC  CES-D -0.15 (0.09) -.07 
CONC  FSFI 0.02 (0.17) .01 
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 Table 12--Continued   
Path Unstandardized coefficient 
(SE) 
Standardized coefficient 
CONT  EAT-26 -0.38 (0.36) -.05 
CONT  CES-D -0.31** (0.10) -.15 
CONT  FSFI 0.24 (0.19) .08 
LOSS  EAT-26 0.80** (0.25) .13 
LOSS  CES-D 0.09 (0.08) .05 
LOSS  FSFI 0.01 (0.14) .01 
BR-Con  CONT 0.63** (0.09) .28 
BR-Con  LOSS 0.35** (0.11) .13 
BR-Con  EAT-26 0.78 (0.62) .05 
BR-Con  CES-D 0.10 (0.18) .02 
BR-Con  FSFI 1.27** (0.33) .19 
BR-Incon  CONT -0.05 (0.09) -.03 
BR-Incon  LOSS 0.13 (0.10) .05 
BR-Incon  EAT-26 3.29** (0.55) .22 
BR-Incon  CES-D 0.85** (0.16) .19 
BR-Incon  FSFI 0.47 (0.29) .08 
PSA  OBC-Shame 0.02* (0.01) .10 
PSA  CONC 0.05** (0.01) .13 
PSA  EAT-26 0.37** (0.09) .15 
PSA  CES-D 0.09** (0.02) .12 
PSA  FSFI -0.02 (0.04) -.02 
Note: OBC-Surv = Objectified Body Consciousness Scale, Body Surveillance subscale; SCS-SF = Self-
Compassion Scale—Short Form; OBC-Shame = Objectified Body Consciousness Scale, Body Shame subscale; 
SAAS = Social Appearance Anxiety Scale; CONC = Dispositional Flow Scale-2 Long Form, Concentration 
subscale; CONT = Dispositional Flow Scale-2 Long Form, Control subscale; LOSS = Dispositional Flow Scale-
2 Long Form, Loss of Self-Consciousness subscale; BR-Con = Daubenmier’s body responsiveness scale, mind-
body congruence subscale; BR-Incon = Daubenmier’s body responsiveness scale, mind-body incongruence 
subscale; PSA = Physical safety anxiety scale; EAT-26 = Eating Attitudes Test-26; CES-D = Center for 
Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale Short Form; FSFI = Female Sexual Function Index.  
* = p < .05, ** = p < .01.
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CHAPTER 5 
DISCUSSION 
 The purpose of the present study was to explore the mediating role of dispositional 
flow and moderating roles of dispositional mindfulness and self-compassion in the 
objectification theory framework. The ultimate goals were to deepen theoretical 
understanding of these constructs and inform interventions to address the consequences of 
sexual objectification. Most hypotheses were not supported. However, results raise important 
questions for future researchers. Model modification and results of hypothesis testing are 
discussed first, followed by other interesting or novel relationships that were proposed during 
model building.  
Model Modification and Hypothesis Testing 
 Objectification theory framework. The basic theoretical model framing this 
investigation was Fredrickson and Roberts’s (1997) objectification theory. Specifically, 
based on this theory, body surveillance was expected to be associated with consequences for 
women’s subjective experiences (i.e., increased body shame, increased appearance anxiety, 
decreased flow experiences, decreased body responsiveness, and increased physical safety 
anxiety), which in turn were expected to be associated with deleterious mental health 
outcomes (i.e., increased disordered eating, increased depression symptoms, and decreased 
sexual functioning). Model 1 used Fredrickson and Roberts’s basic structure, with the 
conceptualization of flow narrowed to include high concentration, feelings of control, and 
loss of self-consciousness as three separate constructs. In addition, based on the results of the 
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EFA, body responsiveness was conceptualized as two separate constructs, mind-body 
congruence and mind-body incongruence.  
 Before discussing specific hypotheses, it is important to acknowledge that we 
modified Fredrickson and Roberts’s (1997) objectification theory model through model 
building, beginning with Model 1. Most notably, we added relationships among 
consequences for subjective experience. Fredrickson and Roberts did not propose any 
relationships among these constructs; however, our data suggested paths from (a) body 
shame to mind-body incongruence, (b) appearance anxiety to mind-body congruence and 
incongruence, (c) appearance anxiety to concentration, control, and loss of self-
consciousness, (d) mind-body congruence to control and loss of self-consciousness, and e) 
physical safety anxiety to concentration. Among these variables, body shame, appearance 
anxiety, and physical safety anxiety could be categorized as cognitive, worry-related 
constructs, whereas dispositional flow and body responsiveness are more experiential 
consequences. Similar to this model, Grotewiel and Marszalek (2013) tested a model in 
which body surveillance and appearance anxiety were correlated with concentration, control, 
and loss of self-consciousness; results showed that appearance anxiety was associated with 
flow constructs, whereas body surveillance was only associated with loss of self-
consciousness. It could be that an alternative model would list cognitive consequences for 
subjective experience as predictive of broader experiential consequences. 
 We retained the added pathways in Models 2 and 3. Although supported by theory, 
they were added post-hoc during the model building process, increasing the likelihood of 
type I error. Results from all models should be interpreted in light of these adaptations. 
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 Flow in objectification theory. Within Model 1, the mediating role of dispositional 
flow was the primary concern, as captured by Hypotheses 1 through 3. Three aspects of flow 
(i.e., concentration, control, and loss of self-consciousness) were deemed most relevant to 
objectification theory based on theoretical underpinnings and results of prior studies. 
 High concentration was hypothesized to mediate the relationship between body 
surveillance and the mental health outcomes (Hypothesis 1). Body surveillance could 
increase depression symptoms by decreasing one's cognitive resources for concentration, an 
important aspect of flow. Indeed, in this study, body surveillance was found to be negatively 
associated with concentration, and concentration was negatively associated with depressive 
symptoms; however, the indirect effect of body surveillance on depressive symptoms was 
practically small and statistically not significant. Counter to hypothesized relationships, 
concentration was not associated with disordered eating or sexual functioning. Concentration 
was not correlated with disordered eating, and at face value, there seems to be little 
conceptual overlap between these constructs. Indeed, lack of relationship between these two 
variables highlights the importance of studying the roles of different components of flow 
within objectification theory. On the other hand, concentration and sexual functioning are 
more intuitively related, and they were significantly correlated, such that greater 
concentration was associated with greater sexual functioning. It is possible that the predictors 
of sexual functioning (i.e., sense of control and mind-body congruence) subsumed the 
variance explained by concentration.  
 Sense of control was hypothesized to mediate the relationship between body 
surveillance and the mental health outcomes (Hypothesis 2) due to feelings of decreased 
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autonomy and efficacy perpetuated by thinking about how others are perceiving one’s body. 
This hypothesis was not supported because the path from body surveillance to sense of 
control was not significant. It is possible that paths from appearance anxiety and mind-body 
congruence added during model-building subsumed the variance in sense of control that 
would have been explained by body surveillance. Indeed, the significant negative correlation 
between body surveillance and sense of control was similar in size to the significant negative 
correlation between body surveillance and concentration. 
 On the other side of the model, sense of control was found to be negatively associated 
with depression symptoms and positively associated with sexual functioning. Sense of 
control is similar to self-efficacy, which has a long theoretical and empirical history of 
predicting depression (c.f., Bandura, 1993). Likewise, sense of control over one’s body is 
intuitively related to sexual functioning, particularly the physiological components measured 
by the FSFI. Indeed, Randolph and Reddy (2006) found that among a sample of women who 
experienced chronic pelvic pain, perceived life control was positively associated with 
satisfaction with orgasm and negatively associated with pain severity, pain interference, and 
negative mood. Sense of control as conceptualized in flow theory is even more intimate, 
related to control over one’s actions and body. So, although our model did not support sense 
of control as a mediator between body surveillance and the mental health risks, it did show 
that greater sense of control was associated with fewer symptoms of depression and greater 
sexual functioning. 
 Loss of self-consciousness was hypothesized to mediate the relationship between 
body surveillance and the mental health outcomes (Hypothesis 3) due to the self-
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consciousness inherent in body surveillance. This hypothesis was partially supported: Body 
surveillance negatively predicted loss of self-consciousness, which positively predicted 
disordered eating. The direct effect of loss of self-consciousness on disordered eating is 
interesting because it was in an unexpected direction: Greater loss of self-consciousness 
predicted greater disordered eating. However, the two variables were negatively correlated. A 
direct pathway from body surveillance to disordered eating was not specified, so it is likely 
that the effect of body surveillance on disordered eating through loss of self-consciousness 
was larger than the direct, independent effect of loss of self-conscious on disordered eating. 
In other words, loss of self-consciousness may have suppressed the effect of body 
surveillance on disordered eating, which is evidence for a buffer effect, but would likely not 
fully mediate it if a direct path from body surveillance to disordered eating was included. An 
interesting alternative hypothesis is that some disordered eating behaviors are consistent with 
a loss of self-consciousness. For example, Heatherton and Baumeister (1991) wrote that "an 
eating binge occurs in a state in which the individual has successfully managed to shut all 
such broader concerns and consideration out of awareness" (p. 94), including meaning and 
long-term consequences. So, there could be a positive correlation between loss of self-
consciousness and disordered eating for a subset of participants, such that women lose self-
consciousness in the midst of a binge-eating episode. Regardless, the indirect effect of body 
surveillance on disordered eating through loss of self-consciousness was statistically 
significant but practically very small.  
 Loss of self-consciousness was negatively correlated with symptoms of depression 
and positively correlated with sexual functioning; however, it was not significantly 
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associated with either of these outcomes in the path model. This finding may further 
underscore the utility of differentiating among the different aspects of dispositional flow 
within the objectification theory framework, particularly in predicting depression. The 
absence of an effect of loss of self-consciousness on sexual functioning is surprising, 
however. Prior research has found that body self-consciousness during sexual activity 
predicts lower sexual esteem and less sexual satisfaction in men and women (Davison & 
McCabe, 2005; Dove & Wiederman, 2000; Pujols, Mestno, & Seal, 2009; Yamamiya, Cash, 
& Thompson, 2006). Limitations of the adapted version of the FSFI used for this study may 
have contributed to this discrepant finding. In addition, the DFS-2 loss of self-consciousness 
subscale does not address body self-consciousness specifically; it may be that a more 
nuanced measure would be necessary in order to ascertain the unique predictive effects of 
body self-consciousness. 
 Overall, results from Model 1 support the broad notion that different elements of flow 
function differently within the objectification theory framework. Within the model, paths 
from body surveillance to concentration and loss of self-consciousness (but not sense of 
control) were supported. Both concentration and sense of control (but not loss of self-
consciousness) were negatively associated with depression symptoms. Sense of control was 
positively associated with sexual functioning. Loss of self-consciousness was, surprisingly, 
positively associated with disordered eating. All three flow variables were implicated in the 
model in different ways, suggesting that a dimensional conceptualization of dispositional 
flow is appropriate within objectification theory. 
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 The moderating role of dispositional mindfulness. The second set of hypotheses 
(Hypotheses 4-9) and Model 2 investigated dispositional mindfulness as a potential 
moderator of the relationships between body surveillance and dispositional flow and body 
responsiveness. We also explored dispositional mindfulness as a moderator of the mediating 
effect of dispositional flow and body responsiveness on the relationship between body 
surveillance and the mental health outcomes (i.e., disordered eating, depression symptoms, 
and sexual dysfunction). This investigation began with the objectification theory structure 
suggested by Model 1 (i.e., including the added relationships and correlations among some of 
the consequences for subjective experience). In the model modification process, we also 
added direct paths from body surveillance to sexual functioning and from dispositional 
mindfulness to body shame, appearance anxiety, depression symptoms, and sexual 
functioning. 
 We originally hypothesized that dispositional mindfulness would moderate the 
relationships between body surveillance and dispositional flow and body responsiveness 
(Hypothesis 4). This hypothesis was not supported. By extension, Hypotheses 5-9, which 
involved moderation by dispositional mindfulness of the mediating effects of dispositional 
flow and body responsiveness on the relationship between body surveillance and the mental 
health outcomes, were also not supported. Notably, however, dispositional mindfulness had a 
significant direct effect on all consequences for subjective experiences other than mind-body 
incongruence and physical safety anxiety (which was not tested). It also had a significant 
direct effect on two mental health outcomes, depression symptoms and sexual functioning. 
Furthermore, with dispositional mindfulness in the model, paths from body surveillance to 
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concentration and mind-body congruence that were significant in Model 1 were no longer 
significant. 
 Although dispositional mindfulness did not moderate the effect of body surveillance 
as expected, it did directly affect a number of consequences for subjective experience, as well 
as depression symptoms and sexual functioning. (Direct effects were assessed without the 
interaction term in the model.) One explanation for this finding is the direct effect of body 
surveillance on most of these variables was small in Model 1, before dispositional 
mindfulness was even added to the model. Indeed, in Model 1, body surveillance had no 
direct effect on sense of control; small effects on loss of self-consciousness, mind-body 
congruence, and mind-body incongruence; and a medium-sized effect on concentration. In 
Model 2, these effect sizes remained unchanged or, in the cases of concentration and mind-
body congruence, were no longer significant. Dispositional mindfulness clearly affected 
concentration, control, loss of self-consciousness, and mind-body congruence; however, the 
effect of body surveillance seemed too small and too independent from dispositional 
mindfulness for its effects to be moderated by dispositional mindfulness. 
 It is possible that other steps in the objectification theory process, such as sexual 
objectification experiences, would be more likely to have effects moderated by dispositional 
mindfulness. Indeed, it may be that dispositional mindfulness is unlikely to change the 
impact of body surveillance once it already exists. Dispositional mindfulness may be more 
helpful in moderating a woman’s reaction to objectifying events when they occur; it may 
help her keep from internalizing them, thereby affecting the chain of effects (i.e., 
internalization of sociocultural standards of appearance; self-objectification) before body 
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surveillance.  Overall, in line with our hypotheses, results from Model 2 show that 
dispositional mindfulness had a medium-sized effect on loss of self-consciousness, control, 
depression symptoms, and sexual functioning and a large effect on mind-body congruence 
and concentration. All of these relationships were in the expected directions. However, 
dispositional mindfulness served as its own predictor of these variables and not as a mediator 
between body surveillance and these variables. 
 The moderating role of self-compassion. The third set of hypotheses (Hypotheses 
10-13) and Model 3 investigated self-compassion as a potential moderator of the 
relationships between body surveillance and body shame and appearance anxiety. We also 
explored self-compassion as a moderator of the mediating effect of body shame and 
appearance anxiety on the relationship between body surveillance and the mental health 
outcomes (i.e., disordered eating, depression symptoms, and sexual dysfunction). This 
investigation began with the objectification theory structure suggested by Model 1 (i.e., 
including the added relationships and correlations among some of the consequences for 
subjective experience). In the model modification process, we also added direct paths from 
body surveillance to depression symptoms and sexual functioning and from self-compassion 
to concentration, control, loss of self-consciousness, mind-body congruence, mind-body 
incongruence, and physical safety anxiety. 
 We originally hypothesized that self-compassion would moderate the relationships 
between body surveillance and body shame and appearance anxiety (Hypothesis 10). This 
hypothesis was not supported. By extension, Hypotheses 11-13, which involved moderation 
by self-compassion of the mediating effects of body shame and appearance anxiety on the 
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relationship between body surveillance and mental health outcomes, were also not supported. 
Notably, however, self-compassion had a medium-sized direct effect on body shame and a 
large direct effect on appearance anxiety. In addition, the paths from self-compassion to the 
other consequences for subjective experience, depression, and sexual functioning that were 
added during model modification were significant. Greater levels of self-compassion were 
associated with more adaptive scores on all consequences for subjective experience as well 
as depression and sexual functioning. Further, similar to Model 2, the paths from body 
surveillance to concentration and mind-body congruence that were significant in Model 1 
were not significant in Model 3. 
 Lack of support for Hypothesis 10 was surprising. Prior studies have generally 
supported self-compassion as a mediator in at least some of these links. Wasylkiw et al. 
(2012) found that self-compassion partially mediated the relationship between body 
preoccupation and depression symptoms. Breines et al. (2014) found that body shame 
partially mediated the relationship between self-compassion and disordered eating. Ferreira 
et al. (2013) demonstrated support for self-compassion as a partial mediator of the 
relationship between external shame and drive for thinness. So, it was noteworthy that in this 
study, self-compassion did not at least moderate the relationship between body surveillance 
and body shame and moderate the mediation of the relationship between body surveillance 
and depression symptoms through body shame. One possible explanation is that prior studies 
did not control for the large number of variables controlled in this study. Further, within this 
model, the direct effect of body shame on depression was not significant, likely because this 
variance was better explained by the direct effect of self-compassion on depression 
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symptoms. More broadly, the effect of body surveillance on most consequences for 
subjective experience was already small, so there was little effect to moderate. Like 
dispositional mindfulness, it is likely that interventions to increase self-compassion would 
have a greater effect on earlier steps in the objectification theory process, such as sexual 
objectification experiences. 
Post-Hoc Analyses and Observations 
 In order to explore the roles of dispositional flow, dispositional mindfulness, and self-
compassion within the objectification theory framework, we assessed all variables in 
Fredrickson and Roberts’s (1997) objectification theory model from body surveillance 
forward. Testing the full model allowed us to understand how these variables function in 
context. Further, during the model modification process, we added many pathways that were 
not proposed by Fredrickson and Roberts (1997). All of these additions were justified using 
theory, but they should be interpreted with caution because they were not the focus of our 
study and were added after data analysis had already begun. Interesting findings will be 
discussed briefly in light of these limitations.  
 Objectification theory framework. Across all three models tested in the present 
study, several relationships established in previous objectification theory research were not 
supported. First, the theorized predictive effect of body surveillance on physical safety 
anxiety was not supported. It is likely that this relationship was absent due to measurement 
problems. The physical safety anxiety scale was created for the current study and had no 
prior evidence of validity. It contained only three questions, all related to fear of highly 
violent crime (i.e., rape/sexual assault, attack with a weapon, robbery/mugging); anxiety 
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about other threats to physical safety, including intimate partner violence or pushing or 
shoving, and a more global, less specific fear for one’s physical safety, was not captured by 
this scale. It is likely that variation in scores on this scale was more strongly related to other 
factors (e.g., age, socioeconomic status, veteran status, other identity statuses, location) than 
to body surveillance. Indeed, age was associated with lower levels of both body surveillance 
and physical safety anxiety. These results mirror the findings of previous studies. For 
example, in a comparison of women ages 18-24 versus 25-68, the younger women had 
significantly higher mean scores on measures of interpersonal sexual objectification and 
body surveillance (Augustus-Horvath & Tylka, 2009). Further, several studies have found 
that older people espouse less fear of crime than younger people, either due to lower 
perceived risk of crime (Ferraro & La Grange, 1992; McCoy, Woolredge, Cullen, Dubreck, 
& Browning, 1996) or by going to greater lengths to avoid situations they perceive to be 
dangerous (Tulloch, 2000). If age had been controlled in this study, a positive correlation 
between body surveillance and physical safety anxiety may have emerged. 
Another deviation in the structure of this model was that sexual functioning was only 
directly predicted by components of two consequences for subjective experience (i.e., control 
and mind-body congruence), not by all five, as expected. This deviation may also be due to 
measurement problems; the adapted version of the FSFI was created by the researchers and 
not validated prior to this study. Most items were highly sensitive and personal in nature, 
which may have made participants more susceptible to social desirability bias when 
completing this scale. Likewise, rather than measuring cognitive or emotional sexual 
enjoyment, these questions largely related to physiological arousal; variation may be 
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attributable to factors not measured in this study. Furthermore, specificity of the FSFI was 
lost by using a full scale score (as also used by Steer and Tiggemann, 2008) rather than the 
subscale scores of desire/arousal, lubrication, orgasm, satisfaction, and pain (as originally 
supported by Rosen et al., 2000). Steer and Tiggemann (2008) did not validate the single 
factor structure of their revised scale; it may be that using specific subscales identified by 
Rosen et al. (2000), such as satisfaction, would have yielded the expected results. Finally, it 
is possible that participants who did not consider themselves sexually active may have 
answered these questions differently than participants who did. 
 Mediating role of appearance anxiety. Model 1 was designed to test mediation of 
the path from body surveillance to the mental health risks through concentration, control, and 
loss of self-consciousness. In building this model, paths were added from appearance anxiety 
to the flow variables. The path coefficient from body surveillance to appearance anxiety was 
much larger than the path coefficients from body surveillance to concentration and control; 
the latter path was not significant. It was similar in size to the path from body surveillance to 
loss of self-consciousness. These findings are in line with Grotewiel and Marszalek’s (2013) 
results and suggest that body surveillance may operate on flow variables through appearance 
anxiety. This structure was retained and effect sizes remained similar in Models 2 and 3. 
 Moderating effect of dispositional mindfulness on body shame and appearance 
anxiety. As part of the modification process for Model 2, the moderating effects of 
dispositional mindfulness on (a) body shame, (b) appearance anxiety, and (c, d) the 
mediating effects of body shame and appearance anxiety on the relationship between body 
surveillance and the mental health outcomes were also tested. We did not initially 
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hypothesize relationships between dispositional mindfulness and body shame and appearance 
anxiety because we expected self-compassion to better predict these variables; however, self-
compassion and dispositional mindfulness share several characteristics and benefits, and self-
compassion was not included in this model. Results showed that dispositional mindfulness 
significantly moderated the effect of body surveillance on appearance anxiety, such that the 
relationship was weaker for women with higher levels of dispositional mindfulness (see 
Figure 8). Mindfulness has been shown to negatively correlate with anxiety (see Brown et al., 
2013), and it has sometimes been shown to be a better predictor of anxiety than self-
compassion (e.g., Bergen-Cico & Cheon, 2013; Soysa & Wilcomb, 2013). It appears that 
dispositional mindfulness buffers against the effects of body surveillance on appearance 
anxiety. It may be that the nonjudgmental aspects of mindfulness are particularly protective 
against anxiety. 
 Moderating effect of self-compassion on flow, body responsiveness, and physical 
safety anxiety. As part of the modification process for Model 3, direct paths from self-
compassion to concentration, control, loss of self-consciousness, mind-body congruence, and 
mind-body incongruence were also tested. We did not initially hypothesize relationships 
between self-compassion and these variables because we expected dispositional mindfulness 
to better predict these variables; however, dispositional mindfulness and self-compassion are 
very similar constructs, and dispositional mindfulness was not included in this model. All of 
these direct paths were significant. Indeed, in prior studies, dispositional mindfulness has 
been correlated with flow (Aherne et al., 2011; Kee & Wang, 2008) and internal bodily 
awareness (Silverstein et al., 2011). 
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 Also during the modification process, a direct pathway was added from self-
compassion to physical safety anxiety. This modification was unique for Model 3 (i.e., a 
parallel pathway from dispositional mindfulness to physical safety anxiety was not added in 
Model 2). We initially hypothesized that self-compassion would have the greatest effect on 
body shame and appearance anxiety, the more cognitive consequences for subjective 
experience. Like body shame and appearance anxiety, physical safety anxiety also involves 
worry. Indeed, self-compassion, but not body surveillance, predicted physical safety anxiety, 
which predicted disordered eating and depression symptoms. 
 Direct effects of body surveillance on mental health risks. In Model 2, a pathway 
from body surveillance to sexual functioning was added during model building. The pathway 
was significant, suggesting that body surveillance had a small, positive direct effect on sexual 
functioning when controlling for dispositional mindfulness. This relationship did not exist in 
Model 1, in which dispositional mindfulness was not controlled. The effect is in an 
unexpected direction: Greater levels of body surveillance predicted greater sexual 
functioning. 
 Similarly, in Model 3, we added direct paths from body surveillance to depression 
and sexual functioning. Both were significant: body surveillance had a small, negative direct 
effect on depression symptoms and a small, positive direct effect on sexual functioning when 
controlling for self-compassion. Like the direct effect of body surveillance on sexual 
functioning in Model 2, these relationships were in unexpected directions: Body surveillance 
was negatively related to depression symptoms and positively related to sexual functioning. 
 In both models, these direct effects are statistically significant but practically small. 
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They may be spurious, given the large number of relationships assessed in this model. 
Alternatively, it may be that any true relationship that exists between these variables is due to 
other variables that affect them both. For example, it could be that women with higher levels 
of insight are more aware of both their self-surveying behaviors and emotional experiences 
during sex. 
 Direct effects of dispositional mindfulness and self-compassion on mental health 
risks. As part of the model-building process for Model 2, we added direct paths from 
dispositional mindfulness to depression and sexual functioning. Both paths were significant, 
such that greater dispositional mindfulness was associated with fewer symptoms of 
depression and greater sexual functioning. Similarly, we added direct paths from self-
compassion to depression and sexual functioning in Model 3. Again, both paths were 
significant: self-compassion had a small direct effect on sexual functioning and a medium 
direct effect on depression symptoms. Dispositional mindfulness and self-compassion have 
promising implications for targeting depression symptoms and sexual functioning beyond the 
ameliorative effects on body shame, appearance anxiety, dispositional flow, and body 
responsiveness. Within the context of the extant body of literature, these results are not 
particularly surprising. Most prior studies have investigated correlations among relevant 
variables (e.g., Kee & Wang, 2008) or conducted experiments with mindfulness or self-
compassion as the independent variable (e.g., Aherne et al., 2011; Silverstein et al., 2011), 
without looking at the moderating effects of these variables. 
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Research Implications and Future Directions 
 The present study contributes to extant knowledge of objectification theory and flow 
in several ways. First, the conceptualization and measurement of flow was grounded in flow 
theory. By focusing on the three components of flow most relevant to objectification theory, 
we were able to elucidate the ways in which these different experiences are affected by body 
surveillance and appearance anxiety and, in turn, uniquely affect women’s mental health 
outcomes. Using a well-validated measure of flow strengthened confidence in our 
conclusions. The same measure can also be scored to produce a global flow score; future 
reasearchers may be interested in analyzing a model of objectification theory with flow as a 
latent variable. This approach could elucidate what role, if any, other dimensions of flow 
play in objectification theory. Future researchers may be interested in exploring how state 
flow functions within the objectification theory framework.   
 The positive association between loss of self-consciousness and disordered eating in 
the structural equation models raises an interesting question about the relationships among 
these variables. These variables were negatively correlated, so the positive association should 
be interpreted with caution; however, prior researchers (e.g., Heatherton & Baumeister, 
1991) have posited that binge eating may function as a temporary escape from self-
awareness. Further research should examine the relationships between loss of self-
consciousness and specific disordered eating behaviors, especially those related to binge-
eating. 
 Hypotheses about the moderating effects of dispositional mindfulness and self-
compassion were largely unsupported by our results. Future researchers are encouraged to 
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explore other places in the objectification theory framework in which these variables may 
intervene, such as the effect of sexual objectification experiences on body surveillance. 
Notably, both mindfulness and self-compassion had direct effects on most consequences for 
subjective experience as well as depression symptoms and sexual functioning. Alternatively, 
it could be that dispositional mindfulness and self-compassion are additional consequences 
for subjective experience, decreased by body surveillance and protective against the mental 
health risks. Indeed, these constructs share many similarities with dispositional flow. 
Practicing mindfulness and self-compassion may be difficult in the presence of high levels of 
body surveillance. 
 The post-hoc analyses conducted as part of the model-building process raise some 
interesting questions about the structure of objectification theory. First, within the basic 
model of objectification theory that we tested (Model 1), physical safety anxiety and sexual 
functioning were related to few other constructs: physical safety anxiety was not predicted by 
body surveillance and only predicted disordered eating and depression symptoms, not sexual 
functioning; sexual functioning was only predicted by feelings of control and mind-body 
congruence. It is likely that physical safety anxiety is increased by experiences of sexual 
objectification; for example, Watson, Davids, et al. (2015) found that sexual objectification 
experiences were related to higher levels of perceived risk of crime, fear of rape, and fear of 
crime. Within our study, physical safety anxiety was associated with higher levels of body 
shame and lower levels of self-compassion and concentration. Future researchers are 
encouraged to (a) develop and validate measures of physical safety anxiety and sexual 
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functioning and (b) remain open to the ways in which these variables may function 
differently within the objectification theory framework than originally posited. 
 It may also be interesting to explore relationships among the consequences for 
subjective experience. Appearance anxiety in particular was related to most other 
consequences for subjective experience. A next step in better understanding the relationships 
among these variables is to selectively add additional exogenous variables to the 
objectification theory model that may explain some of the covariance among mediators, such 
as attachment style or emotional reactivity. Further, future researchers could conduct 
experimental studies in which the levels of body shame, appearance anxiety, or physical 
safety anxiety are manipulated so that causal effects on flow and body responsiveness can be 
measured. Fredrickson et al. (1998) pioneered a manipulation of objectification in which 
participants are asked to try on a swimsuit or sweater before performing tasks and completing 
relevant questionnaires. Using this manipulation, researchers could assess participants’ levels 
of flow in a flow-enabling task and/or in-the-moment body responsiveness. 
 In general, experimental studies will be important in solidifying (a) concentration, 
control, and loss of self-consciousness as the elements of flow most affected by 
objectification theory and (b) the protective effects of mindfulness and self-compassion. 
These relationships have received support from this and other cross-sectional, associational 
studies, many involving SEM and purporting to explain directionality. However, in order to 
truly establish causality, studies involving manipulation (of either body surveillance and 
related constructs to test the role of flow or mindfulness or self-compassion to test the 
moderating effects of these variables) must be conducted. Mindfulness and self-compassion 
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workshops can be particularly useful manipulations because they provide immediate 
therapeutic benefit to participants as well as an easy opportunity for researchers to assess 
effects. Another helpful next step would be a longitudinal study measuring fluctuations in 
consequences for subjective experience and their effects on mental health outcomes over a 
substantial period of time. 
 The mental health outcome of sexual functioning deserves special attention because it 
has received relatively less research attention than disordered eating and depression. It also 
may be especially difficult to measure due to its sensitive nature. Future researchers are 
encouraged to take a creative approach to assessing the predictors of sexual functioning from 
a feminist and positive psychology lens. Physiological indicators of satisfaction that are 
frequently captured in sexual functioning scales, including the FSFI, may not adequately 
reflect sexual enjoyment/satisfaction for many individuals. Further, social and cultural 
expectations, beliefs, and values around sexuality may shape how satisfaction is experienced 
and evaluated. For example, operating from what they termed an “intimate justice” 
framework, McClelland (2010) posited that measures of sexual satisfaction should be 
accompanied by measures of sexual entitlement or importance in order to better understand 
quality of individuals’ sexual lives. Qualitative studies may be especially important in 
developing a more nuanced understanding (and, eventually, measurement) of female sexual 
functioning that incorporates physiological, emotional, relational, and spiritual aspects of 
sexuality. 
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Clinical Considerations 
 The results of this study suggest several strategies for clinicians, especially those 
working with women around issues of eating concerns, depression, and sexual dysfunction. 
Broadly, results suggested that flow is an important part of the objectification theory 
framework that does affect disordered eating, depression symptoms, and sexual dysfunction. 
Similarly, although dispositional mindfulness and self-compassion were not found to 
moderate the effect of body surveillance on most consequences for subjective experience, 
higher levels of these variables were associated with lower levels of body shame, appearance 
anxiety, mind-body incongruence, physical safety anxiety, and depression symptoms and 
higher levels of concentration, control, loss of self-consciousness, mind-body congruence, 
and sexual functioning. Developing qualities of dispositional flow, dispositional mindfulness, 
and self-compassion may positively influence some of the traits and experiences negatively 
affected by objectification. 
 Results of this study provided support for the important role of flow in the 
objectification theory framework, specifically the components of high concentration, sense of 
control, and loss of self-consciousness. For the population of women sampled for this study 
(i.e., White, heterosexual, educated women ages 18-50), enabling these processes may help 
protect against symptoms of eating disorders, depression, and sexual dysfunction. Flow 
experiences are posited to occur when an individual’s high level of perceived skill matches 
the high level of perceived challenge of the task at hand (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990). 
Csikszentmihalyi (1990) explained that games, sports, and art enable flow by requiring the 
participant to acquire new skills and set goals and by providing feedback and making control 
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possible. Counselors can provide psychoeducation to women about the preconditions for 
flow experiences and help them identify activities that may set the stage for a flow 
experience. Activities may be as diverse as individual or team sports, exercise, videogames, 
coding, reading, writing, creating art or music, cleaning, cooking, assembling furniture, or 
working with electronics. 
 When working with women in particular, counselors are advised to attend to 
environmental conditions that may make achieving flow more or less difficult. For example, 
a woman might enjoy strength training, but express concern that lifting weights in a male-
dominated gym makes her feel anxious. Exploring the precedents of this anxiety and 
providing psychoeducation about sexual objectification may be important tasks of the 
counseling relationship. From there, the counselor can help the client identify safe spaces 
with fewer opportunities for objectification. Similarly, advocacy work within a system, such 
a university, can engender systemic change to help make more of these spaces available. 
 Results of this study provide further support to the large body of literature that has 
shown mindfulness to be effective in promoting psychological functioning (see Brown et al., 
2013, and Davis & Hayes, 2011, for overviews). Within this study, dispositional mindfulness 
predicted higher levels of dispositional flow and mind-body congruence and lower levels of 
body shame and appearance anxiety. Importantly, dispositional mindfulness also directly 
predicted sexual functioning above and beyond the mediating effects of the consequences for 
subjective experience. Clinicians looking to incorporate mindfulness interventions to help 
clients address these presenting concerns have a wealth of resources from which to choose. 
Broad mindfulness intervention programs exist that are appropriate for treating a wide variety 
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of client concerns, such as anxiety (c.f., Greeson & Brantley), depression (c.f., Barnhofer & 
Crane), and eating disorders (c.f., Wolever & Best). Interventions that incorporate yoga may 
be especially helpful to bolster connection with one’s body, most obviously on dispositional 
flow and body responsiveness but potentially also affecting body shame and appearance 
anxiety (Daubenmier, 2005; Impett et al., 2006). Finally, recent studies suggest that 
mindfulness interventions in conjunction with sex therapy may be promising treatments for 
increasing women’s sexual functioning and enjoyment (Brotto, Basson, & Luria, 2008; 
Brotto, Heiman, et al., 2008; Brotto et al., 2012).  
 Results of this study also complement a smaller but similarly well-supported 
menagerie of interventions involving self-compassion. We found that self-compassion 
predicted body shame, appearance anxiety, dispositional flow, body responsiveness, physical 
safety anxiety, depression symptoms, and sexual functioning in the expected directions. 
Indeed, empirical studies have shown self-compassion interventions to be beneficial for 
treating binge eating disorder for women (Kelly & Carter, 2015) and self-criticism for female 
athletes (Mosewich, Crocker, Kowalski, & DeLongis, 2013). Among undergraduate samples 
of women and men, self-compassion training has been shown to reduce body dissatisfaction, 
body shame, and contingent self-worth based on appearance (Albertson et al., 2014) and 
increase body appreciation (Albertson et al., 2014), resilience, and well-being (Smeets, Neff, 
Alberts, & Peters, 2014). In a review of self-compassion literature, Barnard and Curry (2011) 
suggested that compassionate mind training, development of a compassionate image, two-
chair, mindfulness based stress reduction and meditation, dialectical behavioral therapy, and 
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Acceptance and Commitment Therapy are all promising approaches to cultivating clients’ 
self-compassion.  
 Overall, results of this study suggest that strength-based approaches may help reduce 
the deleterious consequences of objectification. In addition, broader, social-level reform is 
needed to change the cultural milieu in which sexual objectification is a daily component of 
many women’s lives (Goodman et al., 2004; Vera & Speight, 2003). At systemic or 
institutional levels, psychoeducational programs can be instituted to help teach women and 
men how and when to confront incidences of sexism (c.f., Ashburn-Nardo, Morris, and 
Goodwin, 2008). Finally, psychology training programs are encouraged to help students 
explore their own experiences of gender role socialization as well as the many different types 
of sexism their clients may encounter (Szymanski, Carr, & Moffitt, 2011).  
Strengths and Limitations 
 Results of the present study should be interpreted in light of several considerable 
strengths and weaknesses in the study design. This study was associational, allowing us to 
analyze relationships among many variables. By using an online survey to collect data, we 
were able to reach a large number of participants while minimizing discomfort or 
inconvenience required for participation. Our sample size was large, and most instruments 
were well-validated. 
 This study was also subject to several limitations. One limitation universal to 
associational studies is low internal validity as compared to strong experimental designs. 
Because there is no manipulation, it is difficult to know if the variables examined were 
related to each other in the proposed directions, or if another variable may have influenced 
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multiple variables within this model (e.g., self-objectification). Likewise, causal inferences 
cannot be drawn from associational studies; although SEM posits directionality, it cannot be 
assumed in lack of a true independent variable. Studies that utilize a self-report survey design 
such as this one are subject to participant attitude effects, such as social desirability bias. 
Monomethod bias is another threat, since all responses were collected through the same 
online survey. In addition, instrumentation may pose threats to internal validity of the study if 
the instruments have poor validity; the PSA and FSFI may both present threats to 
instrumentation since their validity was not assessed prior to this study. Related to 
measurement concerns, conceptualization of constructs assessed in this study occurred at the 
trait level. Although there is some evidence that personality traits are malleable, critics could 
argue that attending to state experiences (e.g., state flow; state mindfulness) may be more 
directly relevant to developing preventative and remedial interventions. Future researchers 
are encouraged to explore these constructs at a state level using an experimental design, such 
that flow, mindfulness, and self-compassion may be manipulated in ways applicable to 
intervention planning. 
 Special strengths and limitations apply to the sample and recruitment tactics. One 
strength of this study is the large sample. Another strength is the diversity of recruitment 
methods; although all participants were recruited online, we used three different recruitment 
methods, broadening generalizability. However, participation in this study was limited to 
women who had access to a computer. Further, all participants who completed the survey 
must have met a certain baseline level of emotion regulation in order to have the patience to 
complete such a lengthy study. Emotion regulation likely influences women’s experiences of 
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variables in the model; for example, deficits in emotion regulation are thought to be 
implicated in binge eating disorder (Leehr et al., 2015). Related, participants must have had 
the education to understand the questionnaires and the means to access a computer and the 
internet. Future researchers are encouraged to use more diverse recruitment tactics to reach 
women who do not have regular access to the internet. 
 Generalizability is further limited to United States women between ages 18-50 due to 
inclusion criteria. In addition, the majority of participants identified as heterosexual and 
White. Caution should be taken if results are generalized to women who identify as lesbian, 
bisexual, or another non-heterosexual identity or to non-White women. Sexual orientation 
and ethnic minority women face special stressors based on their intersecting identities, which 
may affect the ways in which the variables studied in this project affect one another. For 
example, Watson, Marszalek, et al. (2015) found that women who identified as Black or 
African American reported more sexual objectification experiences and fear of crime than 
women who identified as White. Watson et al. (2012) situated Black/African American 
women’s experiences of sexual objectification within a historical context of racism in which 
Black/African American women’s bodies were literally owned by White men and were 
overly sexualized. Additional variables may also be implicated in the objectification theory 
model for certain groups of women; for example, Watson, Grotewiel et al. (2015) found that 
heterosexist experiences were associated with increased body image concerns for sexual 
minority women. Future researchers are encouraged to recruit a more diverse sample or to 
conduct studies specifically with populations with different identities in order to better tailor 
the model. 
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 A final important limitation of this sample was that women who were obese were 
underrepresented and women who were underweight were overrepresented. Although 
research on objectification theory among overweight and obese women is lacking, Oehlhof 
(2012) found that these women do experience self-objectification and its consequences with 
some group-specific manifestations (e.g., they may experience different types of objectifying 
experiences). The majority of objectification theory studies have used samples of young, 
normal weight, White, heterosexual college women. Research on objectification theory 
among overweight and obese women would make an important contribution to the literature. 
 Also affecting generalizability, the results of this study are at risk of being over-
specified to its sample and methods. The models retained deviated considerably from the 
traditional objectification model, which is generally well-supported. Modification decisions 
were considered in the context of theory, however, and raise important questions about 
alternative ways in which these constructs may interact with each other. In addition, novel 
relationships explored in this study, including the specific roles of different components of 
flow as well as mindfulness and self-compassion, provide an important step in better 
understanding the objectification process. Finally, these models controlled for a large number 
of variables. A helpful next step would be testing the models supported in this study using a 
new sample and different measures. 
Conclusions 
 The present study investigated the relationships among body surveillance, body 
shame, appearance anxiety, dispositional flow, body responsiveness, physical safety anxiety, 
disordered eating, depression symptoms, sexual functioning, dispositional mindfulness, and 
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self-compassion within the objectification theory framework. Dispositional flow was studied 
using the nine-component conceptualization provided by Csikszentmihalyi (1990). Support 
was found for a model in which the three most relevant components of flow (i.e., 
concentration, control, and loss of self-consciousness) were measured separately. In separate 
models, dispositional mindfulness and self-compassion were found to be associated with 
many other variables within the objectification theory framework; however, they largely did 
not mediate the effects of body surveillance as hypothesized. Results demonstrate the 
importance of conceptualizing flow as a multidimensional construct in future studies of 
objectification theory, and researchers are encouraged to pay special attention to the roles of 
concentration, control, and loss of self-consciousness. Further, the potential buffering roles of 
dispositional mindfulness and self-compassion earlier within the objectification theory 
process should be investigated. Clinicians can use these results to support treatments for 
women’s gender and body-related concerns that draw upon mindfulness and self-compassion 
practices. Indeed, recent trends in positive psychology appear to have promising implications 
for the treatment of mental health concerns born out of a sexist society. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
SCREENING QUESTIONS 
 
Instructions: You will first be asked to answer three separate screening questions. Please 
respond to all three items honestly. 
 
1. Please select your gender identification.  
• Woman 
• Man 
 
2. Please select your age range. 
• Under 18 years old 
• 18-50 years old 
• Over 50 years old 
 
3. Are you a United States citizen? 
• Yes 
• No 
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APPENDIX B 
 
DEMOGRAPHIC QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
Instructions: Please answer each of the following questions honestly. 
 
1. Please identify your biological sex assigned at birth:  
• Female 
• Male 
• Intersex 
• Other (please specify): __________________ 
 
2. Please identify your gender identification (check all that apply): 
• Woman 
• Transgender Woman 
• Man 
• Transgender Man 
• Gender Fluid 
• Gender Queer 
• Non-binary 
• Other (please specify): ___________________ 
 
3. Please identify your age in years:      _________________ 
 
4. Are you a citizen of the United States? 
• Yes 
• No 
 
5. Please identify your race/ethnicity/cultural identity (check all that apply): 
• Asian/Pacific Islander 
• Black/African American 
• Caucasian/White/European American 
• East Indian 
• Hispanic/Latina 
• Middle Eastern 
• Multiracial/ethnic 
• Native American/American Indian 
• West Indian 
• Other (please specify): ________________ 
 
6. Please identify your sexual orientation: 
• Bisexual 
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• Gay 
• Pansexual 
• Queer 
• Questioning 
• Straight or heterosexual 
• Other (please specify): ____________________ 
 
7. Please indicate your highest level of education achieved. 
• Some High School/No Diploma  
• High School Diploma  
• GED  
• Vocational or Trade School  
• Some College/No Degree  
• Associates Degree  
• Bachelor’s Degree (Ex: BA, BS, AB, BSW)  
• Master’s Degree (Ex: MA, MS, MSW, MPH, MEd)  
• Doctorate Degree (Ex: Ph.D., Ed.D., Sc.D., DA, DB, DSW)  
• Professional Degree (Ex: JD, MD, DO, DDS, DVM, PsyD)  
 
8. Please identify your personal annual income. 
• $0-9,999  
• $10,000-19,999  
• $20,000-29,999  
• $30,000-39,999  
• $40,000-49,999  
• $50,000-59,999  
• $60,000-69,999  
• $70,000-79,999  
• $80,000-89,999  
• $90,000-99,999  
• $100,000 or more  
 
9. Please specify your height in feet and inches (e.g., 5 feet 9 inches). If you don’t know 
your height, take your best guess.  
____ feet, ____ inches 
 
10. Please specify your weight in pounds (e.g., 170 pounds). If you don’t know your weight, 
take your best guess.  
____ pounds 
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APPENDIX C 
 
THE BODY SURVEILLANCE SUBSCALE OF THE OBJECTIFIED BODY 
CONSCIOUSNESS SCALE 
 
Instructions: Indicate the number that corresponds to how much you agree with each of the 
statements on the following page. 
 
Indicate NA only if the statement does not apply to you. Do not indicate NA if you don't 
agree with a statement. 
 
For example, if the statement says "When I am happy, I feel like singing" and you don't feel 
like singing when you are happy, then you would indicate one of the disagree choices. You 
would only indicate NA if you were never happy.  
 
Item 1 
Strongly 
disagree 
2 3 4 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
5 6 7 
Strongly 
agree 
N/A 
Does 
not 
apply 
1. I rarely think about how I 
look. 
        
2. I think it is more 
important that my clothes 
are comfortable than 
whether they look good on 
me. 
        
3. I think more about how 
my body feels than how my 
body looks. 
        
4. I rarely compare how I 
look with how other people 
look. 
        
5. During the day, I think 
about how I look many 
times. 
        
6. I often worry about 
whether the clothes I am 
wearing make me look 
good. 
        
7. I rarely worry about how 
I look to other people. 
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8. I am more concerned with 
what my body can do than 
how it looks. 
        
 
APPENDIX D 
 
THE BODY SHAME SUBSCALE OF THE OBJECTIFIED BODY 
CONSCIOUSNESS SCALE 
 
Instructions: Indicate the number that corresponds to how much you agree with each of the 
statements on the following page. 
 
Indicate NA only if the statement does not apply to you. Do not indicate NA if you don't 
agree with a statement. 
 
For example, if the statement says "When I am happy, I feel like singing" and you don't feel 
like singing when you are happy, then you would indicate one of the disagree choices. You 
would only circle NA if you were never happy.  
 
Item 1 
Strongly 
disagree 
2 3 4 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
5 6 7 
Strongly 
agree 
N/A 
Does 
not 
apply 
1. When I can't control my 
weight, I feel like 
something must be wrong 
with me 
        
2. I feel ashamed of myself 
when I haven't made the 
effort to look my best 
        
3. I feel like I must be a bad 
person when I don't look as 
good as I could 
        
4. I would be ashamed for 
people to know what I 
really weigh. 
        
5. Even when I can't control 
my weight, I think I'm an 
okay person 
        
6. I never worry that 
something is wrong with 
me when I am not 
        
180 
 
 
exercising as much as I 
should 
7. When I'm not exercising 
enough, I question whether 
I am a good enough person. 
        
8. When I'm not the size I 
think I should be, I feel 
ashamed. 
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APPENDIX E 
 
THE SOCIAL APPEARANCE ANXIETY SCALE 
 
Instructions: Below is a list of statements which can be used to describe how people feel. 
Underneath each statement are four numbers which indicate how often each statement is true 
of you (e.g., 1 = not at all, 5 = extremely). Please read each statement carefully and select the 
number which best indicates how often, in general, the statement is true of you. 
 
Item 1 
Never 
2 
Rarely 
3 
Sometimes 
4 
Often 
5 
Extremely 
1. I feel comfortable with the way I 
appear to others. 
     
2. I feel nervous when having my 
picture taken. 
     
3. I get tense when it is obvious people 
are looking at me. 
     
4. I am concerned people would not 
like me because of the way I look. 
     
5. I worry that others talk about flaws 
in my appearance when I am not 
around. 
     
6. I am concerned people will find me 
unappealing because of my appearance. 
     
7. I am afraid that people will find me 
unattractive. 
     
8. I worry that my appearance will 
make life more difficult for me. 
     
9. I am concerned that I have missed 
out on opportunities because of my 
appearance. 
     
10. I get nervous when talking to 
people because of the way I look. 
     
11. I feel anxious when other people 
say something about my appearance. 
     
12. I am frequently afraid I would not 
meet others’ standards of how I should 
look. 
     
13. I worry people will judge the way I 
look negatively. 
     
14. I am uncomfortable when I think 
others are noticing flaws in my 
appearance. 
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15. I worry that a romantic partner 
will/would leave me because of my 
appearance. 
     
16. I am concerned that people think I 
am not good looking. 
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APPENDIX F 
 
THE DISPOSITIONAL FLOW SCALE-2 LONG FORM 
 
Instructions: Please answer the following questions in relation to your experiences in any 
activity in life. These questions relate to the thoughts and feelings you may experience in 
everyday life. There are no right or wrong answers. Think about how you feel during 
activities in everyday life and answer the questions using the rating scale below. Mark the 
number that best matches your experience from the options available. 
 
Item 1 
Never 
2 
Seldom 
3 
Sometimes 
4 
Often 
5 
Always 
1. I am challenged, but I believe my 
skills will allow me to meet the 
challenge.  
     
2. I make the correct movements without 
thinking about trying to do so. 
     
3. I know clearly what I want to do.      
4. It is really clear to me how the activity 
is going. 
     
5. My attention is focused entirely on 
what I am doing. 
     
6. I have a sense of control over what I 
am doing. 
     
7. I am not concerned with what others 
may be thinking of me. 
     
8. Time seems to alter (either slows down 
or speeds up). 
     
9. I really enjoy the experience.      
10. My abilities match the high challenge 
of the situation. 
     
11. Things just seem to happen 
automatically. 
     
12. I have a strong sense of what I want 
to do. 
     
13. I am aware of how well I am doing.      
14. It is no effort to keep my mind on 
what is happening. 
     
15. I feel like I can control what I am 
doing. 
     
16. I am not concerned with how others 
may be evaluating me. 
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17. The way time passes seems to be 
different from normal. 
     
18. I love the feeling and want to capture 
it again. 
     
19. I feel I am competent enough to meet 
the high demands of a situation. 
     
20. I perform automatically.      
21. I know what I want to achieve.      
22. I have a good idea about how well I 
am doing. 
     
23. I have total concentration.      
24. I have a feeling of total control.      
25. I am not concerned with how I am 
presenting myself. 
     
26. It feels like time goes by quickly.      
27. The experience leaves me feeling 
great. 
     
28. The challenge and my skills are at an 
equally high level. 
     
29. I do things spontaneously and 
automatically without having to think. 
     
30. My goals are clearly defined.      
31. I can tell by the way the activity is 
going how well I am doing. 
     
32. I am completely focused on the task 
at hand. 
     
33. I feel in total control of my body.      
34. I am not worried about what others 
may be thinking of me. 
     
35. I lose my normal awareness of time.      
36. I find the experience extremely 
rewarding. 
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APPENDIX G 
 
MEASURE OF PHYSICAL SAFETY ANXIETY 
 
Instructions: At one time or another, most of us have experienced fear about becoming the 
victim of crime. Some crimes probably frighten you more than others. We are interested in 
how afraid people are in everyday life of being a victim of different kinds of crimes. Please 
rate your fear on a scale of 1 to 10 where 1 means you are not afraid at all and 10 means you 
are very afraid.  
 
Item 1 
Not afraid 
at all 
2 3 4 
 
5 
Somewhat 
afraid 
6 7 8 
 
9 10 
Very 
afraid 
1. Being raped or sexually 
assaulted. 
          
2. Being attacked by 
someone with a weapon. 
          
3. Being robbed or 
mugged on the street. 
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APPENDIX H 
 
MEASURE OF BODY RESPONSIVENESS 
 
Instructions: Please answer the following questions honestly about your general day-to-day 
experiences. There are no right or wrong answers. 
 
Item 1 
Not at all 
true about me 
2 3 4 
 
5 6 7 
Very true 
about me 
1. I am confident that my body will let me 
know what is good for me. 
       
2. My bodily desires lead me to do things 
that I end up regretting. 
       
3. My mind and my body often want to do 
different things. 
       
4. I suppress my bodily feelings and 
sensations. 
       
5.  I “listen” to my body to advise me about 
what to do. 
       
6. It is important for me to know how my 
body is feeling throughout the day. 
       
7. When I'm not exercising enough, I 
question whether I am a good enough 
person. 
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APPENDIX I 
 
THE EATING ATTITUDES TEST 
 
Instructions: 
 
Please choose a response for each of the following statements. 
 
Item 1 
Never 
2 
Rarely 
3 
Sometimes 
4 
Often 
5 
Very 
often 
1. Am terrified about being overweight      
2. Avoid eating when I am hungry        
3. Find myself preoccupied with food      
4. Have gone on eating binges where I feel 
that I may not be able to stop 
     
5. Cut my food into small pieces      
6. Aware of the calorie content of foods 
that I eat 
     
7. Particularly avoid foods with a high 
carbohydrate content (i.e. bread, rice, 
potatoes, etc.) 
     
8. Feel that others would prefer if I ate 
more 
     
9. Vomit after I have eaten      
10. Feel extremely guilty after eating      
11. Am preoccupied with a desire to be 
thinner 
     
12. Think about burning up calories when 
I exercise 
     
13. Other people think that I am too thin      
14. Am preoccupied with the thought of 
having fat on my body 
     
15. Take longer than others to eat my 
meals 
     
16. Avoid foods with sugar in them      
17. Eat diet foods      
18. Feel that food controls my life      
19. Display self-control around food      
20. Feel that others pressure me to eat      
21. Give too much time and thought to 
food 
     
22. Feel uncomfortable after eating sweets      
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23. Engage in dieting behavior      
24. Like my stomach to be empty      
25. Enjoy trying new rich foods      
26. Have the impulse to vomit after meals      
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APPENDIX J 
 
THE CENTER FOR EPIDEMIOLOGIC STUDIES DEPRESSION SCALE-SHORT FORM 
 
Instructions: Below is a list of the ways you might have felt or behaved. Please tell me how 
often you have felt this way during the past two weeks. 
 
Item 1 
Rarely or 
none of the 
time (less 
than 1 day) 
2 
Some or a 
little of the 
time (1-2 
days) 
3 
Occasionally or a 
moderate amount of 
the time (3-4 days) 
4 
Most or 
all of the 
time (5-7 
days) 
1. I was bothered by 
things that usually don’t 
bother me. 
    
2. I felt that I could not 
shake off the blues even 
with help from my 
family or friends.  
    
3. I felt I was just as 
good as other people. 
    
4. I had trouble keeping 
my mind on what I was 
doing. 
    
5. I felt that everything I 
did was an effort. 
    
6. I felt hopeful about 
the future. 
    
7. I felt like my life had 
been a failure. 
    
8. I felt fearful.     
9. I felt lonely.     
10. People were 
unfriendly. 
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APPENDIX K 
 
THE FEMALE SEXUAL FUNCTION INDEX 
 
Instructions: Please choose a response for each of the following statements. Please answer 
honesty; there are no right or wrong answers. 
 
“Sexual activity” can refer to any activity that you consider sexual, solo or with a partner(s), 
including but not limited to sexual intercourse. 
 
1. Using this definition of sexual activity, do you consider yourself currently sexually 
active? 
• Yes 
• No 
 
2. Using this definition of sexual activity, would you consider yourself sexually active at 
sometime in the past? 
• Yes 
• No 
 
Please use the following scale for the next four questions: 
 
1    = Almost never or never 
2    = A few times (less than half of the time) 
3    = Sometimes (about half the time) 
4    = Most times (more than half the time) 
5    = Almost always or always 
 
Item 1 
Almost 
never or 
never 
2 
A few 
times 
(less than 
half of the 
time) 
3 
Sometimes 
(about half 
the time) 
4 
Most 
times 
(more 
than half 
the time) 
5 
Almost 
always or 
always 
3. Generally, how often 
do you feel sexual desire 
or interest? 
     
4. Generally, how often 
do you feel sexually 
aroused (“turned on”) 
during sexual activity? 
     
5. Generally, how often 
are you satisfied with 
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your arousal 
(excitement) during 
sexual activity? 
6. Generally, when you 
have sexual stimulation 
or activity, how often do 
you reach orgasm 
(climax)? 
     
 
Please use the following scale for the next two questions: 
 
1    = Very high 
2 = High 
3 = Moderate 
4 = Low 
5 = Very low or none at all 
 
Item 1 
Very 
high 
2 
High 
3 
Moderate 
4 
Low 
5 
Very low or 
none at all 
7. Generally, how would you rate your 
level (degree) of sexual desire or 
interest? 
     
8. Generally, how would you rate your 
level of arousal (“turn on”) during sexual 
activity? 
     
 
9.    Generally, how confident are you about becoming sexually aroused during sexual 
activity? 
• Very low or no confidence 
• Low confidence 
• Moderate confidence 
• High confidence 
• Very high confidence 
 
10. Generally, when you have sexual stimulation or activity, how difficult is it for you to 
reach orgasm (climax)? 
• Extremely difficult or impossible 
• Very difficult 
• Difficult 
• Slightly difficult 
• Not difficult 
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11. Generally, how satisfied are you with your ability to reach orgasm (climax) during sexual 
activity? 
• Very dissatisfied 
• Moderately dissatisfied 
• About equally satisfied and dissatisfied 
• Moderately satisfied 
• Very satisfied 
 
12. Generally, how satisfied are you with your overall sexual life? 
• Very dissatisfied 
• Moderately dissatisfied 
• About equally satisfied and dissatisfied 
• Moderately satisfied 
• Very satisfied 
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APPENDIX L 
 
THE FRIEBURG MINDFULNESS INVENTORY-SHORT FORM 
 
Instructions: Thanks very much for all your effort! 
 
Item 1 
Rarely 
2 
Occasionally 
3 
Fairly 
often 
4 
Almost 
always 
1. I am open to the experience of the 
present moment. 
    
2. I sense my body, whether eating, 
cooking, cleaning, or talking. 
    
3. When I notice an absence of mind, I 
gently return to the experience of the here 
and now. 
    
4. I am able to appreciate myself.     
5. I pay attention to what’s behind my 
actions. 
    
6. I see my mistakes and difficulties 
without judging them. 
    
7. I feel connected to my experience in the 
here-and-now. 
    
8. I accept unpleasant experiences.     
9. I am friendly to myself when things go 
wrong. 
    
10. I watch my feelings without getting lost 
in them. 
    
11. In difficult situations, I can pause 
without immediately responding. 
    
12. I experience moments of inner peace 
and ease, even when things get hectic and 
stressful. 
    
13. I am impatient with myself and with 
others. 
    
14. I am able to smile when I notice how I 
sometimes make life difficult. 
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APPENDIX M 
 
THE SELF-COMPASSION SCALE—SHORT FORM 
 
Instructions: Please indicate how often you feel or behave in the following ways. 
 
Item 1 
Almost 
never 
2 
 
3 
Sometimes 
4 
 
5 
Almost 
always 
1. When I fail at something important to me I 
become consumed by feelings of inadequacy. 
     
2. I try to be understanding and patient towards 
those aspects of my personality I don’t like. 
     
3. When something painful happens I try to 
take a balanced view of the situation. 
     
4. When I’m feeling down I tend to feel like 
most other people are probably happier than I 
am. 
     
5. I try to see my failings as part of the human 
condition. 
     
6. When I’m going through a very hard time, I 
give myself the caring and tenderness I need. 
     
7. When something upsets me I try to keep my 
emotions in balance. 
     
8. When I fail at something that’s important to 
me I tend to feel alone in my failure. 
     
9. When I’m feeling down I tend to obsess and 
fixate on everything that’s wrong. 
     
10. When I feel inadequate in some way, I try 
to remind myself that feelings of inadequacy 
are shared by most people. 
     
11. I’m disapproving and judgmental about my 
own flaws and inadequacies. 
     
12. I’m intolerant and impatient towards those 
aspects of my personality I don’t like. 
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APPENDIX N 
 
AMOS PROPOSED MODEL OF THE MEDIATING ROLE OF THE THREE 
DIMENSIONS OF FLOW IN OBJECTIFICATION THEORY 
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APPENDIX O 
AMOS RETAINED MODEL OF THE MEDIATING ROLE OF THE THREE 
DIMENSIONS OF FLOW IN OBJECTIFICATION THEORY 
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APPENDIX P 
 
AMOS MODIFIED PROPOSED MODEL OF THE MODERATING ROLE OF 
DISPOSITIONAL MINDFULNESS IN OBJECTIFICATION THEORY  
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APPENDIX Q 
AMOS RETAINED MODEL OF THE MODERATING ROLE OF DISPOSITIONAL 
MINDFULNESS IN OBJECTIFICATION THEORY 
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APPENDIX R 
AMOS MODIFIED PROPOSED MODEL OF THE MODERATING ROLE OF SELF-
COMPASSION IN OBJECTIFICATION THEORY
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APPENDIX S 
AMOS RETAINED MODEL OF THE MODERATING ROLE OF SELF-COMPASSION 
IN OBJECTIFICATION THEORY  
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